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“REDEEMER” AND “REDEMPTION”¹

There is no one of the titles of Christ which is more precious to Christian hearts than “Redeemer.” There are others, it is true, which are more often on the lips of Christians. The acknowledgment of our submission to Christ as our Lord, the recognition of what we owe to Him as our Saviour,—these things, naturally, are most frequently expressed in the names we call Him by. “Redeemer,” however, is a title of more intimate revelation than either “Lord” or “Saviour.” It gives expression not merely to our sense that we have received salvation from Him, but also to our appreciation of what it cost Him to procure this salvation for us. It is the name specifically of the Christ of the cross. Whenever we pronounce it, the cross is placarded before our eyes and our hearts are filled with loving remembrance not only that Christ has given us salvation, but that He paid a mighty price for it.

It is a name, therefore, which is charged with deep emotion, and is to be found particularly in the language of devotion. Christian song is vocal with it. How it appears in Christian song, we may see at once from old William Dunbar’s invocation, “My King, my Lord, and my Redeemer sweet.” Or even from Shakespeare’s description of a lost loved-one as “The precious image of our dear Redeemer.” Or from Christina Rossetti’s,

“Up Thy Hill of Sorrows
Thou all alone,
Jesus, man’s Redeemer,
Climbing to a Throne.”

¹ Opening Address, delivered in Miller Chapel, Princeton Theological Seminary, September 17, 1915. Some references and explanatory notes have been added.

Best of all perhaps from Henry Vaughan's ode which he inscribes "To my most merciful, my most loving, and dearly-loved REDEEMER; the ever blessed, the only HOLY and JUST ONE, JESUS CHRIST, *The Son of the living God, and the Sacred Virgin Mary,*" and in which he sings to

"My dear Redeemer, the world's light,
And life too, and my heart's delight."

Terms of affection gather to it. Look into your hymns. Fully eight and twenty of those in our own *Hymnal* celebrate our Lord under the name of "Redeemer."²

Let our whole soul an offering be
To our Redeemer's Name;
While we pray for pardoning grace
Through our Redeemer's Name;
Almighty Son, Incarnate Word,
Our Prophet, Priest, Redeemer, Lord;
To that dear Redeemer's praise
Who the covenant sealed with blood;
O for a thousand tongues to sing
My dear Redeemer's praise;
To our Redeemer's glorious Name
Awake the sacred song;
Intercessor, Friend of sinners,
Earth's Redeemer, plead for me;
All hail, Redeemer, hail,
For Thou hast died for me;
Listen to the wondrous story
Of our great Redeemer's birth;
Guide where our infant Redeemer is laid;
My dear Redeemer and my Lord;
All glory, laud and honor
To Thee Redeemer, King;
Your Redeemer's conflict see;

² The references are (by Hymns and Verses): 52.3; 54.2; 59.2; 73.3; 147. 1; 148.1; 150. 3; 162. 4; 172. 6; 190. 1, 5; 197. 1; 216. 1; 218. 1; 239. 3; 276. 1; 293. 3; 300. 1; 311.2; 331. 3; 401. 4; 445. 3; 454. 3; 476. 5; 555. 1; 569. 3; 593. 2; 649. 2; 651. 1.

Maker and Redeemer,
 Life and Health of all;
 Our blest Redeemer, ere He breathed
 His tender, last farewell;
 Here the Redeemer's welcome voice
 Spreads heavenly grace around;
 The church our blest Redeemer saved
 With His own precious blood;
 The slain, the risen Son,
 Redeemer, Lord alone;
 The path our dear Redeemer trod
 May we, rejoicing, tread;
 Till o'er our ransomed nature
 The Lamb for sinners slain,
 Redeemer, King, Creator,
 In bliss returns to reign;
 O the sweet wonders of that cross
 Where my Redeemer loved and died;
 Once, the world's Redeemer, dying,
 Bore our sins upon the Tree;
 Redeemer, come: I open wide
 My heart to thee;
 I know that my Redeemer lives;
 For, every good
 In the Redeemer came;
 A heart resigned, submissive, meek,
 My great Redeemer's throne;
 Jesus, merciful Redeemer;
 Father, and Redeemer, hear.

From our earliest childhood the preciousness of this title has been impressed upon us. In *The Shorter Catechism*, as the most precise and significant designation of Christ, from the point of view of what He has done for us, it takes the place of the more usual "Saviour," which never occurs in that document. Thus there is permanently imprinted on the hearts of us all, the great fact that "the only Redeemer of God's elect is the Lord Jesus Christ"; through whom, in

the execution of His offices of a Prophet, of a Priest, and of a King, God delivers us out of the estate of sin and misery and brings us into an estate of salvation.³ The same service is performed for our sister, Episcopalian, communion by its *Book of Common Prayer*. The title "Redeemer" is applied in it to Christ about a dozen times:⁴

O God the Son, Redeemer of the world;
 Our blessed Saviour and Redeemer;
 Joyfully receive Him for our Redeemer;
 Jesus Christ, our Mediator and Redeemer;
 The merits of our Saviour and Redeemer;
 O Lord, our Saviour and Redeemer;
 Jesus Christ, our only Saviour and Redeemer;
 Our Redeemer and the author of everlasting life;
 Our Redeemer and the author of everlasting life;
 O Lord our strength and our Redeemer;
 Only Mediator and Redeemer.

This constant pregnant use of the title "Redeemer" to express our sense of what we owe to Christ, has prevailed in the Church for, say, a millennium and a half. It comes with a little shock of surprise to learn that it has not always prevailed. In the first age of the Church, however, the usage had not become so characteristic of Christians as to stamp itself upon their literary remains. So far as appears, the first occurrence of the epithet "Redeemer" as applied to Christ in extant Christian literature is in Justin Martyr's *Dialogue with Trypho the Jew*, which was written about the middle of the second century.⁵ And it does not seem to occur frequently for a couple of centuries more.

³ Questions, 20 and 21.

⁴ According to the concordance of the (American) *Book of Common Prayer*, published by the Rev. J. Courtney Jones, 1898. The actual number, as will be seen, is eleven.

⁵ *Dial.* 30. 3: "For we call Him Helper (*Βοηθόν*) and Redeemer (*Λυτρωτήν*), the power of whose name even the Demons do fear"; cf. 83.3. Justin is applying to Christ the language of Ps. xviii. 15 (LXX: E. V. xix. 14). *Λυτρωτής* occurs in the LXX only at Ps. xviii. 15 and Ps. lviii. (lviii.) 35.

This is not to say that it was not in use among Christians during this early period. When Eusebius opens the tenth Book of his *Church History* with the words, “Thanks for all things be given unto God the omnipotent Ruler and King of the universe, and the greatest thanks to Jesus Christ, the Saviour and Redeemer of our souls,” it is quite clear that he is not describing Christ by an unwonted name. Even more clear is it that Justin is not inventing a new name for Christ when he tells Trypho that Christians depend upon Jesus Christ to preserve them from the demons which they had served in the time of their heathenism, “for we call Him Helper and Redeemer, the power of whose name even the demons do fear.” Indeed, he explicitly tells us that the Christians were accustomed to employ this name of Christ: “we call Him Redeemer” he says. Nevertheless it seems hardly likely that so little trace of the use of this designation would have been left in the extant literature of the day, if it had occupied then quite the place it has occupied in later ages. This applies also to the New Testament. For, despite the prominence in the New Testament of the idea of redemption wrought by Christ, the designation “Redeemer” is not once applied to Christ in the New Testament. The word “Redeemer” occurs, indeed, only a single time in the New Testament, and then as a title of Moses, not of Christ,—although it is applied to Moses only as a type of Christ and presupposes its employment of Christ.⁶

The comparative rarity of the use of this title of Christ in the first age of the Church is probably due, in part at least, to the intense concreteness of the Greek term (*Λυτρωτής*) which our “Redeemer” represents, and the definiteness with which it imputes a particular function to our Lord, as Saviour. This gave it a sharply analytical character, which, perhaps, militated against its adoption into wide devotional use until the analytical edges had been

* Acts vii. 35; cf. H. A. W. Meyer and J. A. Alexander *in loc.* Christ is called “Deliverer” only once in the New Testament (Rom. xi. 26) and then by an adaptation of an Old Testament passage.

softened a little by habit. A parallel may perhaps be found in the prevalence in the New Testament of the locution, "He died in our behalf" over the more analytically exact, "He died in our stead." The latter occurs; occurs frequently enough to show that it expresses the fact as it lay in the minds of the New Testament writers. But these writers expressed themselves instinctively rather in the former mode because it was a more direct expression of the sense of benefit received, which was the overpowering sentiment which filled their hearts. That Christ died instead of them was the exact truth, analytically stated; that He died for their sake was the broad fact which suffused their hearts with loving emotion.

The word "Redeemer" is of course of Latin origin, and we owe it, together with its cognates "redemption," "redeem," "redeemed," to the nomenclature of Latin theology, and ultimately to the Latin Bible. These Latin words, however, do not, at their best, exactly reproduce the group of Greek words which they represent in the New Testament, although they are underlaid by the same fundamental idea of purchase. Etymologically, *redimo*, 'redeem,' means to buy *back*, while the Greek term which it renders in the New Testament (*λυτροῦσθαι*) means rather to buy *out*, or, to employ its exact equivalent, to *ransom*. Our English word "ransom" is, of course, philologically speaking, only a doublet of "redemption." But, in losing the significant form of that word, it has more completely than that word lost also the suggestion that the purchase which it intimates is a re-purchase. It might have been better, therefore, if, instead of "redemption," "to redeem," "redeemed," "redeemer," we had employed as the representatives of the Greek terms (*λυτροῦσθαι*, *λύτρωσις*, *ἀπολύτρωσις*, *λυτρωτής*) "ransom," "to ransom," "ransomed," "ransomer."

Of these, only the noun, "ransom" has actually a place in the English New Testament,—in the great passage in which our Lord Himself declares that He "came, not to be ministered unto but to minister, and to give His life a ransom

for many" (Mat. xx. 28 = Mk. x. 45), and in its echo in the scarcely less great declaration of Paul that the one mediator between God and men, Himself man, Christ Jesus, "gave Himself a ransom for all" (1 Tim. ii. 6). Nevertheless these terms, emphatically defining, like the Greek terms which they represent, the work of Christ in terms of ransoming, have made a place for themselves in the language of Christian devotion only a little inferior to that of those which somewhat less exactly define it in terms of redeeming. The noun of agent, "Ransomer", is used, it is true, comparatively rarely; although its use, as a designation of Christ, seems actually to have preceded in English literature that of "Redeemer," or even of its forerunner, the now obsolete "Redemptor." The earliest citation for "Redeemer" given by the *Oxford Dictionary*, at all events, comes from the middle of the fifteenth century⁷—of "Redemptor" from the late fourteenth⁸—while "Ransomer" is cited from the *Cursor Mundi*, some half a century earlier: "Christ and king and ransconer . . ." "Ransomer" is found side by side with "Redeemer" in William Dunbar's verses at the opening of the sixteenth century: "Thy Ransonner with woundis fyve"; and is placed literally by its side by John Foxe in the *Book of Martyrs* in the middle of that century, apparently as more closely defining the nature of the saving act of Him whom Foxe calls "the onlie sauior, redeemer and ransomer of them which were lost in Adam our forefather."

The other forms have, however, been more widely used in all ages of English literature. The character of their earlier use may be illustrated again from William Dunbar who tells us that "the heaven's King is clad in our nature, Us from the death with ransom to redress"; or from a couple of very similar instances from even earlier verses.

⁷ "1432-50, tr. *Higden* (Rolls) viii, 201: 'A man . . . havyng wounds in his body lyke to the woundes of Criste, seyinge that he was redemer of man'."

⁸ "1377, Langland: 'And after his resurrecioun Redemptor was his name'."

In one, Christ is described as Him "that deyid up on the rood, To raunsoun synfull creature."⁹ In the other He is made Himself to say

"Vpon a crosse nayled I was for the,
Soffred deth to pay the rawnison."¹⁰

Milton, our theological poet by way of eminence, not only speaks of Christ as, in rising, raising with Himself, "His brethren, ransom'd with His own dear life," but discriminatingly describes Him as "man's friend, his mediator, his design'd both ransom and redeemer voluntarie." "We learn with wonder," says Cowper, almost in Milton's manner, "how this world began, who made, who marr'd, and who has ransom'd man." Or, coming at once to our own days Tennyson can put upon the lips of a penitent sinner, the desire to minister (as he expresses it) "to poor sick people, richer in His eyes who ransom'd us, and haler too, than I." Let us appeal, however, again to our hymns.

Surprisingly few instances appear, in the hymns gathered in our own *Hymnal* at least, of the use of the noun "ransom," for which direct warrant is given in the text of our English New Testament. Only, it appears, these three:¹¹

Father of heaven, whose love profound
A ransom for our souls hath found;
I'd sing the precious blood He spilt
My ransom from the dreadful guilt
Of sin and wrath divine;
Jesus, all our ransom paid,
All Thy Father's will obeyed,
Hear us, Holy Jesus.

But as over against the dozen times that the word "redeemed" occurs¹² in this *Hymnal*, we have counted no

⁹ *Oxford Dictionary*, *sub voc.*: "1414, Brampton, *Penik Ps.* (Percy Society), 28."

¹⁰ *Political Poems*, etc. (ed. Furnivale), p. 111.

¹¹ 59. 1; 159. 2; 227. ii, 1. The verb "ransom", of course, also occurs (*e.g.* 141. 6); see below, note 14, for the form "ransomed".

¹² Redeemed, 55. 5; 88. 2; 130. 4; 150. 4; 172. 3; 236. 4; 336. 1; 383. 5;

fewer than twenty-two times in which the word “ransomed” occurs. In a couple of these instances, the two words stand together:¹³

He crowns thy life with love,
When ransomed from the grave;
He that redeemed my soul from hell,
Hath sovereign power to save.

And when, redeemed from sin and hell,
With all the ransomed throng I dwell.

The others run as follows:¹⁴

Then be His love in Christ proclaimed
With all our ransomed powers;
Ransomed, healed, restored, forgiven,
Who like me His praise should sing;
Sing on your heavenly way,
Ye ransomed sinners, sing;
Ye ransomed from the fall,
Hail Him who saves you by His grace;
Bring our ransomed souls at last
Where they need no star to guide;
One, the light of God’s own presence
O’er His ransomed people shed;
A wretched sinner, lost to God,
But ransomed by Emanuel’s blood;
Thy ransomed host in glory;
My ransomed soul shall be
Through all eternity
Offered to thee;
Our ransomed spirits rise to Thee;

396. 2; 453. 5; 546. 1; 642. 1. Consult, however, the following also: Redeeming, 81.1; 179. 3; 223. 5; 332. 2; 402. 2; 441. 4; 470. 2; 609. 1; Redemption, 141. 4; 152. 2; 258. 4; 259. 1; 264. 1; 265. 4; 394. 1; 395. 1; 406. 2; 435. 4.

¹³ 130. 4; 453. 5.

¹⁴ 132. 4; 134. 1; 154. 4; 157. 4; 189. 4; 303. 2; 325. 2; 354. 4; 375. 4; 390. 4; 395. 5; 399. 2; 401. 4; 420. 3; 421. 7; 441. 3; 444. 1; 512. 2; 636. 4.

Let none whom He hath ransomed fail to greet Him;
When we, a ransomed nation,
 Thy scepter shall obey;
Till o'er our ransomed nature
 The Lamb for sinners slain,
Redeemer, King, Creator,
 In bliss returns to reign;
Till all our ransomed number
 Fall down before the throne;
Blessed are the sons of God,
They are bought with Christ's own blood,
They are ransomed from the grave;
Till all the ransomed church of God
 Be saved to sin no more;
Thy blood, O Lord, was shed
 That I might ransomed be;
Where streams of living water flow
 My ransomed soul He leadeth;
His laud and benediction
Thy ransomed people raise.

It does not appear, then, that Christian emotion would have found any more difficulty in gathering about the term "ransom" and its derivatives, and consecrating them as the channel of its expression, than it has found in gathering around and consecrating "redeem" and its derivatives. Had these terms taken their proper place in our English New Testament as the exact renderings of the Greek terms now less precisely rendered by "redeem" and its derivatives, and had they from the English New Testament entered into our familiar Christian speech, there is no reason to doubt that "Christ our Ransomer" would now be as precious to the Christian heart as "Christ our Redeemer" is. There is certainly no one who will not judge with old John Brown that "a Ransomer", especially one who has ransomed us "at such a rate," "will be most tender" of His ransomed ones;¹⁵

¹⁵ John Brown, *Life of Faith in Time of Trial and Affliction*, etc., 1678 (ed. 1726, p. 161; ed. 1824, p. 129): "And sure a Ransomer who

and His ransomed ones, realizing what His ransoming of them involved, may be trusted—if we may take the language of our hymns as indications—to speak of Him with the deepest gratitude and love. Nor should we consider it a small gain that then the sense of the New Testament representations would have been conveyed to us more precisely and with their shades of meaning and stresses of emphasis more clearly and sharply presented. After all said, the New Testament does not set forth the saving work of Christ as a redemption, but as a ransoming; and does not present Him to us therefore so much as our Redeemer as as our Ransomer; and it is a pity that we have been diverted by the channels through which we have historically received our religious phraseology from the adoption and use in our familiar speech of the more exact terminology.

One of the gains which would have accrued to us had this more exact terminology become our current mode of speech concerning our Lord's saving action, is that we should then have been measurably preserved from a danger which has accompanied the use of "redeem" and its derivatives to describe it—a danger which has nowadays become very acute—of dissipating in our thought of it all that is distinctive in our Lord's saving action. We are not saying, of course, that "ransom," any more than other terms, is immune from that disease of language by which, in the widening application of terms, they suffer a progressive loss of their distinctive meaning. But "ransom" has, in point of fact, retained with very great constancy its intrinsic connotation of purchase. It may possibly be that, in an extreme extension of its application, it is occasionally employed in the loose sense of merely "to rescue." The *Standard Dictionary* gives that as one of its definitions, marking it as "archaic"; though the *Oxford Dictionary* supplies no citations supporting it. At all events, the word does not readily lend itself to evacuating extensions of application;

hath purchased many persons to himself, at such a Rate, will be most tender of them, and will not take it well, that any wrong them."

and when we say "to ransom" our minds naturally fix themselves on a price paid as the means of the deliverance intimated. The word is essentially a modal word; it emphasizes the means by which the effect it intimates is accomplished, and does not exhaust itself merely in declaring the effect. The same, of course, may be said in principle of "redeem." But this word has suffered far more from attrition of meaning than "ransom," and indeed had already lost the power inevitably to suggest purchase before it was adopted into specifically Christian use. We shall not forget, of course, what we have just noted, that "ransom" and "redeem" are at bottom one word; that they are merely two English forms of the Latin *redimo*. It is, no doubt, inexact, therefore, to speak of the usage of the Latin *redimo* and its derivatives as if it belonged to the early history of "redeem" more than to that of "ransom." Nevertheless it is convenient and not really misleading to do so, when we have particularly in mind the use of the two words in Christian devotional speech. "To redeem" has come into our English New Testament and our English religious usage in direct and continuous descent from its previous usage in Latin religious speech and the Latin Bible; while "to ransom" has come in from without, bringing with it its own set of implications, fixed through a separate history. And what needs to be said is that "to ransom" has quite firmly retained its fixed sense of securing a release by the payment of a price, while "to redeem" had already largely lost this sense when it was first applied in the Latin New Testament to render Greek terms, the very soul of which was this intimation of the payment of a price, and needed to reacquire this emphasis through the influence of these terms shining through it; and that it moreover continues to be employed in general usage today in very wide and undistinctive senses which naturally react more or less injuriously upon the particular meaning which it is employed in Christian usage to convey.¹⁶

¹⁶ When R. C. Trench, *The Study of Words*, ed. 15, 1874, p. 312, coun-

The Latin verb *redimo* already in its classical usage was employed not only, in accordance with its composition, in the sense of “to buy back,” and not merely more broadly in the sense of “to buy,”—whether to “buy off” or “to buy up”; but, also in more extended applications still, in the senses simply of “to release” or “rescue,” “to acquire” or “obtain,” or even “to obviate” or “avert.” It had acquired, indeed, a special sense of “to undertake,” “to contract,” “to hire” or “to farm.” In accordance with this special sense, its derivative, *redemptor*, in all periods of the language, was used, as the synonym of the less common *conductor*, of a contractor, undertaker, purveyor, farmer,—as when Cicero speaks of the *redemptor* who had contracted to build a certain column, or Pliny of the *redemptor* who farmed the tolls of a bridge. When Christ was called the *Redemptor*, then, there was some danger that the notion conveyed to Latin ears might be nearer that which is conveyed to us by a Sponsor or a Surety (the seventeenth century divines spoke freely of Christ as our “Undertaker”) than that of a Ransomer; and this danger was obviated only by the implication of the Greek terms which this and its companion Latin terms represented and by which, and the contexts natural to them, they were held to their more native significance, not, indeed, of buying back, but of buying off. The persistence of the secular use of these terms, parallel with the religious, but with a more or less complete neglect of their original implication of purchase—through the whole period of their use in Latin, and later of the use of their descendants in English—has constituted a perpetual danger that they would, by assimilation, lose their specific implication of purchase in their religious usage also. Obviously in these circumstances they cannot throw up an effective barrier against the elimination from them of the idea of purchase even in their religious applications, on the

sels the school-teacher to insist both on the idea of *purchase*, and on that of purchasing *back*, in all usages of Redemption, he is indulging in an etymological purism which the general use of the word will not sustain.

setting in of any strong current of thought and feeling in that direction. Men who have ceased to think of the work of Christ in terms of purchasing, and to whom the whole conception of His giving His life for us as a ransom, or of His pouring out His blood as a price paid for our sins, has become abhorrent, feel little difficulty, therefore, in still speaking of Him as our Redeemer, and of His work as a Redemption, and of the Christianity which He founded as a Redemptive Religion. The ideas connected with purchase are not so inseparably attached to these terms in their instinctive thought that the linguistic feeling is intolerably shocked by the employment of them with no implication of this set of ideas. Such an evacuation of these great words, the vehicles thus far of the fundamental Christian confession, of their whole content as such, is now actually going on about us. And the time may be looked forward to in the near future when the words "Redeemer" "redemption" "redeem" shall have ceased altogether to convey the ideas which it has been thus far their whole function in our religious terminology to convey.

What has thus been going on among us has been going on at a much more rapid pace in Germany, and the process has reached a much more advanced stage there than here. German speech was much less strongly fortified against it than ours. It has been the misfortune of the religious terminology of Germany, that the words employed by it to represent the great ransoming language of the New Testament are wholly without native implication of purchase. Redeem, redemption, Redeemer, at least in their fundamental etymological suggestion, say purchase as emphatically as the Greek terms, built up around the notion of ransom, which they represent; and they preserve this implication in a large section of their usage. The German *erlösen*, *Erlösung*, *Erlöser*, on the contrary, contain no native suggestion of purchase whatever; and are without any large secular usage in which such an implication is dis-

tinctly conveyed.¹⁷ They mean in themselves just deliver, ✓ deliverance, Deliverer, and they are employed nowhere, apart from their religious application, with any constant involvement of the mode in which the deliverance is effected. One of their characteristic usages, we are told by Jacob Grimm, is as the standing expression in the *Märchen* for the act of disenchanting (equivalent to *entzaubern*); in such phrases, for example, as "the princess is now *erlöst*," "the serpent can be *erlöst* by a kiss," "at twelve o'clock they were all *erlöst*."¹⁸ If you will turn over the pages of the brother Grimm's *Kinder- und Haus-Märchen*, you will come about the middle of the book¹⁹ upon the tale of *The King of the Golden Mountain*, and may read in it of how a young merchant's son comes one day to a magnificent castle and finds in it nothing but a serpent. "The serpent, however," we read on, "was a bewitched maiden, who rejoiced when she saw him and said to him, 'Art thou come, my *Erlöser*? I have already waited twelve years for thee, this kingdom is bewitched and thou must *erlösen* it.'" A still more instructive passage may be met with a few pages earlier, in the tale of *The Lark*.²⁰ There, when the traveller found himself in the clutches of a lion, he begged to be permitted to

¹⁷ Kluge, in his etymological dictionary of the German language, under "er-", tells us it is the new-high-German equivalent of the old-high-German "ir-", "ar-", "ur-", and refers us to the emphasized "ur-" for information. Under that form, he tells us that "er-" is the unemphasized form of the prefix, and adds: "The prefix means *aus*, *ursprünglich*, *anfänglich*." Thus it appears that *erlösen* is a weaker way of saying *auslösen*; and the usage bears that out, *auslösen* tending to suggest "extirpation", *erlösen*, "deliverance". By this feeling, apparently, G. Hollmann, *Die Bedeutung des Todes Jesu*, 1901, pp. 108-9, is led to parallel *Auslösung* with *Loskaufung* as strong terms in contrast with *Erlösung* paralleled with *Befreiung*. The Greek equivalents of *erlösen* and *auslösen* are ἀπολύειν and ἐκλύειν, both of which are found in the New Testament, but elsewhere in senses more significant for our purposes. In the *Iliad* ἀπολύειν (like the simple λύειν) bears even the acquired sense of "to ransom". It is interesting to note that in Job xix. 25, for "my Redeemer" (יְהוָה), the LXX reads ὁ ἐκλύειν με.

¹⁸ *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, III. 1862, *sub. voc.*

¹⁹ See pp. 364, 367-8.

²⁰ See pp. 340, 342.

ransom (*loskaufen*) himself with a great sum, and so to save (*retten*) himself; but the lion himself, who was, of course, an enchanted prince, was—at the proper time and by the proper means—neither ransomed nor saved, but simply *erlöst*. *Erlösen*, *Erlösung*, *Erlöser* of themselves awaken in the consciousness of the hearer no other idea than that of deliverance; and although, in religious language, they may have acquired suggestions of purchase by association—through their employment as the representatives of the Greek terms of ransoming and the contexts of thought into which they have thus been brought,—these do not belong to them intrinsically and fall away at once when external supports are removed.

We cannot feel surprise accordingly, when we meet in recent German theological discussion—as we repeatedly do—an express distinction drawn between *Loskaufung*, “ransoming,” as a narrow term intimating the manner in which a given deliverance is effected, and *Erlösung*, “deliverance,” as a broad term, declaring merely the fact of deliverance, with no intimation whatever of the mode by which it is effected. Thus, for example, Paul Ewald commenting on Eph. i. 7, remarks²¹ that there is no reason why ἀπολύτρωσις should be taken there as meaning, “ransoming” (*Loskaufung*), rather than “in the more general sense of *Erlösung*,” that is to say, of “deliverance.” Similarly A. Seeberg speaks²² of ἀπολύτρωσις as having lost in the New Testament its etymological significance, and come to mean, as he says, “nothing more than *Erlösung*,” that is, “deliverance.” And again G. Hollmann declares²³ that the Hebrew verb פָּדָה while meaning literally “to ransom” (*loskaufen*), yet, in the majority of the passages in which

²¹ *Kommentar zum N. T. herausgegeben von T. Zahn*, x. 1905, p. 7 note. So also Zahn himself in vol. vi, 1-2 p. 181, note 52 (cf. also p. 179, note 50): “Accordingly, λύτρωσις, *Loskaufung*, Lev. xxv. 48, Plut. Aratus, 11; in the wider sense, ‘deliverance’, *Erlösung*, Ps. xi. 9, Lk. i. 68, ii. 38. Heb. ix. 12; 1 Clem. xii. 7.”

²² *Der Tod Christi*, etc., 1905, p. 218.

²³ *Die Bedeutung des Todes Jesu*, etc., 1901, pp. 102, 108-9.

it occurs, means simply 'to liberate,' 'to deliver' (*befreien*, *erlösen*); that is to say, "to free," "to liberate," and not "to ransom," are in his mind synonymous with *erlösen*. We are not concerned for the moment with the rightness, or the wrongness, of the opinions expressed by these writers with respect to the meaning of the Biblical terms which they are discussing. What concerns us now is only that, in endeavoring to fix their meaning, these writers expressly discriminate the term *erlösen* from *loskaufen*, and expressly assign to it the wide meaning "to deliver", and thus bring it into exact synonymy with such other non-modal words as "to free," "to liberate." We may speculate as to what might have been the effect on the course of German religious thought if, from the beginning, some exact reproductions of the Greek words built up around the idea of ransom—such as say *loskaufen*, *Loskaufung*, *Loskauffer*,—had been adopted as their representatives in the pages of the German New Testament, and, consequent upon that, in the natural expression of the religious thought and feeling of German Christians. But we can scarcely doubt that it has been gravely injurious to it, that, in point of fact, a loose terminology, importing merely deliverance, has taken the place of the more exact Greek terms, in the expression of religious thought and feeling; and thus German Christians have been habituated to express their conceptions of Christ's saving act in language which left wholly unnoted the central fact that it was an act of purchase.

The way to the reversion which has thus taken place of late in German religious speech, from the narrower significance which had long been attached in Christian usage to the word *Erlösung*, "ransoming," to its wider, native sense, "deliverance," was led—like the way to so many other things which have acted disintegratingly upon Christian conceptions—by Schleiermacher. So, at least, Julius Kaftan tells us. "Schleiermacher," says he,²⁴ "explained the peculiar nature of Christianity by means of the notion of

²⁴ *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1908, 18, p. 238.

Erlösung. Christianity is the religion in which everything is related to the *Erlösung* accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth. It dates from this that the word is employed by us in a comprehensive sense. We say of the Lord that He is our *Erlöser*. We sum up what He has brought us in this word, *Erlösung*." Kaftan himself is of the opinion that justice is scarcely done to the definition of Christianity when it is thus identified with *Erlösung*, deliverance, taken in the wide, undifferentiated sense given it by Schleiermacher, and after him by the so-called "Liberal theology." A closer definition, he thinks, is needed. But it is very significant that he seeks this closer definition by emphasizing not the mode in which the deliverance is wrought, but rather the thing from which the deliverance is effected. "The word *Erlösung*," he says, "is of a *formal* nature. That it may have its full sense, there must be added *that from which* we are *erlöst*." This he declares is, in the Christian, the New Testament conception, the world. And so, he goes on to assert with great emphasis, "The fundamental idea of Christianity is *Erlösung* from the world."

We are not concerned here with the justice of the opinion thus expressed. We are not even concerned for the moment with the assimilation which results from this opinion of Christianity with certain other religions, the fundamental idea of which is deliverance from the world. We pause only in passing to note that Kaftan explicitly admits that it was "the history of religion which opened his eyes to the fact that in Christianity as in other religions of deliverance (*Erlösungsreligionen*) *Erlösung* from the world is the chief and fundamental conception." What we are for the moment interested in is the clearness with which Kaftan ascribes to the word *Erlösung* the wide sense of "deliverance," with no implication whatever of "ransoming." Christianity, it is said, like other religions of high grade, is an *Erlösungsreligion*, a religion of deliverance. "We have today," we read,²⁵ "attained a wider survey of the

²⁵ P. 239.

religious life of humanity, a wider one, I mean, than that of the older teachers. We have learned that even outside of Christianity, whether really or supposedly, there is something like *Erlösung* (deliverance). From this the arrangement has resulted, in the classification of religions, that we designate the highest stage of the religious life, that of the spiritual religions, also that of the *Erlösungsreligionen* (religions of deliverance). That is to say, there is a class of religions,—no doubt, it embraces only the highest, the spiritual, religions,—which may justly be called *Erlösungsreligionen*, religions of deliverance, and Christianity belongs to this class. When we speak of *Erlösung* with reference to Christianity, we mean the same kind of a thing which we mean when we speak of it with reference to these other religions. As one of the *Erlösungsreligionen* (religions of deliverance) Christianity like the rest offers man deliverance. In point of fact, the deliverance which Christianity offers, according to Kaftan, is just a subjective change of mind and heart; he can write currently such a phrase as "*Erlösung oder Wiedergeburt*" (deliverance or regeneration).²⁶ *Erlösung* (deliverance) in other words, as applied to describe the benefits conferred by Christianity, has come to mean for him just the better ethical life of Christians.

The classification of religions of which Kaftan avails himself in this discussion is derived ultimately from Hermann Siebeck, whose *Hand-book of the Philosophy of Religion* enjoys great vogue among Germans of Ritschlian tendency. This classification has not, however, commended itself universally. Many, like C. P. Tiele for example, strongly object to the distinguishing of a class of *Erlösungsreligionen* (religions of deliverance), which is placed at the apex of the series of religions. In reality, they say, all religions are *Erlösungsreligionen* (religions of deliverance). Precisely what religion is, always and everywhere, is a means of deliverance from some evil or other, felt as such. Does not the proverb say, *not lehrt beten*—a sense of need

²⁶ *Dogmatik*,³⁻⁴ p. 459.

is the mother of all religion?²⁷ The designation *Erlösungsreligionen* (religions of deliverance) has, however, evidently come to stay, whether it be taken discriminatingly as the designation of a particular class of religions, or merely descriptively as a declaration of the essential nature of all religions. And it is rapidly becoming the accepted way of speaking of Christianity to call it an *Erlösungsreligion*—a religion of deliverance,—whether it is meant thereby to assign it to a class or merely to indicate its nature. The point to be noted is that *Erlösung* is employed in these phrases in its looser native sense of deliverance, not in its narrower, acquired sense of ransoming. When Christianity is declared to be an *Erlösungsreligion* all that is meant is that it offers like all other religions, or very eminently like some other religions, a deliverance of some kind or other to men.

What gives this importance for us, is that these phrases have passed over from German into English, partly through the translation into English of the German books which employ them, partly by the adoption of the phrases themselves by native English writers for use in their own discussions. And in passing over into English, these phrases

²⁷ According to Rudolf Eucken, *Christianity and the New Idealism*, E. T., 1909, p. 115, "That which drives men to religion is the break with the world of their experience, the failure to find satisfaction in what the world offers or is able to offer." It is probably something like this that Henry Osborn Taylor, *Deliverance*, 1915, p. 5, means, when he says: "Evidently every 'religion' is a means of adjustment or deliverance." According to this all religions represent efforts of men to adjust themselves "to the fears and hopes of their natures", thus attaining peace or even "freedom of action in which they accomplish their lives". This "adjustment", Taylor speaks of as a "deliverance", that is to say, no doubt, deliverance from the discomfort of non-adjustment with its clogging effects on life. In this view religion is deliverance from conscious maladjustment of life. The implication is, apparently, that all men are to this extent conscious of being out of joint, in one way or another, with themselves or the universe in which they live, and struggle after adjustment. Thus religion arises, or rather the various religions, since they differ much both in the maladjustments they feel and their methods of correcting them. And there are even modes of adjustment which have been tried that cannot be called "religions."

have not been exactly rendered with a care to reproducing their precise sense in unambiguous English, but have been mechanically transferred into what are supposed to be the corresponding conventional English equivalents for the terms used.²⁸ Thus we have learned in these last days to speak very freely of "redemptive religions" or "religions of redemption," and it has become the fashion to describe Christianity as a "redemptive religion" or a "religion of redemption,"—while yet the conception which lies in the mind is not that of redemption in the precise sense, but that of deliverance in its broadest connotation. This loose German usage has thus infected our own, and is coöperating with the native influences at work in the same direction, to break down the proper implications of our English redemptive terminology.²⁹

You see, that what we are doing today as we look out upon our current religious modes of speech, is assisting at

²⁸ Thus, for example, Paul Wernle writes, *Die Anfänge unserer Religion*,² p. 106, of Paul's view of Christianity: "Es war ihm ganz Erlösungsreligion"; "Jesus Erlöser, nicht Gesetzgeber, das war seine Parole". W. M. Macgregor, *Christian Freedom*, 1914, p. 85, knowing what he is about, rightly translates: "To Paul Christianity was altogether a religion of deliverance." But the English translation of Wernle's book (*The Beginnings of Christianity*, 1903, I. p. 176) renders: "Christianity was entirely a religion of redemption for him": "Jesus the Redeemer, not the lawgiver, was his watchword." This is, of course, a truer description of Paul's actual point of view; but it is not what Wernle means to say of him. Similarly Rudolf Eucken constantly speaks of Christianity as an "ethical" or "moral" "Erlösungsreligion" and of the particular "Erlösungstat" to which, as such, it points us (e.g. *Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart*,⁴⁻⁵ 1912, pp. 124, 126, 129). His translators (*Christianity and the New Idealism*, 1909, pp. 114, 117, 119, 120) render as constantly "the religion of moral redemption", "act of redemption", although Eucken has no proper "redemption" whatever in mind,—as indeed the adjective "ethical", "moral" shows sufficiently clearly. An ethical revolution may be a deliverance but it is not properly a "redemption".

²⁹ For example, on the basis of this note: "Beyschlag ('N. T. Theol. II. 157) frankly takes ἀπολυτροῦν, ἐλευθεροῦν, ἐξαιρεῖν (Gal. i. 4), ἀγοράζειν as synonymous," W. M. Macgregor, *Christian Freedom*, 1914, p. 276, retires into the background of all of them all other notion than that of "Emancipation", that is, the notion of the weakest and least modal of them all.

the death bed of a word. It is sad to witness the death of any worthy thing,—even of a worthy word. And worthy words do die, like any other worthy thing—if we do not take good care of them. How many worthy words have already died under our very eyes, because we did not take care of them! Tennyson calls our attention to one of them. “The grand old name of gentleman,” he sings, “defamed by every charlatan, and soil’d with all ignoble use.” If you persist in calling people who are not gentlemen by the name of gentleman, you do not make them gentlemen by so calling them, but you end by making the word gentleman mean that kind of people. The religious terrain is full of the graves of good words which have died from lack of care—they stand as close in it as do the graves today in the flats of Flanders or among the hills of northern France. And these good words are still dying all around us. There is that good word “Evangelical.” It is certainly moribund, if not already dead. Nobody any longer seems to know what it means. Even our Dictionaries no longer know. Certainly there never was a more blundering, floundering attempt ever made to define a word than *The Standard Dictionary’s* attempt to define this word; and the *Century’s Dictionary* does little better. Adolf Harnack begins one of his essays with some paragraphs animadverting on the varied and confused senses in which the word “Evangelical” is used in Germany.³⁰ But he betrays no understanding whatever of the real source of a great part of this confusion. It is that the official name of the Protestant Church in a large part of Germany is “The Evangelical Church.” When this name was first acquired by that church it had a perfectly defined meaning, and described the church as that kind of a church. But having been once identified with that church, it has drifted with it into the bog. The habit of calling “Evangelical” everything which was from time to time characteristic of that church or which any strong party in that church wished to make characteristic of it—has

³⁰ *Aus Wissenschaft und Leben*, 1911, II. pp. 213 ff.

ended in robbing the term of all meaning. Along a somewhat different pathway we have arrived at the same state of affairs in America. Does anybody in the world know what "Evangelical" means, in our current religious speech? The other day, a professedly evangelical pastor, serving a church which is certainly committed by its formularies to an evangelical confession, having occasion to report in one of our newspapers on a religious meeting composed practically entirely of Unitarians and Jews, remarked with enthusiasm upon the deeply evangelical character of its spirit and utterances.

But we need not stop with "Evangelical." Take an even greater word. Does the word "Christianity" any longer bear a definite meaning? Men are debating on all sides of us what Christianity really is. Auguste Sabatier makes it out to be just altruism; Josiah Royce identifies it with the sentiment of loyalty; D. C. Macintosh explains it as nothing but morality. We hear of Christianity without dogma, Christianity without miracle, Christianity without Christ. Since, however, Christianity is a historical religion, an undogmatic Christianity would be an absurdity; since it is through and through a supernatural religion, a non-miraculous Christianity would be a contradiction; since it is Christianity, a Christless Christianity would be—well, let us say lamely (but with a lameness which has perhaps its own emphasis), a misnomer. People set upon calling unchristian things Christian are simply washing all meaning out of the name. If everything that is called Christianity in these days is Christianity, then there is no such thing as Christianity. A name applied indiscriminately to everything, designates nothing.

The words "Redeem," "Redemption," "Redeemer" are going the same way. When we use these terms in so comprehensive a sense—we are following Kaftan's phraseology—that we understand by "Redemption" whatever benefit we suppose ourselves to receive through Christ,—no matter what we happen to think that benefit is—and call Him

"Redeemer" merely in order to express the fact that we somehow or other relate this benefit to Him—no matter how loosely or unessentially—we have simply evacuated the terms of all meaning, and would do better to wipe them out of our vocabulary. Yet this is precisely how modern Liberalism uses these terms. Sabatier, who reduces Christianity to mere altruism, Royce who explains it in terms of loyalty, Macintosh who sees in it only morality—all still speak of it as a "Redemptive Religion," and all are perfectly willing to call Jesus still by the title of "Redeemer,"—although some of them at least are quite free to allow that He seems to them quite unessential to Christianity, and Christianity would remain all that it is, and just as truly a "Redemptive Religion," even though He had never existed.

I think you will agree with me that it is a sad thing to see words like these die like this. And I hope you will determine that, God helping you, you will not let them die thus, if any care on your part can preserve them in life and vigor. But the dying of the words is not the saddest thing which we see here. The saddest thing is the dying out of the hearts of men of the things for which the words stand. As ministers of Christ it will be your function to keep the things alive. If you can do that, the words which express the things will take care of themselves. Either they will abide in vigor; or other good words and true will press in to take the place left vacant by them. The real thing for you to settle in your minds, therefore, is whether Christ is truly a Redeemer to you, and whether you find an actual Redemption in Him,—or are you ready to deny the Master that bought you, and to count His blood an unholy thing? Do you realize that Christ is your Ransomer and has actually shed His blood for you as your ransom? Do you realize that your salvation has been bought, bought at a tremendous price, at the price of nothing less precious than blood, and that the blood of Christ, the Holy One of God? Or, go a step further: do you realize that this Christ who

has thus shed His blood for you is Himself your God? So the Scriptures teach.³¹

The blood of God outpoured upon the tree!
 So reads the Book. O mind, receive the thought,
 Nor helpless murmur thou hast vainly sought
 Thought-room within thee for such mystery.
 Thou foolish mindling! Do'st thou hope to see
 Undazed, untottering, all that God hath wrought?
 Before His mighty “shall,” thy little “ought”
 Be shamed to silence and humility!
 Come mindling, I will show thee what 'twere meet
 That thou shouldst shrink from marvelling, and flee
 As unbelievable,—nay, wonderingly,
 With dazed, but still with faithful praises, greet:
 Draw near and listen to this sweetest sweet,—
 Thy God, O mindling, shed His blood for *thee*!

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

³¹ Acts xx. 28, “Feed the church of God which He purchased with His own blood”. The reading “God” is, as F. J. A. Hort says, “assuredly genuine”, and the emphasis upon the blood being His own is very strong. There is no justification for correcting the text conjecturally, as Hort does, to avoid this. If the reading “Lord” were genuine, the meaning would be precisely the same: “Lord” is not a lower title than “God”, in such connections. 1 Cor. ii. 8, “They would not have crucified the Lord of Glory”, is an exact parallel.

WHAT IS A MIRACLE?

It need not surprise us that a somewhat widespread attempt is being made to reconstruct what is termed a "non-miraculous Christianity." We have witnessed the attempt to hold fast to a "Christless Christianity," and even to an atheistic Christianity which knows nothing of God, but adheres to the "spirit of Jesus." A "non-miraculous Christianity," therefore, might seem to be a mild type of the general tendency toward some form of a reduced Christianity.

But so soon as we speak of a reduced Christianity, we are brought at once to the necessity of a reconstructed Christianity and a critical manipulation of the sources. And this in turn is soon seen to depend upon an underlying philosophy or view of God and His relation to the world. In other words we cannot avoid coming to the task of historical criticism with certain presuppositions, and it is very necessary that this be made clear.

When we speak of a miracle, there are three questions which at once emerge. What is a miracle? Is a miracle possible? What is the nature and value of the evidence for miracles, especially the New Testament miracles. In general it may be said that the recent literature on the subject in England by Sanday, Davies, J. M. Thompson, Headlam, Lock, Holland, and others, is concerned for the most part with a discussion of the question of the evidence for the New Testament miracles. Mr. J. M. Thompson's book, *Miracles in the New Testament* (1911), in which he reached a negative conclusion, has been fully answered by E. O. Davies, *The Miracles of Jesus, A Study of the Evidence* (1913), which is a constructive treatment of the subject rather than a mere reply to Thompson. Already in 1911 some papers contributed to the *Guardian* by Lock, Sanday, Holland, Headlam, and Williams, were published in a book entitled *Miracles*. These papers deal mostly (except Williams') with the question of the evidence for miracles, and all but Sanday's are replies to Thompson.

In Germany, on the other hand, it may be said, generally speaking, that it is the question of the idea of a miracle and the possibility of miracles which has been uppermost in the recent literature on the subject by Beth, Hunzinger, Wendland, and Stange, whose views we shall have occasion to examine.

It might seem to be most interesting, timely, and practical, perhaps, to proceed at once to the examination of the evidence for the Biblical miracles. But this would be a wrong method of procedure. It is impossible to discuss intelligently the question of the possibility of miracles without first obtaining a clear idea of what a miracle is. And the question of the possibility of miracles, in turn, has played a determining rôle alike in influencing the discussion of the evidence for miracles as well as even the question of what a miracle is, so that it is necessary first of all to be clear upon the subject of the nature of a miracle and its possibility.

This can be made clear at once by examples. We need not concern ourselves with those who honestly and baldly assert that miracles are impossible, and so that they cannot have happened, and no amount of evidence could prove that a miracle had taken place.¹ It is more common for students of the evidence to claim that they admit the possibility of miracles and are objectively investigating evidence. But we often find that the *a priori* assumption of the impossibility of miracle in the strict sense, determines either their estimate of the evidence or their idea of what they will call a miracle. This can be illustrated from the case of Mr. Thompson and Dr. Sanday. To put the matter in a word—Mr. Thompson believes that a miracle happens through a breach of natural law and concludes that there is no evidence for miracle; whereas Dr. Sanday thinks the evidence for miracles in the New Testament is valid, but lowers Mr. Thompson's definition of miracle. There is no valid evi-

¹ Dr. B. B. Warfield has quoted a long passage from Wm. MacIntosh to this effect, *cf.* B. B. Warfield, Editorial Notes on Miracle, *Bible Student*, 1903, vol. vii pp. 124, 125.

dence, Dr. Sanday would say, for miracles in Mr. Thompson's sense of the term *i.e.* for events which happen without natural causes, but for exorcisms and faith cures *i.e.*, for events which can be naturally explained there is evidence. Of course Mr. Thompson would not deny this at all. The only difference between them is as to the idea of a miracle, both are sure of the impossibility of events which cannot be explained by purely natural and immanent causes.

Lest it be thought that we do either Mr. Thompson or Dr. Sanday an injustice, let us look at their views more closely. Mr. Thompson² starts with a definition of a miracle which regards it as an event which cannot have been brought about by any natural law or second cause or human means, as an interruption or breach of the course of nature; and then he finds that the evidence for such events in the New Testament is inadequate. The point of his argument lies in the fact that he distinguishes two classes of wonderful events. One class includes healing of disease, exorcism of demons etc. For these there is adequate evidence, but Mr. Thompson would not regard them as miracles. The other class such as raising the dead, the feeding of the five thousand; in short all events which involve a "breach in natural law" are really miracles if they happened, but they did not happen. The evidence here is inadequate, according to Mr. Thompson. It is the result of superstition or credulity or the excited state of mind of the early church.

But is it not true, as Dr. Headlam³ suggests, that if Mr. Thompson thought that he could discover a natural law which would explain all miracles naturally, he would have judged the evidence differently? Thus Dr. Headlam pointedly remarks that the "credulous crowd" in Palestine who believed that our Lord cured a man sick of the palsy, and the ordinary believing Christian also, are supposed to be right, and the critic of some fifty years ago is supposed to be

²J. M. Thompson, *Miracles in the New Testament*, 1911, p. 1.

³A. C. Headlam, "Christian Miracles", printed in *Miracles*, 1911, p. 44.

wrong, because Mr. Thompson thinks this incident can be naturally explained as a faith cure. But as for a real miracle, why we can get no adequate evidence that real miracles ever happened.

But there must be some *a priori* judgment back of such an opinion. It would not be a difficult task—Mr. Davies and most of the writers mentioned have performed it easily and adequately—to show that the evidence for the class of events which Mr. Thompson calls miracles is just as good on all principles of objective criticism, as is that for those events which Mr. Thompson thinks he can explain as faith cures. But as we are only trying to illustrate one point *viz.*, that the idea of the impossibility of a miracle determines Mr. Thompson's dealing with the evidence, we must confine ourselves to one case. In the Gospel of Mark, and hence in one of the primitive sources which are supposed to underlie our Gospels, are found the healing of the man sick with the palsy and the feeding of the five thousand. The former is true and the latter is not, according to Mr. Thompson. He would claim that it is a question of evidence and that his decision is based upon evidence. But the evidence for the miraculous feeding is just as good as that for the healing of the man sick with the palsy. It is in Mark's Gospel and must have been in the sources of Mark. It appears to be as well attested as any of our Lord's miracles. Mr. Thompson sets aside both the rationalistic and the mythological explanations of the event, and seeks one which shall be "psychologically appropriate." He suggests two possible explanations.⁴ The miraculous element of the event—whatever it may really have been—is either merely symbolic of the idea that Jesus satisfies the needs of all, or else it was a case of "assimilation" to Old Testament stories suggested by the institution of the Eucharist in the early church. There was an original incident, the meaning of which we do not know. This impressed itself on the memory of the Apostles and was assimilated to the Old Testament stories

⁴ J. M. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

in 1st and 2nd Kings, and came to be regarded as a miracle at a comparatively late date. Then the account of it would be early assimilated to the experience of Christian worship where Jesus satisfies the needs of all. But all that Mr. Thompson can say in support of this improbable hypothesis is that "assimilation has probably taken place," or "it seems likely" that it has taken place, or "this incident may have been transformed. . . . Then the account of it would be assimilated."⁵ Of course if the account of the event has been transformed to make it like certain other narrated events, then it has been "assimilated." But this is no proof at all that such a process has taken place. In fact Mr. Thompson offers no proof. It is a bare assumption without any evidence. So far as the evidence goes, here is a miracle in the strictest sense.

Even if we were to adopt Mr. Thompson's view of the sources of Mark as being a Petrine tradition (P), the Logia (Q), and editorial additions by Mark (M), there is and can be no proof that this belongs to M, or, if it did, that Mark assimilated it to the Old Testament. Indeed Johannes Weiss,⁶ who cannot believe in the miracle any more than Thompson can, and who like him thinks that something happened which became heightened into a miracle and that the narratives in 1st and 2nd Kings may have played a part in this process, nevertheless asserts that the whole narrative must go back to the earliest Galilean tradition. The whole description is so vivid and detailed that it points to the memory of an eyewitness. That all were filled, Weiss says, is of course inconceivable, and yet the narrator, he says, feels no need to explain how this was because it is for him a matter of course that Jesus could do such things. Weiss, therefore, must simply postulate back of his earliest source this heightening of the event to a miracle. This is a purely subjective procedure, but shows the impossibility

⁵ On the arbitrary way in which Mr. Thompson deals with this miracle (cf. Davies, *The Miracles of Jesus*, 1913, p. 54.

⁶ Johannes Weiss, *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*², I, pp. 129, 130.

of Mr. Thompson's pretense that it may be due to the editorial work of his source M.

It is instructive in this connection, further, to see how J. Weiss emphasizes the fact that the miracles *i.e.*, miracles in the strict sense, or the miraculous element in the events in regard to which both he and Thompson believe that something happened,—how this miraculous element goes back to the earliest sources. We cannot trace the heightening of these narratives as Mr. Thompson would try to do. Weiss tells us that "the tradition, with which we have to do, is indeed—that is the difficulty—anything else but a dry historical account of ordinary, every day events. It is, even in its very oldest parts, already saturated with the miraculous: from the Baptism of Jesus up to the empty grave (Mark), not to mention, from the miraculous birth to the bursting of the seal (Matthew), is the natural course of events inseparably joined with a series of miracles. And we stand yet today, as in the days of supernaturalism and rationalism, facing the question: how are these two elements related to one another? It is the question of questions: is the supernatural only a loose stratum lying on top, which can be easily removed, or is it the original bed-rock? In other words: have we here, not, it is true, an everyday history, but one dealing with a hero, gradually bedecked by legend with miraculous appendages, and elevated into the sphere of the Divine? Or do we have to do from the very outset with a history of gods, which, simply in order to render it persuasive and credible, has been given the necessary place in space and time, and endowed with a historical form?"⁷ This simply means that if we cannot accept the supernatural Jesus of our only sources, we must have recourse to the Jesus of the liberal school or to the Jesus of the radicals. In either case, the point to be pressed here is the impossibility of getting a non-miraculous Christianity from our sources.

But to return to the feeding of the five thousand and Mr.

⁷ J. Weiss, *Jesus von Nazareth, Mythos oder Geschichte*, 1910, p. 114.

Thompson's explanation of it, we can now see that it is in our source and is there represented as a miracle. Hence Mr. Thompson's explanation of it is pre-determined by the idea that a miracle is impossible. Indeed he baldly declares that the events in the New Testament either are in accordance with natural law, in which case they are not miracles; or else they are not in accordance with natural law, in which case they cannot have happened, for nothing can happen except in accordance with natural law. This is the essence of his position in a nut-shell, *i.e.*, miracles cannot happen; they are impossible. Hence whenever such events are recorded, there must be found some way of explaining the miracle away. Dr. Headlam is fully justified when he says ⁸ that "all his (Mr. Thompson's) talk of criticism and evidence has little or nothing to do with the question. They are only the clothes in which he wraps up his real argument. We come back to the old story—miracles cannot happen; if they happen, they are not miracles."

Dr. Sanday, on the other hand, we saw, is quite as much opposed to what he calls miracles "*contra naturam*", *i.e.*, real miracles. But he thinks that a miracle need not be defined in this way. A miracle, then, for Dr. Sanday is only such an event as can be explained in some natural way by second causes. His statement, therefore, that the evidence for miracles in the New Testament is "stringent" can refer, only to such events as he thinks can be explained as cases of faith cure or exorcism. The point of his position is similar to Mr. Thompson's—*i.e.*, in distinguishing two classes of miracles. It follows that Dr. Sanday cannot mean to include all the New Testament miracles when he says that the evidence for miracles is stringent. As a matter of fact Mr. Thompson would admit the evidence for such events as Dr. Sanday calls miracles, and Dr. Sanday is obliged to modify his statement about the evidence being valid in regard to all such events as cannot be explained by natural causes. In fact he does

* A. C. Headlam, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

so very explicitly in his latest word on the subject—his pamphlet entitled *Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*, 1914.⁹ Such events are miracles like the Virgin Birth, the bodily Resurrection of Christ, and the "nature miracles." In regard to "nature miracles" Dr. Sanday expressly says:¹⁰ "In regard to 'nature miracles' I think that of the two hypotheses—that they were performed by our Lord exactly as they are described, and that they came to be attributed to Him in this form by the imagination of the early Church—the latter is more probable. I believe that, in most of these cases *something* happened which gave rise to the story, but that the most difficult element in it was probably due to an extension of the original fact, rather than itself original." In other words the evidence is only that some

⁹ W. Sanday, *Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*, A Reply to the Bishop of Oxford's Open Letter on the Basis of Anglican Fellowship. The other works of Sanday to be noted in this connection are his article "Jesus Christ" in *Hastings Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. II, reprinted as *Outlines of the Life of Christ*, 1905; *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, 1907; "Miracles and the Supernatural Character of the Gospels", a paper read at the Church Conference at Northampton, 1902, printed in the *Expository Times*, 1902-03, vol. XIV, pp. 62 ff.; "The Meaning of Miracle" in the volume *Miracles*, 1911, pp. 1 ff.; the paper on "Miracles" at the Church Congress at Middlesbrough, 1912. With all these should be compared his *Christologies Ancient and Modern*, 1910, where his philosophical views are developed in relation to his conception of the Person of Christ. Here he asserts his belief in the Incarnation and Deity of our Lord, but explains it from his view of the subconscious. It is in the sphere of the subconscious that the Divine life flows into every man. This Divine life flowed more fully into the man Jesus. The Divine in Jesus is, therefore, simply this inflow of God into His subconscious life. This Christology I cannot but regard as humanitarian, since according to Sanday Jesus seems to have been a human Person indwelt thus by God, and all men have this Divine indwelling. This half pantheizing metaphysics leaves no room for any real supernaturalism, in spite of the statements which Sanday makes in this volume, and also in *Bishop Gore's Challenge*, etc., p. 69, and in many other places. For a full exposition of Dr. Sanday's development toward Naturalism—if indeed any development can be spoken of—and for a criticism of his position on the subject of Miracles cf. B. B. Warfield, "Kikuyu, Clerical Veracity, and Miracles," *THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, October, 1914, pp. 529-585, especially pp. 566 ff.

¹⁰ Sanday, *Bishop Gore's Challenge*, p. 19.

natural event happened which was heightened into a miracle by the imagination of the early Church. But we have no evidence of any such natural event, and no evidence of its exaggeration. Our earliest sources, as Johannes Weiss says, are "saturated" with the miraculous. This process of exaggeration is a pure assumption.

This arbitrary method of dealing with evidence is fully illustrated by Dr. Sanday's treatment of the Virgin Birth. Dr. Sanday asserts his belief in the "supernatural birth of Christ."¹¹ But he cannot think that it was "unnatural." "This is just a case", he says, "where I think the Gospels use symbolical language." He can endorse the "substantial" meaning of Luke i. 35. This, he thinks, means "substantially" that our Lord's birth was "sanctified in every physical respect in the most perfect manner conceivable." It means that "the Holy Babe was Divine".¹² But what, then, of the evidence? Does not Dr. Sanday's idea of a miracle as not being "*contra naturam*" and of the impossibility of "*contra naturam*" events determine his dealing with the evidence? He puts a high estimate on the infancy narratives in Luke.¹³ He traces the material recorded ultimately to Mary.¹⁴ But, as Dr. B. B. Warfield has pointed out,¹⁵ the thing which Mary could and does testify to—"I know not a man" Luke i. 34, is that the birth was "unnatural" or "*contra naturam*", while the only thing which Dr. Sanday will admit is something which Mary could not testify to *viz.*, that the Holy Spirit sanctified this child. This is not dealing objectively with evidence; it is an attempt to make the evidence prove Dr. Sanday's own view of what the Virgin Birth means "substantially".

The same method of dealing with the evidence from the point of view of a naturalistic theory is seen in Dr. Sanday's treatment of Christ's Resurrection. "The central meaning

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹³ Art. in *H. D. B.*, ii. pp. 643 ff.

¹⁴ "The Meaning of Miracle", in *Miracles*, ed. by Holland, p. 16.

¹⁵ B. B. Warfield, *PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, Oct., 1914, p. 578.

of the Resurrection," he says," is just that expressed in the vision of the Apocalypse, 'I am the first and the last and the Living One; and I was dead, and behold, I am alive forevermore' "16 Rev. i 18, *i.e.*, the Risen Lord lives and governs His Church. But can Dr. Sanday pretend that the evidence for the empty tomb is less valid and stringent than that for the appearances of the Risen Lord? The empty tomb is in all the Gospels and in two of the sources supposed to underlie them—Mark and "L", a source supposed by many to underlie Luke's account of the passion and resurrection of Christ. Moreover Paul's view of the Resurrection in 1 Cor. xv. evidently supposes a bodily resurrection of Christ. If Paul's belief is to be explained from visions or pagan myths, the resort to such explanations is because a bodily resurrection (the only sense in which we can speak of a resurrection at all) is a miracle "*contra naturam*" and this is regarded as an impossibility. And do not the naturalistic critics of the Resurrection narratives admit all that Dr. Sanday will?

Dr. Sanday goes on to distinguish explicitly between miracles "*supra-naturam*" and "*contra-naturam*",¹⁷ that is between events which may be explained by natural laws and those which "involve some definite reversal of the natural physical order." These latter he cannot believe occurred. For though he says he will not limit God's power, he is nevertheless sure that God's "providence" never "breaks the proper sequence of cause and effect." This latter class of miracles, he says, constitutes a "tiny group". In regard to the evidence for it he tells us that it is the evidence of men whose minds were steeped in the Old Testament, and this fact, he supposes, renders it invalid for the facts as described in the sources. Thus as to the feeding of the five thousand in Mark, Dr. Sanday has no doubt that the story represents a "real event" with "exaggerations in detail". This whole group of miracles

¹⁶ Sanday, *Bishop Gore's Challenge*, etc., p. 20.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

thus become a "fixed type" which arose from the influence of the Old Testament. The "*contra-naturam*" element is only a small part of these events, and "our modern standpoint" shows that it is an unimportant part which in ancient times seemed to be an important addition.¹⁸

This, of course, is dealing with the sources from an *a priori* point of view. So far as the sources go, our Lord not only was conscious of working miracles, but they constituted a part of His Messianic work and occupy an essential place in His Messianic consciousness. And not only is this the truth of the matter, but also miracles which Dr. Sanday calls "*contra-naturam*" are among them, Matt. xi. 5, Lk. vii. 22.¹⁹ Hence when he insists that such miracles did not happen, it is really because he believes that they could not have happened because God never acts in this way.²⁰ Dr. Sanday allows his naturalistic philosophy to influence and distort his dealing with the evidence. He allows it also to determine his idea of a miracle as something which God works by the use of natural means and after the analogy of the relation of the human will to Nature.²¹ Hence his position does not differ essentially from that of Mr. Thompson, who defines a miracle as an event which cannot have been brought to pass by any natural agency, and who then judges the evidence for such events as inadequate. In both cases the same naturalism and the same idea of the impossibility of miracle in the sense in which Mr. Thompson defines it, determines the treatment of the evidence.

This will illustrate what was above stated—*viz.*, that the question of the possibility of miracle should be dealt with before the question of the evidence is taken up. This being

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁹ Cf. for example what Dr. Warfield says (*op. cit.*, p. 581) in regard to Jesus' Temptation which Dr. Sanday regards as well attested. "The point now to be pressed is that this stringent witness of our Lord's own to His miracle-working concerns particularly nature miracles, miracles "*contra-naturam*."

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

²¹ "The Meaning of Miracle", in *Miracles*, p. 7 ff.

so, the question of the idea of a miracle should be the first question to be treated, because one cannot discuss the question of the possibility of miracle without a clear idea of what he means by the term, and also because in cases like that of Dr. Sanday the very idea of what a miracle is is determined *a priori* by his view of the impossibility of events which cannot be explained by natural laws.

When we come to the question what a miracle is we find at once that the usage of the term is varied and somewhat arbitrary. Thus, to mention an older theologian, Rothe²² recognizes what he calls "maximum" miracles and miracles of providence. The first class take place without any co-operation of second causes, and the second class includes exceptional events which occur through God's coöperation with and control of second causes, that is—they are simply cases of special providence. Or, to take a modern theologian, Haering,²³ while he criticises the idea of a miracle as an event due to higher, unknown laws of Nature, and also the idea that it is an event due to the "grouping" or "manipulation" of natural forces by God, so that by implication, at least, he would seem to take a higher view of the nature of a miracle, nevertheless is far from clear upon the point of the relation of the miracle to nature. R. Schmid²⁴ so emphasizes what he calls "the religious aspect" of a miracle as an event manifesting God's power, that he says that every event may be miraculous from this point of view. Though he recognizes miracles in what he calls the "narrow sense" and calls them "events which diverge from ordinary occurrences",²⁵ nevertheless he says in regard to these events²⁶ that we cannot say whether God works in them directly or through second causes as yet unknown; whether these intervening causes are forces which come into existence for the first time when the

²² Rothe, *Zur Dogmatik*.

²³ Haering, *Der Christliche Glaube*, 1906, pp. 351-361.

²⁴ R. Schmid, *The Scientific Creed of a Theologian*.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 193, E. T.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 197.

miracle occurs, or whether they are forces which were all along present in the phenomenal series of causes and are now unloosed for the first time. These views of themselves are sufficient to show us the necessity for seeking a clear definition of a miracle, while this need is only made clearer by the fact that a majority of the most recent works on the subject with which we shall presently have to deal, consider as miracles providential events, answers to prayer, as well as the miracles of the Gospel history (*heilsgeschichtliche Wunder*).

Before attempting to give any outline and criticism of the various views on the subject, just a word must be said concerning the way in which we ought to proceed in seeking a clear statement of what a miracle is. The New Testament terms furnish us with important general marks or characteristics of miracles. They are *δυνάμεις* or works produced by God's mighty power; but this does not tell us how God produces them or what is their relation to natural law. This term, however, does stamp them as works which manifest the power of God with especial clearness. They are called *τέρατα*, that is wonderful events, describing them from their striking subjective effect in producing wonder in the beholder. They are sometimes called *ἔργα* or simply works. Finally they are called *σημεῖα* or signs, not only in the sense of accrediting a divine message or messenger, but because they set forth in striking manner the power of God over all the effects of sin. It would be interesting to follow out these marks of a miracle implied in the New Testament terms for them. Nevertheless it is impossible to get an adequate definition of a miracle in this way. These terms are either too general or else express the function of the miracle rather than its nature. In order to reach an idea of what a miracle is, it is necessary to take some typical cases of miracles from the "highest class," so to speak, for only concerning these events can there be any real distinction from providential events. And then we must ask what is the relation of such events—as for example,

the making of water into wine or the Resurrection of our Lord—to Nature or natural law and to the power of God in its mode of operation.

It will make the matter clearer if we state the general types of what we consider to be inadequate conceptions of a miracle. Dr. C. M. Mead²⁷ has cautioned against what he terms “overstatements” and “understatements” in regard to the idea of a miracle. The views on this subject, then, may be distributed broadly under two main classes. First the view that a miracle is a “violation of natural law.” This overstates or emphasizes in a wrong sense the contra-natural character of the miracle. A second class will embrace all those views which are understatements or which underestimate the supernatural character of the miracle. Without at present entering into details, and speaking only broadly, we shall find three main subdivisions or classes of views as to the nature of a miracle. There is first the view which regards nature as a closed system of mechanical laws which cannot be interrupted and which suffers no intrusion of any higher causality. This reduces a miracle to the experience of the power or presence of God which any event happens to produce upon the mind. The miraculous element in any event is here reduced to something merely subjective. There is secondly the view which regards a miracle as a merely providential event brought about by the special control or combination of different series of phenomena by the power of God and the control which He exercises over the whole course of providence, or else by unknown laws of nature. Then there is a third class of views which would find a place for miracle in nature by breaking down our idea of nature through an extreme empiricism which leads logically to scepticism; or by an idealistic criticism of our idea of nature and of the causal judgment which results practically like the second view in reducing miracle to providence, since there is thus a miraculous element in all providence and thus the distinction be-

²⁷ C. M. Mead, *Supernatural Revelation*, pp. 87 ff.

tween the natural and the supernatural, and between providence and miracle is really obliterated.

First, then, there is the view that a miracle is a "violation" or "transgression" of natural law or a violation of some force of nature. It is supposed by this view that nature is a fixed mechanical system of causes and effects, and that a law of nature is an objective force of some kind which drives events in a certain direction. In the case of a miracle, therefore, the Divine power "violates" or "destroys" the operation of this force of nature, so that a second miracle would be required in every case in order to restore again this force or law and to re-establish the course of nature. Hume seems to have defined a miracle in this way and was criticized for it by Huxley, though Hume's argument against miracles did not depend upon this idea of their nature.²⁸ Park²⁹ uses the term "violation of natural law" in his article on "Miracles" in Smith's *Bible Dictionary*, but so describes them as to indicate that he did not mean this in the strict sense. Weisse³⁰ argues against miracles on this ground and seeks a merely subjective view of miracle. This view of the nature of miracle, according to Köstlin,³¹ goes back to the theology of Scholasticism. It has been asserted that Thomas Aquinas is the chief representative of this idea of a miracle, but this opinion is incorrect.³² What Thomas wishes chiefly to do is to emphasize the supernatural character of the miracle, that is, to show that it takes place apart from all natural causes and wholly without their coöperation. He asserts, therefore, strongly that a miracle is "beyond" (*praeter*) the order of all created nature.³³ He repeatedly asserts

²⁸ Hume, "Essay on Miracles", *Works*, vol. IV, p. 133. Huxley's *Hume*, pp. 127-137 especially 129.

²⁹ Park, Art. "Miracles", *Smith Bible Dict.*

³⁰ Weisse, *Phil. Dogmatik*, I, 96, 100.

³¹ Köstlin, Art. "Wunder", *P. R. E.*,² Bd. XVII, p. 362.

³² Lütze, *Ueber das Wunder*, p. 7, traces this idea to Thomas Aquinas, but E. Müller, "Natur und Wunder", *Strassburger Theologische Studien*, 1892, I, pp. 131 ff., has pointed out that Lütze is mistaken in this matter.

³³ Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, Part I, Q. 110, Art. 4. "Miraculum est

that miracles are *praeter naturam* in the chapters dealing with them in his work in defense of the Catholic Faith against Gentiles. And he also shows that God can act in two ways—through second causes and apart from second causes.³⁴ The same truth concerning the miracle is brought out where he distinguishes three grades of miracles, for the supernatural character of the miracle is brought out in each case.³⁵ The highest grade, he says, is where an effect is produced by God which nature never could produce. The second grade is where God produces an effect which nature or second causes can sometimes produce, but not in the specific causal series in which it now occurs. For example, it is an effect of natural causes that a man lives, walks, and sees, but that he should do this after death is a miracle wrought by God alone. The third grade is where God does without the aid of natural laws that which nature may do, that is, certain cures. Now in every one of these instances, Thomas' point is that God acts alone and apart from second causes in working a miracle. But Thomas does not believe that a miracle is a "violation" of a natural law. Where he asserts that it is "*contra naturam*" he means that it is contrary to our experience of the course of nature, as he explicitly states in the passage quoted in footnote 34. And he also affirms that when God produces any effect "contrary to the course of nature", the order of the whole universe is not destroyed, but only the relations of certain

praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae." He concludes from this that only God can work miracles in this sense of the term. Cf. also *De Veritate Cath. Fid. cont. Gent.*, Lib. III, c. 101 "Haec autem quae praeter ordinem communiter in rebus statutum quandoque divinitus fiunt miracula dici solent."

³⁴ *De Potentia*, Q. 6, Art. 1. § 21. "Respondeo dicendum, quod absque omni dubio Deus in rebus creatis potest operari praeter causas creatas, sicut et ipse operatur in omnibus causis creatis, ut alibi ostensum est; et operando praeter causas creatas potest operari eosdem effectus quos eisdem mediantibus operatur, et eodem ordine; vel etiam alios, et alio ordine; et sic potest aliquid facere contra communem et solitam cursum naturae."

³⁵ *Summa Cath. Fid. cont. Gent.*, Lib. 3 c. 101.

events are changed.³⁶ Moreover Thomas frequently defends the idea that created causes have their own inviolable effects, and the contrary opinion he regards as "absurd."³⁷ And where he speaks of God working beyond (*praeter*) the forces of nature, he says that it is not contrary to nature.³⁸ It is a mistake, therefore, to attribute this "overstatement" of the nature of a miracle to Thomas.

E. Müller, in the article mentioned, attributes this idea to the old Lutheran theologians Buddeus and Quenstedt. Müller says that they considered a miracle to suspend the whole order of the universe to such an extent that in each case a new miracle is required to restore it. It is true that both these theologians do define a miracle as contrary to nature in a somewhat extreme sense. But the context in each case will show that while their definitions are not satisfactory they do not state the matter quite as Müller supposes.³⁹

✓ What we are chiefly concerned to affirm is that this is an "overstatement" of the idea of a miracle. A miracle is performed by the power of God acting apart from natural law. It is the introduction of a new force into nature, and hence "violates" no natural law nor destroys any of nature's forces, if we may speak of 'forces' in nature. If a new force is followed by a new effect no law of nature is violated or even suspended. The new effect being due to a new cause, nature is transcended altogether, but is not violated at all. The customary effects of nature's forces, or of some one of them, may be counteracted, but this is something quite different from saying that it has been destroyed or violated. Accordingly the miracle is supernatural rather than contra-natural. The effect, that is, the

³⁶ *De. Pot. Q. 6. Art. 1.* "Quando Deus agit aliquid contra cursum naturae, non tollitur totus ordo universi, sed cursus qui est unius rei ad aliam."

³⁷ *Distinct*, II, 1, Q. 1, Art. 4.

³⁸ *De Ver. Cath. Fid. cont. G.*, Lib. III, ch. 99.

³⁹ Buddeus, *Inst. Theol. Dogm.*, I, 224 note. "Per miracula ordo naturae" tollitur. Quenstedt, *Syst. Theol.* I. 671. A miracle is said to be "contra vim rebus naturalibus a Deo inditam".

miracle, is an effect in nature, but it is an effect which none of nature's forces could have produced. It is an effect, therefore, which is introduced into the phenomenal series by a transcendent power, and which is in no sense the product of the phenomenal series of second causes, and yet, since the effect is produced entirely independently of nature, no natural law or force is violated.⁴⁰

Coming then to views which are understatements or inadequate concerning the supernatural character of the miracle, we meet with the several main types of theory which were outlined above.

The first of these is that which regards nature as a fixed mechanical system of causes and effects which cannot be broken into or interrupted, and the miracle or the miraculous element in any event is transferred to the subjective sphere and said to be our experience of the presence and power of God which any event in the external world arouses in us. This view of miracle is asserted by those who hold diverging views of nature and of the relation of God to

⁴⁰ J. S. Mill, *Logic*, Bk. III, ch. 25, rightly says that a miracle is a "new effect supposed to be produced by a new cause". Hence it violates no law of Nature. Many criticisms of the idea that a miracle violates natural law have been made. Thus Rothe (*Zur Dogmatik*, p. 88) replied to Weisse that miracles are not violations of natural laws because the efficient cause of the miracle is entirely independent of Nature and acts apart from it. In the miracle we have a new and higher cause producing a new effect in Nature. So also W. M. Taylor, "*Gospel of Miracle*", p. 11, objects to the term "violation" for the same reason as Rothe does. See also J. H. Newman, *Two Essays on Miracles*, ed. 2nd, p. 4; Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, p. 338; C. M. Mead, *Supernatural Revelation*, pp. 97, 98; B. B. Warfield, *Bible Student*, VII, 1903, 121, 122; Carl Stange, *Naturgesetz und Wunderglaube*, 1914, *vid.* the opening sections, and *vid.* also Stange's article, "Natural Law and Belief in Miracle", *The Constructive Quarterly*, March, 1915, pp. 137-158. Stange gives a long and elaborate criticism of the idea that a miracle is a violation of a law of Nature. Stange's criticism of this view, however, rests upon the idea that it is only possible to define a miracle in this way if we adopt an outworn conception of Nature *viz.* the mechanical one, and that from the standpoint of the idealist we get a new view of Nature, consequently a more adequate idea of the miracle. Consideration of this, therefore, must be postponed till we come to deal with Stange's position.

nature. It may be held by one who is a deist and who denies God's providential control of the course of nature, and who likewise holds the mechanical view of nature. This regards it as a mechanism due to matter and motion which are supposed to explain all quantitative distinctions of our knowledge, while all qualitative distinctions are traced to sensation rather than thought, and so regarded as purely subjective. This subjective view of the miracle may also be held by the speculative theist who believes in the providence of God, and who rejects the mechanical theory of the universe. We have said that it reduces the miracle to something purely subjective. It is necessary, therefore to distinguish it sharply from other views which also regard a miracle as subjective in one sense or another. Of course we do not include here such a view as that of Dr. A. Kuyper⁴¹ who includes under the idea of miracle such strictly supernatural events in the psychic sphere as Regeneration. Dr. Kuyper from his supernaturalistic point of view recognizes the objective cause of Regeneration in the Holy Spirit and the supernatural mode of operation of the Holy Spirit in regenerating the spiritually dead soul. The views to which we refer differ from this in two respects. They deny the supernatural character of the event which gives the experience, and they regard the miracle, not as a subjective event, but as a subjective impression derived from some external event. Neither do we refer to the view of Lange expressed in his *Life of Christ*.⁴² In dealing with the miracle at Cana of Galilee he supposes that the water in the pots remained water, but through the influence of Jesus on the minds of the guests at the wedding it was made to taste as if it were wine. This is an old view, and the dilemma involved has frequently been exposed. If the influence of Jesus on the minds of those present was truly miraculous, that is apart from all natural psychic causes or influences, then it would have been a truly supernatural event, and there would be no reason for objection to the

⁴¹ A. Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*, E. T., pp. 420 ff.

⁴² Lange, *Life of Christ*, E. T., II, p. 137.

miracle as recorded in John's Gospel, that is, no reason for inventing this change from the miracle as recorded. If, however, the alleged psychic effect was wrought by hypnotism or any natural means, then it is no more a miracle than any instance of hypnotic influence.

What we have reference to is rather the tendency to emphasize what is called the religious aspect of the miracle. It is said that it is a remnant of Scholasticism to enquire into the relation of the miracle to the power of God or to the laws of nature. It must be viewed in its relations to the religious consciousness, and must be studied as regards its conditions by means of an analysis of the religious consciousness. Such an analysis will show, it is said, that belief in miracle is an essential element in the Christian consciousness and that the miracle is essential to Christianity. Such a view of miracle, however, reduces it to something purely subjective, and that not simply in the sense of a psychic or subjective event, but in that of a mere subjective impression produced by some event. It further renders it impossible to distinguish a miracle from any providential event, and in its most characteristic forms raises an antinomy between the scientific view of the world and faith in miracle. As illustrating what has just been said Ritschl⁴³ may be taken as one example. He argued in 1861 in an article, and later in his *Instruction in the Christian Religion*, that when the supposed miracle occurs, we do not know what happens objectively, nor is it essential that we should know this. A miracle is an event which makes us immediately conscious of God's presence and power. This, he thinks, is the religious view of a miracle. It is obvious that upon this view any event could turn out to be a miracle, and would become so simply through the subjective impression made upon the person experiencing it or hearing of it from others. This view is the result of Ritschl's well known distinction between religious and theoretic knowl-

⁴³ A. Ritschl. *Jahrbuecher für deutsche Theol.*, Bd. IV, 1861, pp. 429-459. *Unterricht u. s. w.*, § 17.

edge, according to which the former kind of knowledge would not be concerned with the cause of the miracle nor with its relation to nature, since religious knowledge is concerned with the value of the objective event and this consists in the impression of God's presence which it makes. This naturally leads to the self-contradictory idea of "the double truth", an idea which Haering⁴⁴ rejects and subjects to criticism, although he lays stress on the religious value of the miracle.

Probably the best illustration of this way of viewing the miracle is given by Herrmann.⁴⁵ In his address, which was first delivered at Giessen in 1908, entitled *Der Christ und das Wunder*, he emphasizes strongly what he terms the "collision" between what he believes to be the true idea of miracle and that of nature and natural law. He sets forth his view over against the view which seeks to avoid this "collision" by means of an inadequate conception of the inviolability of natural law, and over against the opposite view, which seeks the same result by doing away with the supernatural character of the miracle. He criticises the view of Stange as not doing justice to the modern conception of nature, and that of Schleiermacher as seeking to explain the miracle by purely natural causes. Over against these views Herrmann asserts that he goes further than the "old dogmatics" in emphasizing the idea that the miracle is something "*supra et contra naturam*." He says that he emphasizes more strongly than the old evangelical theology the supernatural character of the miracle, and that this is seen especially in the fact that whereas the old theology sought to give a rational and metaphysical basis for its idea of the miracle, he not only acknowledges but also emphasizes the fact that this idea of the miracle is logically irreconcilable with our idea of nature and of natural law.

It might appear from this that Herrmann believes that we have two conflicting world-views—a scientific and a re-

⁴⁴ Th. Haering, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

⁴⁵ W. Herrmann, *Offenbarung und Wunder*, 1908; for a review of this cf. PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, VII, 1909, pp. 515 ff.

ligious—each one in conflict with the other, and both equally valid. If this were the situation in which the Christian faith finds itself, it would go hard with that faith. The mind cannot rest in such a contradiction. We cannot be persuaded of the truth of miracles on one set of grounds, and of their irrationality on impossibility upon another set of grounds. This, however, is not Herrmann's view. For it at once becomes evident, upon studying his book, that instead of two conflicting views of the world, what we have is an objective and a subjective view, the scientific view with its assertion of the impossibility of miracle being objective, and the religious view with its assertion of their reality and necessity being subjective. Perhaps it might be a more accurate description of his position to say that from the scientific standpoint any event is viewed from the point of view of its causation, whereas from the religious standpoint the same event is regarded from the point of view of the impression which it makes upon the Christian of the power and care of God. That this really is his view can be seen from Herrmann's criticism of Seeberg. He commends Seeberg for seeking the proof of miracles in Christian experience. He differs from Seeberg in that while the latter seeks in Christian experience a standpoint from which the reality of the New Testament miracles may be established, or at least from which their evidence may be considered, Herrmann, on the contrary, sees a miracle in any event which produces such an experience. This amounts to saying that after all it is the experience which constitutes the said event a miracle. It is difficult to see, then, how his view differs from the purely subjective one which he rejected at the beginning of his essay, and which would explain a miracle by purely natural causes, the miraculous element being reduced to the mere subjective impression which the event makes upon the mind. And this, of course, amounts to saying that there are no miracles in the external world, and really none in the inner or psychic sphere, for surely it is not miraculous that the providence of God im-

presses us with a sense of His power and presence. And if a miracle is only the religious impression made upon us by some providential event, it is very difficult to see how it is *supra et contra naturam*, or why such a conflict between the scientific and religious world-views, as Herrmann maintains, can possibly arise. Here, then, we have no definition of a miracle but a denial of the possibility of miracles. We may conceivably deny them, but we cannot do so by means of a definition of them.

There have been a number of theologians who have endeavored in one way or another to combine this purely subjective view of miracle with some attempt at an objective account of it. Ménégoz seems to have combined this subjective view with the idea that the miracle is simply a case of special providence, or to have librated between the two views.⁴⁶ Also W. A. Brown's idea⁴⁷ of miracle seems to belong to the general class which regards the test of a miracle as being primarily its subjective impression. He distinguishes between what he terms the religious and the philosophical views of a miracle. According to the religious view it is an event which in an especial manner reveals God. According to the philosophical view it is a wonder which cannot be accounted for by any known natural causes. These are not two different kinds of events; it is two ways of looking at one event. Now the important thing for Dr. Brown is the revealing impression of the event. His view seems similar to that of Herrmann, but Brown admits the legitimacy of asking what a miracle is objectively. In this connection he tells us that modern science is rendering it increasingly difficult to isolate any event and call it a miracle in the sense of being the product of any new creative power in nature. On the other hand, he says, modern science is showing us that nothing can be accounted for ultimately without this power of God, and that every transformation in nature is a creation. This of

⁴⁶ Ménégoz, *Essai sur bib. notion du miracle*, 1894.

⁴⁷ W. A. Brown, *Christian Theology in Outline*, 1906, pp. 223 ff.

course means simply that Dr. Brown cannot distinguish a miracle from any providential event, and that he regards all providence as a species of continuous creation. This half pantheizing philosophy involves the denial of miracle in any sense differing from events of God's providence.

Kessler also would remove the question of miracle from the sphere of the causal judgment into that of religious appreciation or value, leaving thus the real question of the objective nature of the miracle unsettled.⁴⁸

Possibly the most recent attempt to define a miracle so as to make it a matter of religious experience is that of Hunzinger.⁴⁹ He vibrates between the idea that a miracle is simply the experience of God which we derive from certain events in nature and the idea that a miracle is an event due to unknown laws of nature. He thinks that the old theology made a mistake in regarding a miracle as an event in nature wrought by the immediate action or causality of God, and that in this way the religious significance of a miracle was reduced to a minimum.⁵⁰ We cannot speak, he says, of any twofold mode of God's action in relation to nature.⁵¹ A miracle is an event in which we experience a revelation of God. It belongs to a different sphere of experience from our ordinary experience of natural events. We can speak of a miracle only when we experience events which introduce us to another world, and this experience can only be an experience of God. It is not in the relation of an event to nature or natural law, but in its relation to God, that we can hope to define a miracle. But if we should ask Hunzinger how a miracle is related to God, he would tell us at once that the question does not concern its relation to the Divine mode of action in producing the event, because events in which we experience God cannot be put into the categories of the understanding such as the

⁴⁸ Kessler, "Wunder und Causalität", *Zeitschr. für Theol. u. Kirche*, 1900, pp. 284-324.

⁴⁹ Hunzinger, *Das Wunder*, 1912.

⁵⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁵¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 33.

causal category. The miracle, he says, belongs to a transcendent sphere. It has to do with a different kind of experience from ordinary experience and scientific experience.⁵²

This, however, is quite confusing to us. No doubt religious experience is different from ordinary experience, but when this religious experience attaches to an event in the external world, it does not remove the event itself into a "transcendent sphere". How, then, does the event take place? What is its nature? How is it related to God's power and to natural law? And why does it give an experience of God which certain other events do not? Hunzinger can answer none of these questions satisfactorily. He is sure that in a miracle we look at an event from a different point of view from that of science. In science, that is, in the explanation of events by natural causes, and in the immediate production of an event by God's direct intervention, the old theology saw a twofold mode of God's action. Hunzinger says this is wrong, and he sees here only a twofold way of viewing events. From the causal point of view they are all alike, yet some reveal God and some do not. How, then, can we distinguish a miracle in any objective sense from any providential event? Hunzinger says there is a distinction because, while for religious faith all events are "supernatural"⁵³ *i.e.*, reveal God, nevertheless Christian experience finds God in an especial manner in some events, and cannot find Him thus in all events. These are the events connected with Jesus and the Gospel history. But here Hunzinger is in a dilemma. If there can be no event which is not explainable by natural causes, then he must deny just these supernatural events upon which Christian experience depends and which Hunzinger would wish to maintain. If he maintains the reality of the supernatural events of the Gospel, he must give up his assertion that God can work only through natural causes. He has

⁵² *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁵³ *Op. cit.*, p. 114.

given a definition of miracle which renders it impossible to distinguish it from any providential event, and which would necessitate the denial of the Virgin Birth and Resurrection of Christ. He does not wish to accept the Jesus of the liberal theology; he knows that this Jesus cannot account for Christian history or Christian experience; and yet he has adopted a philosophy which renders a miracle impossible in any but a purely subjective sense. He must elevate his philosophy or lower his Christianity. He seems to feel the inadequacy of his subjective view, for when he comes to ask what is the relation of the miracle to nature, he tells us that we do not know nature's working forces but only its phenomenal side, and that therefore a miracle may be due to some unknown forces of nature. In another part of his book he says that all providence is a continuous creation or miracle, and in still another place he tells us that for the Christian "everything natural"⁵⁴ comes under the category of God's supernatural action and is miraculous. He cannot, therefore, distinguish miracle from providence, and yet appears dissatisfied with his purely subjective idea and groping after some objective criterion of the miracle.

It has now been pointed out how this subjective view of a miracle is unable to distinguish between a miracle and any event of God's providential control of nature and history. It remains to indicate briefly how it thereby destroys the religious or experiential value of the miracle from the Christian point of view. The communion with God which we have through providence or even through the Jesus of the liberal theology stripped of all that is supernatural and reduced to a fact of providence, cannot take us beyond the sphere of natural religion. This natural religion, therefore, can contain no redemptive element. Providence gives us no assurance of the Gospel or the grace of God in relation to sin. Religious faith without the supernatural history in the Gospels is not the Gospel of redemption from sin. For the latter we need the historic facts of the Gospel history. Now it is the characteristic of the miracles recorded in the

⁵⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 114.

New Testament that they give us a Gospel. They either constitute the Gospel and show us God actually working out man's redemption centrally in history, as in the Incarnation and Resurrection of Jesus; or else they are signs of Jesus' power to redeem from sin; or once again actual illustrations or symbols of that power of Christ; or finally they have an eschatological significance, and indicate that, at the end of the redemptive process, the universe, now cursed for man's sake, shall be transformed by the supernatural redemptive power of God. This soteriological significance of Jesus miracles is seen from the simple fact that the frequent demand for faith in Jesus' grace and power to save is usually in direct connection, in the Gospels, with a miracle which He is said to have wrought. All this we may be led to accept or reject, but this is the view of miracle and of Christianity which we derive from the sources. Hence the "religious value" of the miracle as conceived by Herrmann falls below the specifically Christian level.

This is fully recognized by Hunzinger who criticises Herrmann, and points to the essential place of the Cross and the Resurrection of Jesus in Christianity and in Christian experience, and who emphasizes the importance of what he calls the miracles of the Gospel history, but whose philosophy seems to force him into the same subjective view of a miracle. God, he says, cannot act apart from nature. All events in nature are alike supernatural, by which he only means that he conceives providence as a "continuous creation". It follows, therefore, that any events which transcend the power of nature's forces, however loudly one proclaims their "creative" character, are impossible. The man who holds the subjective or "experiential" view of miracle must either give up the supernatural facts of Christianity, as Herrmann does; or hold them in contradiction to his philosophy, as Hunzinger tries to do.

When we turn from the purely subjective view of a miracle we come to the second class of "understatements", which still maintain that nature is a system of objective

forces, and which seek to give an objective explanation and definition of a miracle without breaking down this concept of nature. This class of views in general may be said to regard a miracle as an event due to the providence of God, and find its distinction from ordinary providential events in some special control of natural laws by God.

But before taking up these views a word must be said about a view which may be described as deistic and mechanical. God's control of nature is pushed back to the time of Creation, and the seeds of the miracle are supposed to have been introduced by God at the creation. This has been called the "pre-formation" theory. It is supposed that the germs of miracles at the creation of the world were inserted into nature to emerge when the time comes.⁵⁵ This view really does away with the miracle altogether. It rules out any special activity of God when the miracle takes place. The proximate cause of the miracle is nature. If, then, these supposed "seeds" of miracles are simply the ordinary forces of nature, a miracle becomes an impossibility. If, on the other hand, we should be bold enough to assume such a highly speculative thing as a "miracle germ" inserted in nature which is suddenly to burst forth at the proper moment, this amounts simply to saying that the miracle is due to an unknown natural force or law. This view will come up for discussion later.

If, on the other hand, any action of God, whether immediate or providential and mediate, is admitted at the time of the occurrence of the alleged miraculous event, supposedly liberating these "seeds of miracles", then this view passes beyond the limits of Deism, and must regard the event as the result of God's providential control of nature's forces. This advance upon the pre-formation theory was made by R. Schmid.⁵⁶ He believed that nature is "prepared" for the miracle which is brought to pass by the providence of God. This view transcends the deistic pre-formation theory. In fact Dorner is mistaken in class-

⁵⁵ Dorner, *Christl. Glaubensl.*, I, p. 591, gives an account of this view.

⁵⁶ R. Schmid, *Die Darwinischen Theorien*, pp. 332-361.

ing it under any form of that theory. It would seem to come under the next class of views which conceive the miracle as due to the special providential control of nature by God, although in his later book⁵⁷ Schmid says that we cannot tell whether in a miracle the Divine action works mediately or immediately.

We are led, therefore, naturally to the second class of "understatements" of the nature of miracles, as above mentioned. These views recognize nature as an objective system of forces and of causes and effects which constitute an unbroken series, and ascribe the miracle to some form of God's Providential control of nature. Under this class of views are found several different ways of conceiving the action of God's Providence in causing the miracle. In each case the validity of the causal judgment is recognized, and the unbroken continuity of the course of nature, but the miracle is reduced in each case to the level of a merely providential event. This has been done in several different ways.

The first of these practically reduces the miracle to an ordinary providential event. This view is agnostic as to the mode of God's action in relation to second causes or natural laws, but would explain a miracle as due to the co-operation of God with all the course of nature, controlling second causes. It would seem, therefore, to reduce a miracle to an ordinary providential event. If it really does this, then it rules out the miracle altogether, whereas if it remains really agnostic as to the mode of God's action in working a miracle, it fails to give an answer to the very point which would enable us to discriminate the miracle from providential events. This position seems to be that of Professor George T. Ladd⁵⁸ when he says that "a miracle must be conditioned upon the existing course of nature", and that "no event in history can even be conceived of without the coöperation of all the preceding forces and laws of the physical universe." Of course if this

⁵⁷ Schmid, *The Scientific Creed of a Theologian*, p. 197.

⁵⁸ G. T. Ladd, *Doctrine of Sacred Scripture*, p. 296.

means only that the effect produced takes its place in the series of natural phenomena or in nature, the statement is obviously true, but then it throws no light at all upon the question at issue, which is as to the cause of the said effect. But if it means that all events must be the product of natural forces operating under the Divine control, then it leaves no room for a miracle. Take for example the miracle which our Lord is said to have wrought at Cana. The wine, when made, was ordinary wine and subject to all the chemical conditions of wine. It is also true that the water out of which the wine is said to have been made was "the physical basis" of the wine. But the water and its properties did not produce the wine; did not evolve suddenly into wine. That special quality which distinguishes wine from water, the water in the Providence of God could not have produced. One may say that such an event never happened, but if it happened, the Providence of God does not account for it. Moreover in some "nature miracles", nature so far from coöperating with the power of God, requires to be conteredacted, as in the case where Jesus is said to have walked upon the sea. One may deny that this happened; it is hopeless to try to explain it as due to God's providential control of nature's forces. If such events as these ever did happen, they cannot be explained from the Providence of God, nor may we say, with R. Schmid⁵⁹ that in the case of miracles "in the narrow sense" *i.e.*, "nature miracles", that it is impossible to say whether God works directly or through natural means. Upon this view there is no possibility of distinguishing a miracle from any providential event.

Hence we proceed to consider views which conceive of the miracle as due to God's providential control of nature, but which attempt to give some special account of the peculiar mode of God's providential control in the case of a miracle, that shall discriminate it from ordinary providential events.

⁵⁹ R. Schmid, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

* A second view, then, is that the miracle is due to the "acceleration" of the "natural process" by Divine power.⁶⁰ This view has little acceptance and need not detain us. It explains nothing, and is a baseless speculation. In the case of such a miracle as the resurrection of the dead it is meaningless.

X A third view under this general class is that a miracle is due to special "grouping" of natural causes, or to the "manipulation" of natural forces by God, after the analogy of the control which the human will can exercise over nature. This is not a new view, though it has been recently advocated by Beth and Sanday. It is the view of Gloatz, which he advocated in a long article on miracles in 1886.⁶¹ It was advocated long before this by Köstlin.⁶² These writers say that man to a certain extent may control nature, and hence God may act in this way in working miracles. This view has recently been advocated by Beth, Sanday, and Seeberg, Illingworth, and possibly Headlam.⁶³ Beth asserts that the

⁶⁰ Olshausen, *Com. on John*, ch. II.

⁶¹ Gloatz, "Wunder und Naturgesetz", *Studien und Kritiken*, 1886, pp. 403-546.

⁶² Köstlin, *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.*, 1864, pp. 259 ff. Köstlin says, "The Divine power presiding over things may intervene in the reciprocal action of the forces. In this way these forces produce the miraculous." For a criticism of this general position see C. M. Mead, *op cit.*, chap. IV; Haering, *op. cit.*, p. 353; C. Stange, *Wunder u. Naturgesetz*, p. 45 ff.

⁶³ Beth, "Das Wunder", *Biblische Zeit und Streitfragen*, IV, 1908, Heft 5; Seeberg, art. "Wunder", *P. R. E.*,³ Bd. XXI, pp. 558-567; Sanday, "The Meaning of Miracle", in *Miracles* 1911 pp. 1 ff.; Illingworth, *The Gospel Miracles*, 1915, p. 92. Illingworth, after speaking of man's control of nature's laws says that here there is something "strictly analogous to the only thing which reasonable people mean by miracle—the guidance, that is, of natural laws, to the production of new effects, by the intervention of God's freewill". Dr. Headlam defends the historicity of the New Testament miracles. He believes in the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection of Jesus. But his view of the nature of miracle is unsatisfactory because of its indefiniteness. He says that "a miracle means really the supremacy of the spiritual forces of the world to an extraordinarily marked degree over the mere material". Nature and man, he says, are responsive to the Spirit of God, and hence miracles are possible. The difficulty with this definition of miracle is

"inviolability" of natural law, by which he means its uninterrupted uniformity, and the miracle in nature can both be defended. He starts with a philosophy of nature, rather than with an epistemological criticism of the causal judgment. Scientific knowledge, he says, gives us only a knowledge of the mechanism of nature, not of its inner organization.⁶⁴ The course of nature is not determined by mechanical necessity. The question concerns the guidance and control of natural laws by God. Is the interaction of natural laws to be conceived mechanically, or does a higher power control them? The continued and abiding course of nature points to a higher power, *i.e.*, to God. But once recognize the government of God, and then the explanation of a miracle, Beth says, becomes easy. For God can control and combine the different laws of nature. This control is quite in accordance with nature and yet seems marvellous to our apprehension. Beth illustrates this by the case of a number of ants crawling along until their progress is impeded by a stream which they cannot cross. They move up the bank and suddenly cross on a log which has fallen across, and this log and this passage across it seems miraculous to them. Or again, he uses the illustration of the way in which a physician will use the forces of nature to counteract and cure the progress of disease in the human body. Thus for Beth there is no action of God apart from second causes or forces of nature. A miracle is thus only an event produced by God's providential control of nature. Moreover he seems thus to give no explanation of real miracles according to his own view. For he distinguishes

that it does not state the mode of the Divine action in producing the miracle, nor its relation to nature and second causes. Indeed he sometimes speaks as if human causes were operative in producing the miracle. Thus he supposes that the Holy Spirit so affected the spiritual life of Mary that her spirit became powerful over her body to such an extent that she conceived and brought forth Jesus. This is a far more difficult idea to believe than that the miracle is due to the immediate power of God. Cf. Headlam, *The Miracles of the New Testament*, 1915, pp. 335-340.

⁶⁴ Beth, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

between what he calls a real miracle and a relative miracle.⁶⁵ A relative miracle, he says, is an event the natural causes of which we do not know, but of which we assume a natural explanation unknown to us without the need of God's "direct causality". This, Beth rightly says, is not a miracle but only a providential event. It would seem to follow from this that a real miracle for him must be an event which is produced by God's direct causality apart from natural laws. But Beth will not accept this view. Instead of this he says⁶⁶ again that we know only the external mechanism of nature, not its inner organism or the entire sum of its forces. And he seeks to explain the "real miracle" by a combination of these forces by God. He thus reduces it to what he before called the "relative miracle," which he himself said was no miracle at all but only a providential event. His whole polemic is against the mechanical world view. He is right in supposing that in refuting this he has made room for the possibility of miracle. For if there is a God of Providence, He may act in another and supernatural mode. But Beth does not take this further step. Having defended the idea of the Divine Providence, he proceeds to reduce the miracle to a merely providential event, and thus leaves no basis for any idea or defense of the miracles of Christianity.

Seeberg's position is similar to that of Beth. He does not attempt to give a philosophy of Nature, as Beth does. He limits himself to pointing to the analogy between the Divine and the human will in relation to Nature. When a man bends Nature to his ends, he does not act against Nature. Just so in a miracle we are concerned with "a special combination of natural forces for the production of an effect which has not happened before."⁶⁷

Sanday's view is also to be classed here. He starts with

⁶⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁶⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 24, 25.

⁶⁷ Seeberg, *op. cit.*, p. 566. In a miracle "es handelt sich um eine besondere Kombination natürlicher Kräfte zur Hervorbringung eines früher nicht geschehenen Effektes".

the definition of miracle in the *New English Dictionary* as "a marvellous event occurring within human experience which cannot have been brought about by human power or by the operation of any natural agency, and must therefore be ascribed to the special intervention of the Deity or of some supernatural being." . . . This definition he pronounces as "very good" though not "quite ideal." Where it fails, he thinks, is that it is too definite, for "when we read of an 'event which cannot have been brought about by human agency and must therefore be ascribed to the special intervention of Deity', we need not beg the question quite so far as this." It will be enough to assume that a miracle "suggests" Divine intervention. For "whatever be the case in the absolute nature of things, to our human experience at least God is more manifestly present in some events than in others."⁶⁸ But that any idea of a direct action of God in Nature is rejected by Dr. Sanday can be clearly gathered from his own words. He continues by saying: "I confess that the movement which tends, as it were, to merge miracles in the supernatural—in other words to lay stress on the Divine cause rather than the exceptional mode—seems to me entirely wholesome and to be welcomed, so long as it keeps within the bounds of Christian reverence and humility, and does not become too free with its negations."⁶⁹ The course of nature, he says, is uniform and never contravened, and a miracle is likened to the catching of a ball by a man, in which act the force of gravitation is neutralized.⁷⁰ A miracle, therefore, is "supernatural" only in the sense that God is its cause ultimately. Dr. Sanday will not recognize that God can work in nature apart from natural laws or second causes. Accordingly he finds an apparent, but as he thinks only apparent, conflict between belief in miracle and the modern view of the uniformity of nature.⁷¹ The evidence, he says,

⁶⁸ Sanday, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁶⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁷⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁷¹ Cf. art. in *The Expository Times*, vol. XIV, pp. 62 ff.

is undoubted that Christ and His Apostles wrought what they thought to be miracles. How then are we to reconcile this fact with the belief of the modern man in the uniformity of nature? It might be supposed that what they thought to be miracles in the sense of interruptions of natural law, we, by our better knowledge of nature's law, can see were really not such events. This solution Dr. Sanday finds to be unsatisfactory. He finds the solution of this difficulty in the analogy between God's relation to nature and that of man's will. Just as man can to a certain extent manipulate the forces of nature, so can God to a greater degree. But this, as we said reduces a miracle to a providential event. And we have seen that Dr. Sanday cannot allow that any such events have occurred which cannot find some explanation in a purely natural way, as cases of faith-cure, and how he rejects the evidence for miracles like the Virgin Birth which cannot possibly have any natural explanation. It is only by lowering his idea of a miracle that he can allow the evidence to stand for cases where he thinks a natural explanation of the event can be found.

This whole class of views as to the nature of a miracle is quite unsatisfactory. The teleological action of man is not even a proof against a purely mechanical explanation of events. It goes without saying that man can exert an influence upon nature, but the same is true of natural causes in cases where one influences another. If it be said that man acts with a purpose, this will not exclude the fact that in nature the events which man's action bring to pass, can take place in accordance with nature conceived as a mechanism. Still less can it explain miracles. The human will can never go beyond nature or produce any event which transcends her power. This view, therefore, can never explain how God acts in working an event which transcends nature. It can never go beyond simply pointing to an analogy between man's action on nature and God's providential control of nature, and even this analogy is most imperfect. If the action of God in the miracle is only the

teleological ordering of natural events, then what Beth and Seeberg call "miracles of providence" can be thus explained simply because such so called miracles are just events of God's providence and nothing more. But there is no possibility of what they call "nature miracles" like the feeding of the five thousand or the resurrection of the dead. And yet Beth and Seeberg seek an explanation of these miracles instead of dealing with the evidence as Sanday does. But even these "nature miracles", according to Beth and Seeberg, must be explained as only a combination of natural forces. Thus Seeberg says that bread and wine are not made from nothing, but through an especial combination of chemical substances.⁷² But Wendland is quite right when he terms this an "artificial invention" (*ausgeklügeltes Kunstprodukt*); and Stange criticises Seeberg severely on this point.⁷³ It is a mere evasion. If we hold this view of a miracle, we must explain away these miracles as Sanday does. In the making of water into wine or in the increasing of the bread there is manifest a power transcending any combination of natural forces, and we must either deny that these events happened or seek a better explanation of them than this theory can give.

— A fourth view of miracle which comes under this general class is that it is produced by "higher" or "unknown" laws of Nature. If it is not due to the "manipulation" or "grouping" of natural causes by God, and if one denies that God can or at least that He has acted apart from natural causes, there seems nothing left to say except that what we call a miracle is due to some unknown law or laws of Nature. This view has been wrongly attributed to Augustine.⁷⁴ Augustine says that "a miracle, therefore, does

⁷² Seeberg, *op. cit.*, p. 566.

⁷³ Wendland, *Der Wunderglaube im Christentum*, 1910, p. 107. Stange, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁷⁴ The view that a miracle is due to unknown laws of Nature has been erroneously attributed to Augustine by Lütze, *cf. op. cit.*, p. 4, and by Hunzinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 2 ff. The misunderstanding of Augustine here involved has frequently been exposed. Cf. F. Nitzsch, *Augustins Lehre vom Wunder*; Diestel, "Bibel und Naturkunde", *Studien und*

not happen contrary to nature, but contrary to nature as known". But what Augustine means by nature as known to us is the real objective uniformity of nature *inclusive* of any supposedly unknown laws, while by nature absolutely, against which the miracle does not occur, he means the predetermination of the whole course of nature in the eternal plan or purpose of God. This is evidently what Augustine means, as can be seen from the quotations given in footnote 74. God cannot do anything contrary to his eternal plan which includes all that comes to pass, for that would be to contradict Himself. He may and has caused events which transcend altogether what we understand by natural laws or forces.

Kritiken, 1866, p. 233; E. Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 136. This mistake is due to taking Augustine's statement out of its context: "Portentum ergo fit non contra naturam, sed contra quam est notam naturam", *De Civ. Dei*, Lib. XXI, c. 8; *Cont. Faust. Man.*, Lib. XXIX, 2; XXVI, 3. What Augustine means by Nature as known to us is the real and objective uniformity of all Nature, including any supposedly unknown natural laws; while Nature absolutely means the entire course of the universe as determined by God's eternal plan. God cannot act contrary to Nature in this latter sense without contradicting Himself. This is all that Augustine means. This is abundantly clear from the whole of *Cont. Faust. Man.*, Lib. XXVI, 3; and also from Augustine's fine conception of the fixed objective course of Nature and of natural law in *De Gen. ad lit.*, Lib. IX, 17; and his attribution of miracles to the omnipotence of God (*De Civ. Dei*, Lib. XXI, c. 7). To the course of Nature thus conceived a miracle is in "opposition", though not a violation of natural law. But any opposition of any event to the eternal purpose of God is of course for Augustine inconceivable. But this does not answer the question as to how Augustine did conceive of the miracle and Nature. He does make a distinction between relative and absolute miracles. A relative miracle is one where God at creation inserted the germs of a miracle in Natural forces, so that their concrete occurrence demands the intrusion of God's power to liberate these forces; no immediately creative power is required, *Quaest. in Hept.*, II, q. 21; *De Trin.* III, c. 8, § 13, c. 5, § 11; but Augustine recognizes an absolute miracle. He denies that all miracles can be explained as above. God, he says, has in Himself the causes of events which He has not put in Nature, and which He produces in a creative manner for man's salvation. This is an absolute miracle, due to God's creative power and transcending all natural law. Cf. *De Gen. ad lit.*, IX, 17; also Augustine's statement that the ultimate ground of belief in miracles is the omnipotence of God (*De Civ. Dei*, Lib. XXI, c. 7). See also the long quotation from Augustine by E. Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

This idea of a miracle, as produced by "higher" or "unknown" laws of nature, appears to have been asserted by the Duke of Argyll, Baden Powell, and Ménégoz. Schleiermacher leans toward it in his *Glaubenslehre*, though it is not his most characteristic view which is found in his *Reden*, and which is that the miracle is a sign of the immediate dependence of everything on the Infinite.⁷⁵ As we saw, Schmid⁷⁶ says that probably this is the true conception of miracle, though he is agnostic upon this point.

This idea of the miracle has called forth much criticism not only formerly but also recently, and its weaknesses have been thoroughly exposed by a number of writers on the subject.⁷⁷

In criticising this view we have in mind both its older and its newer forms. For it makes really no essential difference whether we say, upon the basis of a naïve realism, that in natural science we know nature as it really is but do not know all of its laws, so that some unknown law may be the cause of a miracle; or whether upon the basis of a critical theory of knowledge we say that we only know the phenomenal aspect of nature, only nature as a mechanism, not its inner and real organism and the forces which really are active in it. For this conception of a miracle, while it might account for some miracles of healing, cannot account for the so-called "nature miracles". It is true that the progress of modern scientific knowledge has shown us great stretches of reality yet to be conquered. It has made us conscious of our ignorance. But at the same time modern

⁷⁵ Schleiermacher, *Der Christl. Glaube*, § 47: *Reden u. s. w.*, 2 te Rede; The Duke of Argyll, *Reign of Law*, p. 22; Baden Powell, *The Order of Nature*, pp. 376, 377; Ménégoz on the Biblical notion of miracle in *Seance de Rentrée de la Faculté de Théologie Prot. de Paris*, 1894, p. 40.

⁷⁶ Schmid, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

⁷⁷ Mozley, *Miracles*, Bampton Lectures, 1865, pp. 144-165; A. B. Bruce, *The Miraculous Element in the Gospels*, pp. 48 ff.; C. M. Mead, *Supernatural Revelation*, pp. 111 ff.; C. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, I, pp. 622 ff.; W. B. Greene, "The Place of the Miracle in Nature," in *Bibliotheca Sacra*, vol. LXIII, 1906, p. 547 ff.; Haering, *Der Christliche Glaube*, 1906, p. 353.

scientific knowledge of nature has by its advance made us more sure of some things. If we were totally ignorant of nature we might suppose it could do many wonderful things. But it is just because we know so much about nature that we can say that it is not creative. It does not multiply substance; it does not bring life out of death. And not only can we say that it does not, but we know enough about it to say that it cannot. In other words, some of the miracles recorded in the New Testament transcend not only all known but all possible laws or forces of nature. If Jesus really fed the five thousand with two loaves, if He really rose from the dead, these events cannot be explained in this way. In the face of the evidence even, it would seem more reasonable to deny the occurrence of these events than to attempt to explain them by attributing them to unknown or higher laws of nature.

And even in the case of some miracle of healing, where some such explanation might conceivably be made, two things must be remembered. One is that because it might conceivably be thus explained is no valid reason for asserting that this is its true explanation. The other is that when the cure takes place at a word from Jesus, it is more than highly improbable that these unknown laws of nature were operative just at the desired moment. If, on the other hand, it be urged that God acted immediately so as to start these unaccustomed and unknown forces at work, then God's creative and supernatural action is called in and only moved one link further back. Such an explanation even of the miracles of healing is one which is not only merely hypothetical, but improbable to the verge of impossibility.

Furthermore this idea of miracle really tends to do away with miracles in any objective sense, and to pass into a subjective view. For in referring miracles to unknown laws of nature, it reduces the miraculous element in any event to our ignorance of nature. As far as the general idea or category of miracle goes, this view would thus reduce it to our ignorance of nature. Hence the number of

miracles would increase or diminish in inverse ratio to our scientific knowledge, and hence become a purely subjective matter. Dr. Mead has remarked that upon this view a juggler's tricks would become miracles for those who could not understand them.

Nature, then, controlled by the providential government of God cannot work miracles. Nor does the course of nature leave any room for the miracle without an interruption of its course. This being so, there is only one other conceivable way to explain or define a miracle if one is still unwilling to admit that God can act immediately apart from natural causes, as well as through them. This is to break down the conception of nature.

The third main class of views of the miracle, therefore, are those which attempt to break down the idea of nature as an objective system of forces acting as causes of events.

This has been done either by means of an extreme empirical scepticism as to the ideas of causation and natural law, or by an idealistic conception of nature.

It will be best, therefore, before examining the views which come under this class, to ask more definitely what the ideas expressed by the terms nature, natural law, and causation, mean. There are two erroneous conceptions of nature and of natural law which either operate to render belief in miracle impossible, or else to give rise to very inadequate conceptions of what a miracle is.

One of these may be called the mechanical view which asserts that nature is a closed system of second causes or objective forces producing events in a necessary manner. Nature is regarded as a name for this complex of necessarily acting causes or forces. This is supposed by many to be the particular achievement of "the modern mind." Thus Professor H. R. MacIntosh,⁷⁸ who seeks to refute this view, nevertheless says that "the modern mind has taken in the conception of the world as a closed system of

⁷⁸ H. R. MacIntosh, "Miracles and the Modern Christian Mind", *Expositor*, 1910, Series VII, vol. 9, pp. 420, 421.

physical sequences. And in the main that conception is a modern novelty." Professor MacIntosh also tells us that "today the Christian believer is faced by the conception—often enunciated as the basal presupposition of all science—that the world is an inviolable system of mechanical causation, a complex unity of rigidly fixed forces, acting and interacting in absolutely predetermined ways."

This view would render it as impossible for God to act in the world as for man. But in ruling out the miracle, it does so on grounds which render man's free agency and God's providential government of the world alike impossible.

This mechanical view, however, is a philosophical or speculative, and not a scientific one. Natural science regards the uniformity of nature as an empirical generalization, and natural laws are considered by natural science as empirical descriptions, or possibly explanations, of the way in which things happen. Such a mechanical determinism in natural science purposely abstracts all qualitative characters of things, and knows that its explanation is not ultimate and exhaustive of reality. When put forward as an ultimate philosophy of the universe, it is not science, but speculative metaphysics constructed from the viewpoint of the science of mechanics, but not a valid inference from that science.

On the other hand, there is an opposite view of nature which has just as much claim to be termed "modern," and which is perhaps quite as fashionable as the above view. It is a sceptical view which, carried out logically, will invalidate all scientific knowledge, but which is frequently used in such a way as to give a specious defense of miracle, and to result in an erroneous idea of what a miracle is. It starts out from Hume's idea that the uniformity of nature is only a matter of custom or habit, and that it is merely a generalization from a number of experiences. We suppose that the future course of events will be like the past because of our past experience. Likewise particular laws of nature are simply registers of experience, the expression of the way in which we find things to behave in the ex-

ternal world. Hence there is no necessity about nature, and no idea of objective forces producing events, and no reason why events may not happen anytime quite contrary to our past experience. If it be replied that one experiment will make us certain that a particular antecedent will be followed by a particular consequent, it is replied in turn that this certainty is in turn only because of our belief in the uniformity of nature, which again is only a belief resting upon past experience, and which accordingly can give no necessity for the future being like the past.

This view, instead of furnishing any rational ground for belief in miracle, must lead to complete scepticism in the sphere of natural science, because it is not merely the uniformity of nature which it reduces to a merely empirical basis, but also the causal judgment which lies at its basis. Hume supposed that all knowledge rests on sensation. The senses can take cognizance only of the sequence of events. One event follows another. That which uniformly precedes, we call the cause; that which follows, we call the effect. The supposition that there is anything in the antecedent which determines the consequent is arbitrary. A cause, therefore, is only an invariable antecedent, and an effect only an invariable consequent. That is all that we can affirm.⁷⁹

But experience only relates to the past; it cannot guarantee the future. If we are to say that a given consequent always will, let alone must, follow a given antecedent, there must be some other ground of belief than the fact that it always has done so. And this ground of belief is the causal judgment as a necessary law of thought. Night follows day, but we do not regard day as the cause of night. If we wish to explain the darkness of night, we refer to the movement of the earth on its axis by which part of it is turned away from the sun. But on Hume's principles this is no more the cause of night than is day, for each are invariable antecedents of night. On these principles there is

⁷⁹ Hume, *Enquiry*, etc., § 4 and § 7.

no rational ground for belief that the future will be like the past. A universal scepticism as to any scientific knowledge is the result.

Hume, therefore, gives no explanation of the causal judgment. Experience in Hume's sense cannot even show what event is cause and what is effect, much less the necessary connection which exists between them. A wider and wider experience will not explain this necessary connection. If we once understand the reason why a certain phenomenon or group of phenomena give rise to a certain effect, no amount of custom or experience will increase our certitude. According to Hume we ought to be more and more certain the more our experience of the same sequence is increased, but this is contrary to fact. If we understand the reasons why certain causes give rise to certain effects, no multiplication of these particular sequences can render us more certain. And this is a fact of experience which Hume's theory fails to account for.⁸⁰

Such a view leads, as was said, to absolute scepticism as to any knowledge in the sphere of natural science. Hence its result would be to do away with any rational explanation of any events and of course with any distinction of a miracle from any other event. It is not only illogical, therefore, it is a highly precarious method of procedure when Christian apologetes appeal to such a scepticism in order to defend the possibility of miracle, and still worse when it is used to determine the nature of a miracle.

This has been done by Wendland, who, though not a disciple of Hume, nevertheless makes use of a sceptical criticism of the principle of causation and an idealistic natural philosophy to defend the possibility of the miracle and to explain its nature as an event which may deviate from the course of nature and at the same time be brought about by natural causes in so far as natural causes can be said to explain any event. Wendland attempts to define a miracle, and to give it its place in relation to natural law

⁸⁰ Cf. W. G. T. Shedd, "Hume, Huxley, and Miracles", *Presb. Review*, vol. I, 1880, pp. 22 ff.

by an idealistic criticism of the idea of nature and by the destruction of the idea of causality. Causality, he says, is only valid as an empirical category, not as a principle of explanation of the world.⁸¹ He says that "all scientific concepts can only deal with a specific side of reality. They leave room for other and deeper explanations."⁸² This statement is true, but Wendland goes much further than this. He does this by attempting to show that the mechanical idea of causation is inadequate as an ultimate principle. Here too he is right. But instead of showing that a more adequate conception of causation is necessary, he seeks to break down entirely the idea of causation in natural science so as to leave room for a miracle produced in accordance with natural laws, in so far as they are capable of producing anything. He does this by a criticism of the causal judgment which is false and which no scientist would admit. For example he will not allow the principle of the "similarity" of cause and effect in nature.⁸³ This, he says, is never found, but always a dissimilarity. He here appeals to the dissimilarity between a physical event and the resulting sensation *i.e.*, between the prick of a needle and the sensation of pain. But he surely cannot suppose that he is saying anything new to natural or to psychological science. Neither can he thus refute the equivalence of cause and effect, for this does not mean that in the effect there is always found precisely the same thing as in the cause. This principle has never been so understood. In the physical sphere there is always a transformation of energy, so that the effect may differ from the cause. This principle only means that the same cause always produces the same effects under identical conditions, and that there is a constant relation between cause and effect. Moreover, to point to the sensation as the effect of a physical stimulus is aside from the point, for mechanical science does not carry its

⁸¹ Joh. Wendland *Der Wunderglaube im Christentum*, 1910; cf. p. 117 f.

⁸² *Op. cit.*, p. 120.

⁸³ *Op. cit.*, p. 116.

doctrine of the conservation and transformation of energy into the mental or psychic sphere. Whatever independence is shown for mental phenomena, no place for a miracle in nature can be thus made without the interruption or suspension of natural law. When, for example, James Ward in his *Naturalism and Agnosticism* criticises the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism, he does not suppose that he is making room for a miracle. In a word, to show the inadequacy of the mechanical view of the world is not to make room for Christian supernaturalism. In the mental sphere, moreover, the causal judgment presupposes a natural antecedent for each effect. Without the acknowledgement that God can act apart from natural causes, no point is gained for the miracle, and furthermore this line of argument will result in making all events alike contain a miraculous or creative element, as we shall find Wendland actually does. Second causes are thus reduced to a complete non-efficiency.

In the next place, Wendland says that the causal law asserts only that the effect is necessary when the condition or cause is given, but it does not follow that the cause is necessarily given.⁸⁴ But natural science replies that the cause itself is the consequent of a preceding condition, and comes under the causal law. We might argue in this way that the existence of the world is not necessary, but not against the validity of the application of the causal idea to the phenomena of nature.

Once more Wendland seeks to weaken the idea of causality by saying that events in the world allow of many possibilities as to future occurrences. It is not only that subjectively we cannot know future possibilities, but objectively from the causal standpoint future possibilities are not certain.⁸⁵ Every event must have its causes but it does not follow that every event is so completely determined by its antecedents that it necessarily must occur.⁸⁶ But this is not the case and, were it true, would not help us. Causation

⁸⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 122.

⁸⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 129.

⁸⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 117.

means just the necessary connection of events. In the idea of causation there is no possibility of a different set of consequences unless the antecedent conditions are different. It is only our ignorance of the antecedent conditions which gives rise to this illusion. If we knew all the causes and con-causes we could predict the future with precision. Natural science, it is true, cannot say that a miracle is impossible. But this gives us no right to say that a miracle in nature is possible in accordance with natural laws. Natural science from its point of view claims that whatever happens in nature is determined by a fixed relation of cause and effect.

In thinking then of natural laws discovered by observation and experiment, it may be asked how we get the idea of any causal necessity. If observation and experiment leads to the drawing up of particular laws of nature, we must reckon with the fact that under circumstances experience leads to other results *i.e.*, to a correction of laws of nature so drawn up. Hence science concedes that particular laws have only a conditional and provisional validity. They are only hypotheses for the knowledge of phenomena. This much is widely acknowledged by men of natural science. But no representative of modern science supposes that therefore the idea that all phenomena in nature have a natural explanation can be given up. Although our statements of natural laws may always be subject to revision, the idea of natural law and natural explanation of events is the rule of knowledge in natural science.

It is false, therefore, when theologians adopt a scepticism in reference to separate and particular so-called natural laws and often apply it for apologetic purposes. They wrongly suppose that this relativity—a provisional character of particular laws—discredits natural science. But this is not so at all. Even if particular statements of natural laws have to be revised, the standpoint of natural science and a natural causal explanation of events in nature is not touched.

How then do we get our idea of the necessity involved in

the natural sequence of events? It cannot be derived in an empirical way, as we have seen. Those who would do this would suppose that by abstraction from different particular cases there arises an idea of necessity in regard to natural law. But this conclusion falls to pieces the moment the relativity of these separate laws is considered. If they have only an empirical significance, they cannot establish the necessity of the general idea of natural law. On the other hand if we suppose that it is the idea of general natural law which gives the idea of necessity to the particular laws, we are arguing in a circle, as Stange has pointedly shown.⁸⁷ We can reach the idea of natural law in general only through the particular laws, and they can attain to the idea of necessity only through the general idea of natural law. Extreme empiricism cannot escape this circle.

But the idea of a necessary connection between natural events is really due to the causal judgment as a necessary law of thought. This leads us beyond the mere empirical description of sequences of events in nature to the idea that nature is a complex of forces which produce events in a necessary chain of causes and effects. If miracles are possible, it cannot be by breaking down our idea of a natural cause, but only by recognizing a higher cause than nature—a transcendent cause which can act apart from the second causes of nature.

This method of breaking down the idea of nature and natural cause, moreover, leads Wendland to the idea that all providence and all God's action in nature is of a creative character, and so gives rise to the idea that all events are miraculous, thus destroying the idea of a miracle as distinct from other natural events. He regards God's Providence as a continuous miracle, saying that there is a continuous

⁸⁷ C. Stange, "Natural Law and Belief in Miracle", *Constructive Quarterly*, March, 1915, pp. 137-158. Stange has given an acute criticism of the method which uses a scepticism as to natural law in defense of miracle. His views coincide with those expressed above on this point, though we shall find his idea of the miracle unsatisfactory.

creative working of God in the world.⁸⁸ And also he says that because God is transcendent as well as immanent, His working in the world must have a transcendent miraculous character.⁸⁹ This does not follow. It is true that if God is transcendent, He may thus work, and if He is only immanent, enmeshed as it were, in nature, He cannot thus work. But it does not follow that because God is transcendent He must always work in a miraculous manner. This at once makes every event in providence a miracle. God can work nothing but miracles on such a view—*i.e.*, in the sense that there is a creative element in every event of providence. Wendland's idea of nature, moreover, shows that he regards all providence as miraculous. He says that in nature there is a creative working of God, but it is in all events. Hence all the course of nature is miraculous in having this creative element in it, and yet not really miraculous in a real sense because he says that for this very reason, it is a mistake to say that there is any interruption or even suspension of natural law or that any event can come to pass apart from natural causes. How is it possible, then, for God to create something new in nature and at the same time not act apart from natural causes? It is impossible, Wendland would say,⁹⁰ if natural law is viewed uncritically as an ultimate explanation of any event. Natural law is inadequate to explain any event, and hence Wendland supposes that what he terms the "miraculous" *i.e.*, the providential working of God, does not suspend or act independently of any natural laws or forces. Consequently he defines miracles⁹¹ as "acts of God, which ground a new condition of things, which did not find its ground in the already existing connection of phenomenal events in the

⁸⁸ Wendland, *op. cit.*, p. 6, "es gibt ein stetiges schaffendes Wirken Gottes in der Welt". 10.

⁸⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 1. 3

⁹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 8, "Wunder sind Taten Gottes, die einen neuen Tatbestand begründen, der nicht in den bestehenden Zusammenhängen der Welt begründet lag."

world." Hence he says⁹² that the assertion that in a miracle God works immediately, is true, but it is not true to say that He works in some events mediately and in others immediately.

Hence his idea is that all events of providence involve an immediate or creative activity of God, but this does not mean an activity apart from second causes, nor even one in which second causes contribute nothing toward the production of the event. Hence all providence is "supernatural" in the sense that no event is explicable from second causes but requires an activity of God which Wendland calls creative, but every event, on the other hand is the product of second causes in as far as they can produce anything. We have left then no possible means of distinguishing between a miracle and any providential event. Wendland wishes to distinguish the great Christian miracles from other events, but in asserting that providence is a continuous creation, that God acts only in one manner, and that all events happen without interruption of natural law, he has robbed himself of the possibility of making any such distinction. Hence instead of attempting an impossible defense of the great Christian miracles, we find Wendland making concessions to the demands of his philosophy, and saying, for example, in the case of the Resurrection of Jesus that so long as we are sure that He is alive, it makes no difference whether His Resurrection was a bodily one, and in fact how we conceive its mode.⁹³

Another method of conceiving a miracle from the point of view of an idealistic criticism of nature is that of Carl Stange.⁹⁴ He differs sharply from Wendland, though we shall find that his conception of a miracle in the end is quite similar. He proceeds not so much from the point of view of an idealistic reflection upon nature combined with the breaking down of the idea of causality, as Wendland does,

⁹² *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁹³ *Op. cit.*, p. III ff.

⁹⁴ C. Stange, *Naturgesetz u. Wunderglaube*, 1914; "Natural Law and Belief in Miracle", *The Constructive Quarterly*, March, 1915, pp. 137-158.

but rather from an epistemological criticism of our knowledge in natural science. He criticises Wendland severely for his treatment of the principle of causation, and in fact for trying to find a place for the miracle within nature by this scepticism as to scientific knowledge. He wishes to remove the miracle altogether from its connection with the causal principle, which he limits to its mechanical form, and to regard it as an act of God. And yet while it belongs to a different sphere than phenomena in nature from the point of view of natural science, it is nevertheless an event which is in nature and history. And since he denies any action of God apart from second causes, it is difficult to see in what essential respect Stange's view differs from that of Wendland. Stange, then, says that a miracle is to be considered, not from the standpoint of causation, but as an act of God. We must not start from the opposition of a miracle to nature, nor from an analysis of religious experience.⁹⁵ Both methods are one sided. We must hold fast the truth that faith in miracle is possible only for religious experience, but we must show, over against "the experiential view", that the miracle is not a universal element in all religious experience, but is objective and involves a specific relation to our empirical consciousness of nature. The question concerns the relation of God's activity to the world. And the question is as to how it is possible that the Divine activity stands in a twofold relation to the world. From the standpoint of causality such an idea is impossible. In other words if we conceive of God's relation to the world under the idea of causation, we can go no further than the ideas of creation and providence as explaining the existence of the world and its course of events. If, then, we are to reach any other idea of God's relation to the world, we must abandon the causal idea as inadequate. Indeed it is inadequate even as applied to creation and providence. The causal idea only explains things from the mechanical point of view, and even in creation and providence we conceive

⁹⁵ *Naturgesetz u. Wunderglaube*, pp. 84 ff.

the world and its course of events as acts of God. The constitutive mark of the miracle is that it is an act of the Divine Will, "not an event which is distinct from the ordinary course of events".⁹⁶ A miracle, then, means that in it we meet with God as a Person; we think of the "content" or "motivation" of the Divine Will. In creation and providence we do not meet God as a Person, and "do not advance beyond the idea of an impersonal power".⁹⁷ These two conceptions, he says, are common to Deism; and "to a certain extent" even pantheism accepts them. To limit God to the work of creation and of providence is to fail to see Him as a Person. To see Him as a Person we must look to the motives and content of His Will. In Christianity and in Christian history God gives us to share His life. And in these events we see that holiness and love are the motives of His personal Will. Creation and providence do not give us this knowledge and experience. The course of nature fails us here, and so does the religious consciousness itself, unless we are to regard religion as something merely subjective. There must be, therefore, events in history of a specific kind in which we can recognize the especial character of the Divine Will; events beyond those of creation and providence. Hence the analysis of the Christian idea of God leads us to the conception of events which are "essentially distinct" from natural events. These are the miracles of the Gospel history (*heilsgeschichtliche Wunder*). A miracle, then, is an act of God in history in which we recognize the Will of God as love. If we did not have these events we would be helpless against Deism and Pantheism. But though these events are objective and meet us in nature and history, it is not as if we had to do with two different modes of God's action in the world.⁹⁸ If we ask after the mode of God's action in miracle, it is the same as in events of providence; the point is that in the miracle we look at the motive of God's will.

⁹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 87.

⁹⁷ Art. in *Constr. Quarterly*, March, 1915, p. 158.

⁹⁸ *Naturgesetz u. Wunderglaube*, p. 94.

If we ask how this can be and if after all this is not simply a subjective view of miracle, Stange would reply in the negative, and say that the ground of his view is in the idealistic view of nature. Nature is simply the world of phenomena as apprehended by the understanding under its ideas of space, time, and causality. Hence everything that belongs to the world of phenomena must be included by the understanding under its form of necessary causation. But our knowledge in natural science extends only so far as we have to do with phenomena as apprehended by the understanding. Hence nature is not the whole of reality. We have also "perception" which is not, as in Kant, the grouping of sense presentations by the understanding, but a kind of immediate apprehension of reality. Here we can find a "standard" for the "valuation" of experience of objective events as real. Hence for *every* event the scientific point of view is limited. In this way we really understand no single event. Natural science regards the world as a series of interrelated necessary events. But that there is such a universe of events lies beyond the purview of natural science and in the same way, no single event can be ultimately conceived by natural science. Hence when we meet with miracles, we have events which we regard as beyond the sphere of natural science, but at the same time we cannot say that they "suspend" the laws of nature or are not the product of natural causes. Consequently while we cannot deduce the idea of miracle from the idealistic conception of nature, we can see that it leaves room for miracle, and can understand that the religious consciousness must embrace types of ideas that cannot be measured by the standards of scientific knowledge.

How then does Stange's view differ from that of Wendland? Both assert that God acts only in one manner *i.e.*, through natural laws. Both assert that nothing takes place except through the operation of natural laws. Wendland finds God active "creatively" in every event. His difficulty, therefore, is to show how we meet with God more in some

events—those in the Gospel history—than we do in others, in ordinary events. Stange thinks we meet with God as a Person in no events of providence, but only in those of the Gospel history. His difficulty, therefore, is to show why this is so. If God is not the cause of these events in a particular way, they become providential events. But providence, he says, cannot bring us face to face with God. If, on the other hand, these events differ from events of providence, Stange fails to show how. The view of miracle given by both Stange and Wendland is, therefore, very much the same. It is an act in which we are brought face to face with God. They differ only in their view of providence. Providence for Wendland is a kind of continuous creation and at every point reveals God. Providence for Stange is a mere mechanism and does not reveal God at all. Hence Wendland cannot distinguish a miracle from providence because all providence is in his sense miraculous, while Stange can only discriminate the miracle by appealing to its motive in the mind of God.

In criticism of Stange's view it is only necessary to show its inherent contradictions. He is involved in a hopeless dilemma. If providence does not reveal the personal will of God, and if miracles do so, and if at the same time they differ objectively from providential events, then it follows that miraculous events cannot be brought about by natural law as are all providential events according to Stange. On the other hand if, as Stange affirms, God can act only in one way and if even miracles, as he asserts, are produced in accordance with natural law, then miracles become merely providential events, and since providence cannot reveal the personal will of God, neither could a miracle. If he points to the "content of the Divine Will", that is the love of God, manifested in the miraculous event, then he really passes into a subjective view of miracle. For the love and care of God may conceivably be seen in some providential events as much as in some miracles. The fact is that no view which asserts that God acts in the world only through

natural causes and that all events are thus produced, can make any real objective distinction between miracle and providence. Stange tries hard to give an objective view of the miracle and to discriminate it sharply from providential events, but he just as vigorously asserts that "in the case of the saving activity of God there is no suspension of the laws of nature."⁹⁹ But this is quite impossible. In the last analysis a miracle for him must be a providential event, and its miraculous character must consist in the experience of God which we derive from the event. It is simply viewing some events religiously, while these events and all others may also be viewed scientifically. And the one viewpoint is after all subjective and the other objective. We cannot see that his view differs essentially from that of Herrmann, though he criticizes Herrmann most severely, and strives earnestly to maintain an objective idea of the miracle.

Having found these three main classes of views unsatisfactory, we proceed to state what we believe a miracle to be, upon the basis of the preceding criticism of those views we deem inadequate.

A miracle, of course, has a religious function and a vital relation to Christianity and Christian experience. But to define a miracle we must state its relation to the power of God and to nature and natural law. An adequate conception of nature and natural law leaves room for the miracle. The matter was well put by John Stuart Mill in a passage which is well known and which Mozley has quoted.¹⁰⁰ Mill says—"But in order that any alleged fact should be contrary to the law of causation, the allegation must be, not simply that the cause existed without being followed by the effect, for that would be no uncommon occurrence; but that this happened in the absence of any adequate counter-acting cause. Now in the case of an alleged miracle, the assertion is the exact opposite of this. It is that the effect was defeated, not in the absence, but in consequence of a

⁹⁹ Art. in *Constructive Quarterly*, p. 157.

¹⁰⁰ J. S. Mill, *Logic*, vol. II,⁸ pp. 167, 168; Mozley, *Bampton Lectures*, 1865, p. 302.

counteracting cause, namely, a direct interposition of an act of the will of some being who has power over nature; and in particular of a being whose will, being assumed to have endowed all the causes with the powers by which they produce their effects, may well be supposed alike to counteract them. A miracle (as was justly remarked by Brown) is no contradiction to the law of cause and effect, it is a new effect supposed to be produced by the introduction of a new cause." This statement shows that there can be no rational objection to a miracle from the causal judgment. But it gives us no right to define a miracle as an event produced by natural causes operating in a manner contrary to ordinary experience. It gives us no right to find a place for miracle in nature and through natural law, by pointing to the limitations of scientific knowledge, because science assumes that any given event must have some natural explanation. A miracle, therefore, transcends explanation by natural causes, and its possibility cannot be defended by pointing to the limits of scientific knowledge, but rather by pointing to the power of God. It is an event due to God's immediate working apart from natural law and second causes.

When we view the miracle in its relation to the power of God, we see that it is one instance of a class of events which we call supernatural. If this directly supernatural or immediate action of God apart from second causes is denied, one goes beyond natural science and constructs a naturalistic philosophy or metaphysics. This has been done, for example, by Pfeiderer.¹⁰¹ He says that theology must adopt the "scientific method". "This method is simply that of causal thinking, according to which every event is the necessary effect of causes whose operation is again determined by their connection with other causes or by their place in a reciprocal action of forces according to law." This is a fair description of the method of natural science. But Pfeiderer insists upon its universal application, and here

¹⁰¹ Pfeiderer, *Evolution and Theology*, p. 2.

he goes beyond the point where he can find any justification at all from natural science. He says that "there is only one choice: either the evolutionary mode of thought is right, in which case it must be uniform in all fields of investigation, in history, then, as well as in nature; or it is wrong, in which case the views of nature acquired by means of it are not justified, and we have no right to prefer them to the traditions of faith." Hence according to Pfleiderer the supernatural activity of God is to be denied in every sphere. The intrusion of any cause outside the immanent nexus of second causes is, he thinks, to be strictly denied. But this conclusion is an unwarranted extension or universalizing of the principles and method of natural science. It is not justified by the idea of natural law in natural science which lays no claim to such universal validity. It is not warranted by the uniformity of nature, as the above quotation from Mill clearly shows. It cannot base itself upon the causal judgment which only affirms that every effect must have an adequate cause. It could only find its justification in the denial of the transcendence of God. And yet, strangely enough it is put forward as an axiom by men like Pfleiderer who admit the existence of God, His transcendence, and His providential government of the world. These men argue that just because God is not absent from the world, but is concerned in the production of every event through natural causes, therefore *no* event can occur outside this causal connection. But this by no means follows. It was a mistake to see God only in supernatural events. According to this naïve view the progress of scientific discovery could only mean the gradual banishment of God from the world. But it by no means follows that the recognition of God's providential control of all events renders it impossible for Him to act immediately in the world apart from second causes. The assertion that God cannot thus act is wholly unwarranted for anyone who believes in the God of creation who made the world, and the God of providence who upholds and governs it. It is not only an assertion to which natural

science lends no support; it can be supported only by an atheism which denies God's existence, or by a pantheism which denies His transcendence and personality.

In order, therefore, to understand the nature of a miracle, we must ask what is meant by this supernatural action of God. This can best be understood by briefly defining the ideas of creation, mediate creation, and evolution. According to the Scriptural view of creation, it is an action of God alone in which He only is active. It is further an originating activity which produces something new, that is, something before non-existent; something not potentially contained in anything preceding. Creation, then, implies the previous non-existence of its product, and hence no possible *concursus* of the action of God with anything else.

Contrasted with this originating activity of God, is His providential control of all things, by which He not only upholds and preserves them in being, but controls them. This providential control is not a continuous creation, but a *concursus* of God's action with second causes. It is not an originating activity, but an unfolding or evolution by the means of natural forces under the Divine control. It does not bring forth a new product, but unfolds or draws out what was potentially contained in the evolving series. Now it is very important, for the proper view of a miracle, to note that creation and evolution are opposite ideas, and mutually exclusive in the sense that where there is creation, there is not found evolution, and vice versa.¹⁰² Evolution is an unfolding, and this process produces nothing. It simply evolves what was before contained in the evolving series. Creation, on the other hand, is an origination, the production of something new. Now we do not mean to assert that in any specific product, such as man, both these forces may not have been at work; we do mean, however, that any element in any complex whole which is the product of creation is not the product of evolution, and *vice versa*. This

¹⁰² Cf. B. B. Warfield, *Bible Student*, 1901, pp. 1 ff. Dr. Warfield has brought out clearly this mutually exclusive character of the ideas of creation and evolution.

is important to bear in mind. On the one hand some natural scientists are clear headed enough to realize that just in so far as things are accounted for by evolution, just so far is the creative activity of God excluded. On the other hand some theologians and apologetes have sometimes presented a weak defense of supernaturalism by forgetting this mutually exclusive character of creation and evolution, and by speaking of evolution as God's method of creation, or by using phrases like "creative evolution". If, then, we remember the real nature of creation and evolution, we will not be exposed to the danger of supposing that we are upholding the Christian view of the world, while we are all the while admitting the contention of naturalism. For suppose that we should distribute the activity of God in relation to the world under just these two ideas—absolute creation and evolution, and at the same time remember that they are in the above sense mutually exclusive. Then we would conceive that God absolutely originated or created the original world stuff, and then that *all else* is to be accounted for by the action of natural causes under God's control. Here, then, we should have a truly theistic evolution, but by no means the Christian view. For in order to have a Christian view of the world, we must recognize the direct intrusion of the activity or power of God apart from second causes at least in the Incarnation and Resurrection of Jesus, and also in the creation anew of the human soul in the new birth. In all such cases the result is joined to the series of second causes which may be operating according to their nature, but which have no part in producing the event.

This, accordingly, brings us to the idea of "mediate creation". This term is unfortunate. This is not a creation by means of or "through" second causes. This would not be any kind of a creation at all. Mediate creation, like all creation, is an absolutely originating activity. It is the insertion into the already evolving series of second causes, of something entirely new, and which, although joined to the series of natural causes, is not in any sense their product,

and not within their power to produce even under the Divine control. The second causes may be acting, but they are not active in producing the product of this mediate creation. Mediate creation, then, does not exclude a genetic relation of any *total* product to the preceding phenomenal causes, but it does imply that the new element, that is, that which is the product of this creative power, is not in any sense produced through second or natural causes.

Now this "mediate creation" is just the supernatural or direct mode of the Divine action on the world. It is implied in the Christianity of our sources, and is essential to New Testament Christianity.

A miracle, then, is a supernatural event in this sense. It is an event due to the immediate activity of God apart from second causes. All miracles, therefore, are supernatural events. But all supernatural events are not miracles. The class of supernatural events is wider than that of miracles. There are supernatural events in the psychic sphere such as Regeneration which is a creative act of God alone, and sanctification which is a supernatural process due to God's power, though not apart from man's coöperation, and these events are sometimes called miracles. Hence it is better to distinguish the miracle from these other supernatural events, since the terms applied to it in Scripture are scarcely applicable to these inner events. A miracle, then, is not only an event due to the immediate power of God; it is an event in the external world. We may define a miracle, therefore, as an event in the external world due to the immediate power of God.

This definition will of course exclude what most of the recent writers on the subject have included under the category of miracle, and called miracles of providence, and of the answer to prayer. But we have shown that such events are not miracles, and all those writers recognize the miracles of "the Gospel history" as a higher class of miracle, though we have seen that they have been unable to give any satisfactory idea of their nature.

Most of the objections to this idea of a miracle really involve and spring out of the denial of its possibility. To discuss them would take us beyond the limits of our subject and require a consideration of the second main question concerning miracles—the question of their possibility. There is, however, one objection concerning which a word must be said in closing. It is often urged as an objection to the above given conception of miracle, that it is a modern conception, and that the Scripture writers did not have our modern notions about nature and laws of nature. But this objection is without adequate support in the Bible. While it is true that the writers of the Biblical accounts of miracles did not write out of a consciousness formed by the ideas of modern natural science, it is nevertheless true that, even though they may not have had the idea of a “law of nature”, they did have a sufficiently clear conception of “the natural order of things”, and they by no means identified the natural and the supernatural, neither did they regard everything as supernatural. In a word the Biblical writers distinguish between the natural order of events and wonderful works of God which transcend this natural order and are referred to the omnipotence of God. This, indeed, is acknowledged to be the case by Ménégos who rejects this idea of the miracle while acknowledging it to be that of the Biblical writers. Thus, for example, after reviewing some of our Lord’s miracles, Ménégos says that the writers of the accounts evidently believe that it is by the power of God that the miracle is wrought, and that it involves a “domination” of nature, so that the natural order of things yields to a superior will, the will of God.¹⁰³ In all these accounts, Ménégos continues, “the miracle is invariably considered as a phenomenon contrary to the natural order of events. It is precisely that which gives it the peculiar character of a miracle.” This is true of the Old Testament which distinguishes clearly enough between what conforms to the ordinary course of nature, and what does not. Köst-

¹⁰³ Ménégos, *op. cit.*, pp. 24, 25.

lin agrees with Ménégos on this point *viz.*, that in the Old Testament the idea of the miracle is practically the same as the one we have above stated, and that the miracle is always considered as a supernatural *intérvension* of God in the ordinary order of events.

Moreover it should be noted that this is the common idea of a miracle throughout the Bible as we have it. This is admitted by a writer such as Ziller¹⁰⁴ when he seeks to show that this unitary conception of miracle is due to the working over of the sources which, in the case of the Old Testament, they suffered in the post exilic period when a more fully developed idea of God led to a more fully developed conception of miracle. It is thus only through a reconstruction of the Old Testament's own account of the development of its doctrine of God, that the unity of the Biblical idea of miracle can be denied.¹⁰⁵

Turning to a very brief confirmation of what has been said concerning the Biblical idea of miracle, the Old Testament writers recognized fully the unchangeable continuance of nature and its uniformity.¹⁰⁶ Consequently when a miracle occurred it was recognized as a reversal of the natural order of events, and attributed to the power of God.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, so far from conceiving of everything as the product of God's power alone, the author of Genesis

¹⁰⁴ Ziller, *Biblische Wunder*, 1904, p. 4.

¹⁰⁵ On this whole subject besides the works of Köstlin, Ménégos, and Ziller already cited, see also Gloatz, *op. cit.*, p. 403. Schultz, *Alttest. Theol.*, p. 577; Kleinert, "Naturanschauung des Alten Testaments", *Studien u. Kritiken*, 1898, p. 1 ff.; Koeberle, *Natur und Geist nach der Auffassung des Alten Test.*, 1901, pp. 231, 260. Compare also the brief but well considered statement of Bavinck, *Gerreformeerde Dogmatiek*,² I, 350 ff. See also Sanday's statement in his article on Miracles and the Supernatural Character of the Gospels, *Expository Times*, vol. XIV, p. 64, where he says, "The ancients as well as the moderns believed that there was an order of Nature; if they had not had this belief, they would not have attached the importance they did to miracle."

¹⁰⁶ Gen. viii. 22; Job. xxxviii. 10 ff.; 7-10; Jer. v. 22; xxxi. 35, 36; xxxiii. 20, 25.

¹⁰⁷ 2 Kings xx. 9-11.

ascribes causality to nature,¹⁰⁸ and the working of miracles is the making of a new thing by God.¹⁰⁹

When we turn to the New Testament, we find that Jesus recognized an order of nature with its own causality,¹¹⁰ and, in the latter passage given in footnote 110, regarded the continuance of this natural order as a proof of God's mercy to a sinful world. The miracle Jesus regarded as transcending the natural order of things, as can be seen from the fact that in connection with all His miracles Jesus taught that they were works lying only in the power of Him in whom was all power, so that nature was obedient to His will. The Evangelists also distinguish between the natural order of things and the miraculous, and believe that the natural order is subject to Jesus and to God.¹¹¹ All through the eighth and ninth chapters of Matthew where Jesus, without any means but His mere word of power, healed a leper, two blind men, two demoniacs, a dumb man, a woman sick with fever, and another with an issue of blood, calmed a tempest, raised a dead man to life, it is clearly the idea of the Evangelist that there is a natural order and that it is subservient to the Divine Will, so that the miracle is an event which interrupts this natural order and is wrought by the power of God.

If we leave the Gospels and turn to Paul, it would not be difficult to point out how he considered the Resurrection of Jesus to be a work of God's power, and of such a creative nature that the Apostle uses it to illustrate the greatness of the power of God in regenerating the soul that is dead in sin,¹¹² and how the whole world order introduced by Christ's Resurrection into this natural order now ruled by sin, is through and through supernatural and due to the risen Christ as the powerful life-giving Spirit.¹¹³ But to unfold the meaning of all this would lead us far beyond our

¹⁰⁸ Gen. i. 11, 12.

¹⁰⁹ Numbers xvi. 30.

¹¹⁰ Mark iv. 28; v. 45.

¹¹¹ Matt. viii. 27; ix. 5 and 6, 24, 25, 33; xiii. 54.

¹¹² Eph. I. 19, 20.

¹¹³ I Cor. xv. 45 ff.

purpose which was simply to answer the objection that the writers of the Biblical books had no idea of a natural order of events and no idea of this distinction between the natural and the supernatural.

This has been done sufficiently. We cannot enter on the great topic of the function of the miracle. The contrast between the natural and the supernatural in the New Testament, especially in Paul, is soteriological and eschatological. We should have to speak of the connection of the miracle with sin and the effects of sin in nature, and how it points us to the power of God to save from sin, and to that future when all nature shall share in the glorious liberty of the sons of God. Our purpose has been simply to set forth the idea or nature of the miracle as an event in the external world wrought by the immediate power of God.

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PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROBLEM OF REVELATION*

The theistic theory of the world has usually been held, when held at all, as a reasonable, if not also a necessary, implication of ordinary experience. The ordinary course of nature, constitution of the mind, and evidence of a universal moral order are facts of observation that in all historic times have been thought to imply a divine revelation in the nature of things. Shields has said that "a theistic theory of the world is scientifically probable. As a mere hypothesis, viewed in a scientific light, it explains the universe better than other hypotheses, and ever holds its ground against them with increasing evidence." "A theistic theory of the world can alone make the world itself fully cognizable or intelligible. As we have already shown, the very course of science must logically end in a theistic ontology."¹ This conclusion has been always held by men of science in great numbers, and of the first rank, from Aristotle to Lord Kelvin, and many still living. There is a divine revelation in all common experience for all those who have eyes to see, and this may include that rudimental consciousness of God which most men may experience at times, the *sensus numinis*, so called by ancient writers.

A theism based solely on these universal sources is a natural theism, such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Cicero held. The Greek philosophers had no other means for the knowledge of God than such as are common to all men; and their attainments in this knowledge were sufficient to vindicate the assertion of the Apostle Paul that in this way God certainly may be known. Yet Plato and Aristotle be-

* See first article under this title in this *Review* for July, 1915.

¹ *Philosophia Ultima*, ii. pp. 355 f.

lieved that the religious mythology of their own time was the corrupted tradition of a better knowledge of divine things possessed by men of the earliest time and afterward lost. Plato evidently longed for some heavenly messenger and articulate message to confirm and complete the imperfect knowledge he had gained. The prevalent belief of antiquity that the gods at times assumed a human form would inevitably follow any such actual experience of theophanies and angelophanies as the Bible records; if that record is historical, not mythical.

Evidence of a primeval theism in which many races shared has been gathered in many fields by many scholars who agree with the conclusion of A. H. von Schlegel who said: "The more I investigate the ancient history of the world, the more I am convinced that the civilized nations set out from a purer worship of the Supreme Being" than anything they subsequently exhibited.² Cudworth collected much proof of the wide prevalence in ancient times of the tradition of one Supreme God and Heavenly Father, and the proof since Cudworth has been enormously enlarged. Cousin says that "all antique traditions refer to an age in which man at his departure from the hand of God received from him immediately all lights and all truths, soon obscured and corrupted by time and the incomplete science of man".³ In the days of Homer, if there was a Homer, the miraculous revelation made to the Hebrews, if such was made at all, was still in progress, and its leading events must have been widely rumored abroad: while in the Hebrew account this revelation began not with Abraham but with Adam, and had always intermittently accompanied the career of man: though for the most part, in its more obvious forms, limited to the faithful. Echoes and traces of this early revelation may still, perhaps, be found in the

² H. B. Smith, *Apologetics*, 1881, p. 80.

³ M. Victor Cousin, *Course of the History of Modern Philosophy*. Translated by O. W. Wright. 1852, i. p. 148; Cf. pp. 33, 36, 162-169, 418, 424.

traditions and mythology of many peoples, especially throughout the Orient.⁴

A theism derived from the ordinary sources of experience alone, accompanied by the deliberate rejection of all higher sources, may be called a naturalistic theism, such as the deists, with Rousseau, Kant and Emerson have professed. Of this naturalistic theism deism is the first crude form. What is called deism, is, from the Christian point of view, simply an impoverished theism, of which the essential notion is a personal God who never intervenes. He is absolute in natural attributes and moral excellence, and yet He never intervenes.⁵ His intervention is unnecessary, and would also be unreasonable, unsuitable to His perfect wisdom, and opposed to the order of the world. This deistic conception of God as a being who never intervenes is now taught in many pulpits which have been established by the Christian faith, and is taught on the assumption of scientific necessity. Since Kant this form of theism has been improved by the arguments of his second and third *Kritiken*, and by the new emphasis on divine immanence and human dependence that Jacobi and Schleiermacher introduced, involving a factor that is experimental; though Schleiermacher himself regarded his experimental theism as exclusively mediated through Christ.

A naturalistic theism is not pantheism, although tending to pantheism; which last, in effect, reduces God, the world and man to one being, God and man to one agent. God

⁴A tradition of Joshua's sun is said to exist in China to this day. This was told to the present writer by Dr. William A. P. Martin, than whom no better sinologue has ever lived. Some have thought that this tradition, others, that events of the Deluge, may be reflected in the myth of Phaethon.

⁵Some deists, like Bolingbroke, have doubted the moral excellence, saying that "God's natural attributes, with His wisdom, are cognizable by us, but that we dare not pronounce on such so-called attributes as goodness and justice." Cf. John Cairns, *Unbelief in the Eighteenth Century*, 1881, p. 78. This kind of deism was not common before the days of recent science, which is often taught in a manner wholly to obscure the moral character of God. Cf. Pritchett, *What is Religion?*

did not create the world, Spinoza says, because He is the world. Many men have been miscalled pantheists who are not such, or who did not so remain. Thus Schleiermacher and Goethe have been called pantheists because, for a time, they were strongly influenced by Spinoza. This was only their reaction from what had been a deistic isolation of the world from God, a reaction in the direction of the Bible itself. For no such isolation can be properly found in the Bible, where, although God and nature are totally distinct, His Spirit is not only universally present, but active in the most ordinary functions of nature. This conception is complementary, not antagonistic, to that of divine transcendence, and like that pervades the entire Bible. Pantheism makes the essential omnipresence of God to be an identity with all things, allows no place for contingent reality, and ignores, even when admitting, the divine transcendence. The two conceptions of immanence and transcendence are by no means mutually exclusive, as often represented in these days. In the Bible they form a perfect synthesis, together with a clear recognition of the ontological distinction between the Creator and the creature.

Divine transcendence is sometimes misconceived to mean a remote localization of God from the world, and His want of all immediate relation to it, unless in some first act of creation and other exceptional and miraculous acts. This would make God a finite being, and the old deists were not so ignorant as to think like this. We are assured by Robert Flint, who was thoroughly conversant with the literature of deism, that "there is no warrant for the view that the deists held nature to be independent of God, self-conservative and self-operative; or, in other words, God to be withdrawn from nature, merely looking on and 'seeing it go'. They believed that God acted through natural laws, and that it was doubtful if he ever acted otherwise." "Deism sought to found religion on reason alone. It represented 'nature' as the sole and sufficient revelation of God."⁶

⁶ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed. art. Theism.

From this it appears that the difference between the conception of God entertained by the British deists, before Kant, and the naturalistic theism since Kant is mainly a difference in emphasis, and in the reasoning by which it is supported. The old deists accepted, but did not emphasize, the essential omnipresence of God and His constant action; while they denied His initial action except in the original creation. In this want of emphasis and in this denial lies their practical separation of God from the world. The later attention given to Spinoza changed the emphasis. Transcendence in God, as in man, is that property of personality whereby a personal cause not only equals the total of any given effect it may produce, but is greater than the effect, and capable of more and different effects. As the personal cause of the phenomenal world-order God must infinitely transcend this order, while omnipresent in it, and His possible action is not confined to that observed in our ordinary experience. The whole world-order is contingent on His will, and will is a power that always transcends its given product. Spinoza himself saw plainly that an Absolute Being must infinitely transcend in power all given finite manifestations; but he dogmatically insists that no manifestation was ever made save that of our familiar experience.

A man may learn something from Spinoza without becoming a Spinozist, but whatever hold his doctrine had for a time on Schleiermacher, Herder or Goethe, there is no good reason to suppose they were ever, in a strict sense, pantheists; and even if so they certainly outgrew this position. The fascination of Spinoza for certain minds is largely due to a superficial reading of the Bible; for the doctrine of God's essential presence in all His works has its best expression in that book. No one makes more of it than Jacobi, yet he could not tolerate Spinoza, while perfectly acquainted with his writings; just as the Calvinistic theologian, Henry B. Smith, was intimately versed in them. The modern vogue of Spinoza began with Lessing; and Jacobi has given reason to suppose that Les-

sing in the end became really a Spinozist. In this case Lessing accepted Spinoza's metaphysics no less than his critical view of the Bible.

The pantheist is necessarily an ego-theist, and cannot recognize relations with God that are reciprocal and responsible. Religious communion, fellowship, adoration, prayer, and service become reduced to mere contemplation and speculation. The theist can retain these last with all the rest. There can be no religious dependence on any being where no natural opposition of personalities obtains, real or supposed. Religion, says Emerson in his first book, includes the personality of God. The doctrine of divine immanence, or essential omnipresence, has been a recognized part of Christian theology from the beginning, and should not be confounded with pantheism, as too frequently is done. Those who make this blunder should read that great sermon on Omnipresence in the old Puritan classic, Stephen Charnock's *Divine Attributes*,—a sermon which, with some modern annotations, might be made extremely useful again by separate publication.

Schleiermacher had a deep sense of divine omnipresence and of fellowship with God; and also of dependence on Him and of His grace exhibited in Christ. Goethe dabbled in Spinoza, but came in time to the conclusion that "everything Spinozistic in poetry becomes in philosophy Machiavelism". During the greater part of his life, Goethe was no more a pantheist than Wordsworth. The poet Wordsworth was an English churchman who never departed from the creed of that communion. He has been called a pantheist because he emphasizes that living presence of God in all His works which has its most varied, vital and magnificent expression in very many of the Hebrew Psalms. The Bible is an immeasurably more rich and beautiful and modern book than many of its readers discover because their reading is too casual, or too mechanical or too professional. The most severely professional reading of this greatest book will find little of its charm and worth and

power unless the book be allowed full opportunity to speak for itself, and make its own due impression on the life. Goethe's famous question is well put:

"Was wär' ein Gott der nur von aussen stiesse?"

Any of the Hebrew prophets might have asked the same; for such a God is not their conception, nor that of Christ. Yet this question is often quoted as if it led to a nobler conception of God than that of the Bible.

We learn from Lenormant that pantheism is found at the beginnings of history in Babylon; and it has been the favorite philosophy of pagan civilizations much of the time. It has not been their best philosophy, as individuals have risen above it. On the supposition of a primitive theism, elsewhere suggested, pantheism would appear as a faded-out theism in which all ontological and moral distinctions have been lost. It has belonged to all historical centuries of the Orient, and its general prevalence in Western lands would mean the paganization of the Occident. By Christianity alone the Western world has hitherto been largely kept from it, and by the Christian doctrine of an intervening God. Christianity, whether right or wrong, is essentially the doctrine and religion of an intervening God, a God compelled by love and righteousness to intervene. This is its irreducible minimum. The idea of a Supreme God who never intervenes is essentially pagan. In its primary documents, and common acceptance from the beginning to this day, Christianity assumes a higher form of revelation than that of ordinary experience, more immediately personal, moral, direct, unmistakable, and explicit; in short, an overt revelation such, indeed, as may rightly be expected from a God who is in the highest sense a moral being, solicitous for the welfare of His moral creatures. Whether the Christianity of the Bible be right or wrong, be truth or fiction, a naturalistic Christianity is a contradiction in terms.

"From the first Christian centuries there has always been a naturalistic view of God and the world, standing in op-

position to Christianity, and its supernaturalistic world-view".⁷ But the naturalistic movement of modern times, beginning in Italy with the Renaissance, has reached the present day through the English deists, the French Encyclopaedists and the German rationalists in direct succession, together with the strong individual influence of Hobbes and Spinoza and Bayle. It is all one movement, with a varied emphasis and application of the fundamental assumption that no revelation was ever known to the experience of man but such as is common to all men, the universal revelation implicit in all ordinary experience. This assumption discredits as unnatural and irrational essential features of what has always in the past been recognized as the Christian view of God and the world. It involves a different conception of both nature and reason from that required by the Christian conception hitherto. What is called naturalism is its view of nature, and what is called rationalism is its view of reason. Although seldom radically self-consistent, religious rationalism as such, which Hegel considered irreconcilable with philosophy, excludes from its view of nature and human history all recognition of initial action on the part of God, and reduces the whole process of nature and history to a genetic succession of phenomena from natural antecedents alone. God may indeed be conceived as the immanent cause of this succession, unless exception be made for the action of free-will in man; but God never reveals any liberty in His own action, nor that first prerogative of will in the origination of anything new. His agency is strictly confined to maintaining the genetic process, and in that process He is so much concealed that it takes a philosopher to discover Him,—and even philosophers do not always succeed.

Naturalism that is self-consistent, such as that of Spencer and Spinoza, denies all freedom to the will of man, and cannot conceive how even freedom may have its laws, and be exercised in conformity with cosmic order. Thus.

⁷ C. W. Hodge, *Princeton Theological Review*, 1910 (viii), p. 229.

Spencer says that "Psychical changes either conform to law or they do not. If they do not conform to law, this work in common with all works on the subject is sheer nonsense; no science of psychology is possible. If they do conform to law there cannot be any such thing as free will".⁸ Lord Kelvin was certainly not inferior in knowledge of natural law to Spencer, and he says that "every action of human free-will is a miracle to physical, chemical and mathematical science".⁹ If so, it becomes an interesting question whence this liberty was derived. Is it drawn from necessitated natural antecedents, or directly from a free-source in the world-ground? Certainly if the law of biogenesis still holds good there must be a law of psychogenesis to go with it. Is science ready to assume an unconditional naturalism which admits of no initial causality at any point in the process of nature and human history? Is personality only the natural product of physical conditions? Spencer believed his own philosophy was the best, but necessitated product of persistent force; he did not say that he thought his opponents all similarly inspired. Yet where there is no free will there can be no free thought, and most philosophers think they are free thinkers.

Is the naturalistic theist, who grounds the whole world upon will, ready for this? But if man himself is capable of free initial causality, how was his originative power introduced or produced from the unbroken continuity of a necessitated natural order? Theism of an attenuated sort may, indeed, be inferred as a necessary presupposition of the world-order and the moral order without calling in the miracles of the Bible, unless only to account for the origin of man. But science has not proved, even as a remote possibility, the derivation of human personality from necessitated natural antecedents without some act of initial causality on the part of a divine Creator. The speculations designed to prove this are speculations still, that have failed to produce the evidence. This is the decided conclu-

⁸ *Data of Ethics*, p. 220.

⁹ Thompson, *Life of Lord Kelvin*, ii. pp. 1090, 1098.

sion of very many men of science down to the end of the last century, if not to this day. The dogmatic insistence on a universal negative by other men of science, and their pulpit repeaters, is wholly aside from the mark. But however this may be, if divine intervention occurs in a single instance, it belongs to the order of the world and it may occur in other instances. Science and philosophy have no question more pertinent to their interests than the question when and where does initial causality come in?

The world can be rationally explained only in the measure that it is rightly described. The phenomenal facts precede all theory, and must be adequately stated first to yield their necessary implications. It is a good thing, said Huxley, who did not always follow his own rule, to sit down like a little child before a fact. If anywhere in the world-order initial causality is the necessary implication of phenomenal facts, and is itself the noumenal fact involved, the whole order is conditioned by that fact and can never be rightly explained with that fact ignored. Initial causality coming from the ground of the world can be understood as a volitional act, and as such only. It is a personal, self-revealing act, and how much it reveals depends on the form, conditions and product of the act. In a recent volume on *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature* Dr. James Y. Simpson says:¹⁰ "It is not incredible that though God is ordinarily known to us in the order of nature which he has established as a worthy and permanent expression of his creative and sustaining will, yet should he also manifest himself for special purposes in some unusual impulse, to deny this is to refuse God the liberty he has given to man". "If the aversion to miracles is simply an expression of belief in a purely mechanical self-contained world, then the human spirit must hail them in defense of its own liberty. For if God be so bound by his laws that initiative is no longer his, much more are we, and if he cannot intervene in the physical world, still less can he do so in the spiritual; for the two stand in close relationship".

¹⁰ P. 361.

If in physical nature, or in human history, we find any product with which the natural antecedents are not commensurate, then but one inference can be drawn. Some power has intervened to make the new factor in the product, and only that power which has produced the world is able to do it. Is life a necessitated product of commensurate natural antecedents? Is man such a product? Is Christ such a product? But these are only three preëminent instances, among many less pronounced, in the whole succession of phenomena, physical and moral, where the question of initial causality on the part of God is an entirely pertinent question. When and where in the world-order does initial causality come in? For every theist the world-ground is an omnipotent will guided by infinite wisdom. This is an irreducible minimum of theism; and there is much reason to believe that if our common experience warrants theism our total experience warrants Christian theism, or the Hebrew and Christian doctrine of an intervening God. This is the glory of Christianity and of the ancient Hebrew faith, but is abhorrent to naturalistic thought, and often antagonized in every possible way in the laboratory of science, in the chair of philosophy, and even in the pulpit of the church.

It is generally acknowledged that in the realm of religious experience the Hebrew prophets, apostles and the Christ are the best examples furnished by the human race. "We are greater than the men of old in research, but immeasurably beneath them in the richness and reality of religion". "The world awaits the vision, the passion, the simplicity and the stern truthfulness of the Hebrew prophet; it awaits the imperial breadth and moral energy of the Christian Apostle to the nations; it awaits the teacher who, like Christ, shall carry his doctrine in a great mind and in a great character".¹¹ It is also well recognized in science that the maximum experience carries the maximum authority. Yet the naturalistic theologian never can admit that

¹¹ George A. Gordon, *Religion and Miracle*, pp. 175, 182.

these supreme witnesses are to be trusted in the account of their own experience. Before that account can be accepted by the wise and prudent of the present day it must be emptied of all the elements that make it entirely unique, and so far as possible cut down to the near level of that experience which the modern rationalist enjoys. The science of theology hitherto has found its primary data in the united testimony of these ancient witnesses to the fact and contents of an overt revelation. The testimony seems to exhibit the highest category of experience known to man, and a consensus of witnesses who in moral weight and influence for good never have been equalled. But now these are cross-examined, and largely discredited as incompetent to tell a straight story about the experience in which confessedly they excel all other men, because that experience so much exceeds that of their critics.

If we might imagine a man of science oblivious of his own personality, learned in all the laws of nature below life, yet one who has never witnessed the phenomena of life, and knew nothing about them, the world-order for him would be exclusively mechanical and chemical. The data of biology first recounted in his hearing would seem to contradict the order of nature; the alleged experience would seem incredible. If we imagine a learned botanist acquainted with physics, but ignorant of all facts above the plants, and oblivious of himself, the realms of zoölogy and psychology would seem to contradict the order of nature. If again we imagine a biologist oblivious of himself and humankind, the phenomena of personality would so immeasurably transcend his field of vision as to seem, when told him, a wholly different world, irreconcilable with the world he knew. These hypothetical cases are impossible; but nothing is more familiar than the absolute incredulity of whole communities, whole ages and the best learned minds toward good testimony regarding experience that to these minds and times may appear unaccountably exceptional and foreign. Human nature oscillates between ex-

tremes of credulity and incredulity, often both extremes meeting in one person.

Hence the consensus of Hebrew testimony in the matter of an overt revelation goes unregarded or discredited by many minds prepossessed with certain familiar aspects of experience, bound under a spell of current opinions, and deficient in a personal experience sufficiently congruous with that rejected to supply the needed clues. So the primary data of theology now are sought not where experience is greatest but where it is least, not in its highest examples, but in the most rudimental forms known to modern anthropologists, psychologists and critics. Yet the ancient testimony still remains, even at its lowest estimate, the highest witness within reach of the facts of revelation and religion; and the least philosophy can do is to place that testimony in just and normal and logical relation to all other testimony in its field for an honest comparison of witnesses and data. It is beginning to be seen that all religious experience has values for philosophy; and if this is true of experience in its lowest forms, how much more so of its highest!

As Kant brought back a religious view of life by showing philosophical warrant for bare theism, after the devastation wrought in life and thought by the scepticism, sensualism and sensuality of his time, so Shields and others have shown philosophical warrant for that Christian theism and its universe, of which the Bible is the primary expression. The Christian view of God and the world has its first and most universal expression in the historical and literary forms found in the Bible. For the whole Bible exhibits in epitome one universe, physical and spiritual, historical and predictive, a scheme of thought that centers in Christ, by whom it is assumed and amplified and exemplified. "Who," said Pascal, "knows not Christ, knows not the order of the world, knows not himself."

Physics, biology, psychology and theology may yet vindicate unmistakably their old ground as representing four

irreducible categories of experience, including, perhaps, irreducible subdivisions, involving not only a teleological ascent, but also initial causality for the change of level, whatever genetic connection may exist. And the whole world-order may yet prove to involve in combination as integral, alternate, complementary factors, initial causality and the genetic process, both proceeding from the same world-ground in the eternal and omnipotent will of God.¹²

For every theist the world-ground is an omnipotent will, guided by infinite wisdom; and it is a question for philosophy whether a being so equipped cannot, or will not, for moral ends exercise the first prerogative of a transcendent freedom in perfect conformity with the plan of the world; a question whether such action, varied to meet the conditions of time and place, would not be the most effective means of self-revelation to His rational creatures; whether good evidence exists of such action as an empirical fact; and whether the whole range and contents of such action, as known to actual experience, may not be logically co-ordinated, as an experience and a teaching, with the whole of experience and all other means of knowledge in the cosmic synthesis of philosophy. All these are pertinent questions for philosophy, and Shields has answered them plainly. He also has effected this co-ordination; or at least, since his work is only an organon, he has shown how it can and should be done.

If it be true, as Rashdall says,¹³ that God both thinks the world and wills it, in respect of its fundamental order, and if he wills the world for moral ends, ends agreeable to his own character as the Moral Absolute and Perfect Being, a being of infinite solicitude for his moral creatures, then nothing more suitable to these ends can be conceived than a self-revelation of God to man involving initial action, or revelation by miraculous means. This is but a corollary of the truth that the world-ground is not only, as Spencer believed, an eternal power, but also a godhead, a supremely

¹² Cf. Rev. iv. 11, Revised Version.

¹³ Hastings Rashdall, *Philosophy and Religion*, 1910, chap. ii.

personal and moral being, who both thinks the world and wills it. While in growing numbers men in the pulpit, under the supposed compulsion of science, deny that God ever intervenes, and call such intervention an interference, a long list might be named of scientific men who agree with Sir Oliver Lodge that miracles are neither impossible nor necessarily lawless, nor unworthy of God, nor incapable of good attestation, nor wanting in great spiritual values. If they occurred they are means of revelation, and those who see no revelation in them must be blind.

Naturalism has two levels, lower and higher. The first discredits all evidence of personality in the ground of the world, and reduces everything to mere necessity. The second affirms God, but denies his use of originaive power, initial causality or freedom of action; denies all revelation of that transcendence which is metaphysically inseparable from an absolute being, as indeed it is inseparable even from finite personality. The Christian view of both natural and human history recognizes marks of initial causality, at suitable junctures, on the part of God, as means employed in His self-revelation to men, and as action equally suitable to the prerogatives of a moral agent and to His general plan of the world. Indications of such initial action are found in the whole ascent of nature from the very beginning of that world-order now under human observation. The revelation attested in the Bible exhibits divine action of this kind in strong relief, as known in many ways to the actual experience of man from the beginning of human existence on the earth to the culmination in Christ; as never entirely intermitted from the providential government of the world, and as certain to be resumed with unquestionable evidence at the definite conclusion of the present scheme of things.

The Christian conception of God has in Christ himself its highest and its final exponent; in Christ as presented in the Gospels, and in the Christ of the whole New Testament. For everything said of Christ in the New Testament,

whether historical and true or not, makes one self-consistent presentation; and the whole conception of God entertained by the New Testament Christ, whether right or wrong, is one perfectly self-consistent conception, which should constitute for Christian theism the norm. The only God recognized by the Christ of the Gospels is the intervening God of the Hebrew patriarchs and prophets, also conceived as the only God of the whole earth. The Christian conception of God is more than a strong emphasis placed on the personality of the world-ground, and more than a recognition of his paternal interest in man. It regards God as giving historical expression to that interest in unmistakable and impressive ways, required alike by his own moral nature and the necessities of his moral creatures; and as having done this from the beginning.

Christian theism is essentially the theism of an intervening God, intervening by initial action when and where and how he will; not however, as often asserted, in contravention of the general plan of the world, but indeed as an integral part of that plan, to make himself plainly known to a race that is exceedingly prone to forget him; known in his universal presence, power, knowledge, goodness, severity and purposes; known in his primary relations to the whole world-scheme, as indeed befits the moral source and ruler of the world. The revelation that has in Christ its unit of measure, its central organ and final criterion, is fundamentally a revelation by intervention, designed for both the education and the redemption of the human race. The most effective instrument now in our hands for this education and redemption is the written record of that overt revelation, a revelation supernatural in its source, and largely, not exclusively, miraculous in its method. The influence already exerted in the world for education and redemption, by this single written instrument, has so immeasurably surpassed all other influence and means, as to place the Bible among books as much in a category by itself as man among animals and Christ among men. This

is the regard in which the Bible, man and Christ have always been held in lands where Christ was known. Opposed to this regard is the leveling movement of all naturalistic thought which makes Christ only the world's best man, and a fanatic at best; man, only the world's best animal, anomalous at that, the only animal that tramples on the law of its own wellbeing, and wages exterminating wars on its own species; the Bible, only the best religious book, yet filled with folk-lore and delusions in which all mankind and Christ himself have shared, besides being marked with literary imposture of a peculiarly blasphemous sort. Well said Goethe, in his *West-Oestlicher Divan*: "The great and deepest theme of the history of the world and man is the conflict between faith and unbelief".

A naturalistic theologian will insist that God is love, and will construe his character in terms of the highest character known or imagined among men, and yet will reject the evidence of divine intervention for the ends of love as a needless and incredible derangement of good order in a world whose very existence he himself believes is for moral ends alone. "We are justified in holding that our God is as good, as kind, as inexhaustible in compassion and hope for man, as Jesus was. A God as good as Jesus . . . that result is the illumination and consolation of human history; for a better than Jesus we do not need, a better than he we cannot conceive." "Our worthiest thought of God regards him as the God and Father of our Lord Jesus. The humanity of God is given in the humanity of man. It is given supremely in the humanity of Jesus."¹⁴

But where was the illumination and consolation of history before the coming of Jesus, and how was the humanity of God displayed during those unrecorded aeons of man's far worse than bestial state which the naturalistic theologian must assume? Why has only this latest fraction of time received plain evidence that God is love? Nothing like this was ever assumed by Jesus. His only God was one

¹⁴ George A. Gordon, *Through Man to God*, 1906, pp. 34, 40.

who had acted the part of a Heavenly Father from the day that he created man upon the earth, and was hindered only by man's wilful and persistent estrangement from universal and continual displays of heavenly care. Of course, it is supposed that Jesus did not know what all enlightened persons know today about the original state of man, graphically depicted for instance by Jack London.¹⁵ But it cannot be denied that in assuming as true the Bible story of beginnings Jesus had a far more exalted conception of man's dignity and God's goodness than is possible under the new interpretation.

The infinite value of the individual human soul, for whose redemption Jesus died and rose again, if we are allowed to suppose the Gospel tale, was connected in His mind with the assumption that at the very beginning man was created to bear the image and share the fellowship of eternal God; and all the emphasis placed by Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson, Kant and Hegel, Channing and Emerson on the worth of personality is but an echo of this Christian doctrine, now despised, and the Genesis account of man's creation. Indeed not one of these men took seriously the naturalistic origin of man. The more convinced Darwin and Huxley became that their scheme of anthropology was true, the less of God were they able to see in it; and their conception of human origin is as little verified today as when they first began to write. It may yet become as fabulous as the geocentric astronomy, which displaced an earlier heliocentric teaching on the ground of an exceedingly wide induction of particular observations. Shaler says that verification is the weakest part of science; and this is now getting a good deal better recognition in biology than it had a while ago.

At the meeting of the British Association in Melbourne, the president, William Bateson, referring to Sir Oliver Lodge remarked: "My predecessor said last year that in

¹⁵ *Before Adam*, 1907. This is included by Professor A. G. Keller in his course in Anthropology at Yale, and is said by him to be "in all essentials correct and scientific in its conception of early man".

physics the age is one of rapid progress and profound scepticism. In at least as high a degree this is true of biology; and, as a chief characteristic of modern evolutionary thought, we must confess also to a deep but irksome humility in the presence of great vital problems."¹⁶ This address is largely devoted to dispelling illusions and reversing judgments which had come to be settled dogmas of the science, though strongly opposed at the beginning by other men of science whose testimony went unheeded under the naturalistic spell that Darwin cast.

Darwin proved what was always more or less seen, and is especially conspicuous in the human species, that every type of life is subject to an enormous range of variation. He proved the existence of a law of selection by which the modification and survival of species are largely conditioned. But what he principally aimed to prove he entirely failed to prove, that species originates by this law. Nor has this been proved by anyone else, nor yet the origin of species by any other law that has been proposed as either the substitute for natural selection or its complement. Nor is any single instance certainly known in which one species has been changed into another, nor has any process for this change been suggested upon which biologists can agree; and even if they agreed they would probably be wrong so long as neither the process of change nor the change itself from one species to another has become a fact that is actually observed.

It was long ago said by Huxley, and now is repeated by Kellogg, that "no indubitable cases of species forming by transforming, that is of descent, have been observed; and no recognized case of natural selection really selecting has been observed. . . . The evidence for descent is of satisfying, but purely logical, character." This amounts to saying that if the empirical conditions are really such as the theory demands, the theory of descent will fit the conditions. The evidence is satisfying, but purely logical, given

¹⁶ *New York Times*, August 16, 1914.

the hypothesis; and this biologist openly calls attention to the almost "completely subjective character of the evidence for both the theory of descent and natural selection".¹⁷ This evidence satisfies him, and is logical, however deficient in empirical factors. No evidence can satisfy him if it points to either directive or initial action in the primary cause. Yet after fifty years of such organized research as never before was applied to a problem of natural science the empirical evidence is still sadly wanting for confirming the hypothesis, and for determining not only the process by which one species is developed from another, but whether the development actually occurs. If we suppose the origin of species by natural descent alone to be a fact, perhaps some theory of the process may yet be made to fit the fact. But no such theory has hitherto been framed, and the fact itself has yet to be observed. Innumerable and conflicting suppositions are offered to account for the details of a still suppositious fact,—a fact never observed, but only inferred from the inadequate and conflicting data so far obtained.

These data however in no wise conflict with the discarded earlier belief that all natural change is within a closed circuit. This conception, both Hebrew and Greek, which has come down from antiquity, which Heraclitus and Aristotle believed, and which countless natural analogies support, would imply that every true species, like the individual, has a maximum range of possible development and variation never transcended, as illustrated in the human species; and would imply that every real species, or primary type of life, originates in some creative act. In his last discussion of this subject, Louis Agassiz declared the existence of a law "controlling development, and keeping types within appointed cycles of growth." He asserted that whatever be the means of preserving and transmitting properties, the primitive types have remained permanent and unchanged; and that "there is no evidence of a direct descent of later from earlier species in the geological succession of animals".¹⁸

¹⁷ Vernon L. Kellogg, *Darwinism Today*, 1907, pp. 18, 382.

¹⁸ *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1874.

These views once shared by many men of science have been displaced by the ruling fashion; they have not been disproved by empirical evidence. They were maintained to the end by Guyot and Dawson and Dana, and several other men of science in the first rank both in this country and in Europe; and in these days of "irksome humility" for biology they should have serious reconsideration. "Vaulting ambition doth o'erleap itself" in science as in politics and war, and needs inducements to reconsideration. The unity of nature needs not to depend at all on the genetic continuity of all things from minerals to morals, but on universal conformity to an end, the exhibition of a single plan, and the subordination of all the parts to the whole. Every thing below man looks toward man and culminates in him, so far as our earthly and solar system shows; and doubtless it was planned to do so. Evidence of rational design in the world as a whole may also be accompanied by evidence of volitional and initial action.¹⁹ At the very outset of the phenomenal world-order, since this present order had a beginning, the genetic movement may have been introduced by some origi-native act, and by similar and successive acts raised at fit intervals to successive levels. By such acts of initial causality from the world-ground the evolution of the world-order may be lifted from one plane to another, and æonic cycles of development follow in a teleological series; all this subordinated to moral ends and the education, not of man alone, but of all the ranks of finite intelligence that may populate the universe. Such a scheme of evolution would lose nothing of its unity or sublimity by the self-revelation of its Creator in acts expressing His creative genius, His transcendent freedom, or His redeeming love; and whenever, as with the advent of man on the scene, a responsive and responsible moral agent appears,

¹⁹ Perhaps no more comprehensive view of teleology was ever published in this country than the paper by John Bascom entitled "As One Whole" in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1911, pp. 627-640. This was the last article published by Dr. Bascom during his long and exceedingly fruitful life.

nothing would be more suitable to his needs, and to the moral character of his source, than the accentuation of initial action on the part of God within the experience of this moral agent. There is nothing trivial in such a view, even if these acts are miracles; and this is the kind of world-order the Bible exhibits. In this way wholly new types of being and categories of reality may be introduced; and man himself may well have been honored by his Creator in having been thus created at the beginning a perfectly normal type of his species, from which all the variations and perversions have descended. The process of development may be only half the method of nature;²⁰ the complementary half, the alternative factor, is the initial factor, to be found in the series of originative or creative acts by which the planes and subjects of development are introduced. The fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians illustrates this no less than the beginning of Genesis. The entire Bible exhibits a world-order that involves a law of æonic unfolding, to whose magnificence of conception the current views of evolution cannot hold a tallow dip. But the word evolution is large enough to include all factors entering into the cosmic unfolding, and should not be confined in application to the genetic process only if any other factor is discerned. The Bible has its own law of cosmic evolution, ineffably sublime, which may, without any misgiving, be commended to the attention of scientific men; who in these days, for the most part, do not read this old book with sufficient care to make the proper connections in its teaching. The æonic conception of time in the world-order was in the Bible long before it entered modern science; and when the whole world-system of the Bible ceases to be travestied, even in the pulpit, even by believers, and gets a decent chance to be understood, it will command the unbounded admiration of the most learned and scientific men; it will win their adoration for its author. Sir Isaac Newton was not ashamed to say: "I account the Scriptures of God to be the most sublime philosophy."

²⁰ Cf. Shields, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 350.

"The origin of man as man", says Tayler Lewis, "was special and peculiar. By this we mean his distinctive humanity, as separate from all that he has in common with the lower natures. We are not much concerned about the mode of production of his material or merely physical organization. In regard to this there is nothing in the expressions: He made or he created him, or he made him from the earth, which is at war with the idea of growth or development during either a longer or a shorter period." "There was a moment when man, a man, *primus homo*, began to be, who a moment before was not. There was one in whom humanity commenced, and from whom all subsequent humanity has been derived. There was one who first began to be a man, and this principium has its date from the first emerging of that higher life which came from a direct inbreathing of the Almighty and Everlasting Father of Spirits."²¹ The whole context from which these words are taken is an invaluable treatment of the subject, first published in 1855, two years before Agassiz's great *Essay on Classification*, and four years prior to Darwin's *Origin of Species*. The extract emphasizes only the irreducible minimum of the creative act, but the author does not himself think this is all the Scripture passage intends. If the creation of man involves initial causality at all, the extent of that causality is incidental to the principal fact; and if this is involved in the origin of man, its place below man in the biological scale is incidental and of less importance.

Huxley had more than once appealed to Dana as a master in science, and both men died in 1895. In that year also the *pithecanthropus erectus* of Java was exhibited in Leyden, and the claims made for it were rejected by Virchow. James D. Dana, but two weeks before his death, completed the revision of his geological primer, reaffirming his mature conviction that "the present teaching of geology very strongly confirms the belief that man is not of nature's

²¹ Tayler Lewis, *The Six Days of Creation*, 1855, pp. 248, 250.

making. Independently of such evidence, man's high reason, his unsatisfied aspirations, his freewill, all afford the fullest assurance that he owes his existence to the special act of the Infinite Being whose image he bears".²² This book was the author's most elementary production, but it gives his final statement of this ground, and is the testimony of a man who stood at the head of his profession in this country, with an ample international recognition. Dana is not without eminent followers in this position even today, and he had a very eminent predecessor in the Lord Jesus Christ. For there cannot be the smallest doubt that Christ and all His apostles, and all the Hebrew prophets who went before, assumed this view of man's creation, and derived from it the most important considerations regarding the relations of God and man.

Grant the specific creation of man by initial action, his creation as the normal type of his race, and the explicit revelation follows, an inseparable moral implication of such a creation. The conditions have only to be fairly faced for any one to see the moral impossibility involved in supposing that an omnipotent God of infinite goodness would create a perfect human pair, physically and morally normal representatives and progenitors of their race, and never speak to them, never make Himself known to them in a way that they could understand at least as well as a child can understand a loving father in his character, wishes, instruction and personal relations, however ignorant of his public dignity and functions. An omnipotent personal God could certainly find some way of doing this, however inscrutable His ways may be to us; and the way of God's approach described in Scripture lacks nothing of dignity, simplicity, suitability or possibility. It is so in every instance told in Scripture of divine approach to man. If all these forms of manifestation read like fables it may often be only because they seem too good to be true. They never want for dignity or fitness, a perfect adaptation to

²² *The Geological Story Briefly Told*, 1895.

the particular times and conditions involved. They are not too good to be true if God is indeed at once the loving Heavenly Father, and the righteous Judge, no less almighty than all good, and the kind of God that Christ would have us believe. "The creation at its best", we are told, "gives the Creator at his best, the highest man is the supreme revelation of God." "And this is what we mean by God. He is the conscience of the universe." "Shall we construe the character of the Eternal by what is lowest, or by what is highest, by the beast of prey or by the apostle of love, by cosmic hostilities to man, or by the human heart?" "The Bible is the lover's book. It is the greatest expression of the greatest love that has ever visited mankind. . . . The Bible is an elemental book, elemental in the vastness of its vision of the ideal, and in the fulness and splendor of its passion. And this book is a sealed book until the angel of love breaks the seal." "You can as soon explain color to the blind, or a Beethoven symphony to the deaf, as you can expound to a loveless heart the greater things in the Bible. For the Bible is born of love; it is the sovereign historic expression of it, and that one may understand it he must bring to it the lover's mind and heart."²³ Many a heart will respond to this true witness, and again when he says: "There is nothing in God to account for Jesus unless God is love. There is nothing in all the universe to account for Jesus unless at the heart of the universe there is a love equal to his. The cause must equal the effect. Jesus is not self-created, he points backward to his origin in the Eternal".²⁴ But who would imagine that this discerning interpreter of Scripture should go on to say of mankind that "The race started with nothing, and with a heavy inheritance from the animal."²⁵

If the world-ground is a moral Creator of infinitely per-

²³ George A. Gordon, *Through Man to God*, 1906, Preface and pp. 17, 33, 118 f.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

fect character, how could he have brought into existence under such distressful and humiliating conditions, with no antecedent guilt, moral offspring destined ultimately to bear His image and reflect His character? Or if at the beginning these offspring of God were indeed made like their Maker, how could He have left them like abandoned bastards, without a sign of loving care? But Jesus never doubted that Eden and Gethsemane belong together, nor that the being who suffered on the cross and rose again for man's redemption was the being who walked with Adam in the garden. Whether the story is a fable or true, it represents the same God and the same love in both gardens. If we care to have the mind of Christ we should take his mind in this matter as in others. If he had perfectly the mind of God, how should he be an incompetent witness here? But if we know anything about Christ at all, we know that he accepted in full, and assumed in all his teaching, the Bible story of begininngs, and the whole Scriptural conception of the world and man and God. There is but one conception of God and of the universe in the Bible, progressively revealed, yet one indivisible conception, whether true or false, unutterably sublime; misprized because it is misunderstood, first travestied, and then derided.²⁶ But now we understand that several hundred thousand years elapsed before the smallest sign appeared of any such solicitude on the part of God as the entire Bible represents. Truly the Bible is the lover's book and opens its message to a lover only. What kind of a God is this we are asked to receive on the terms laid down by modern thought? Why make the least pretense that he is the same as the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we are believers in God that raised him from the dead, and gave him glory; so that our faith and hope may be in God?²⁷

Christian theism is not a naturalistic theism, but supernaturalistic. It is essentially the doctrine of a righteous,

²⁶ Cf. Ps. cxliv. 3.

²⁷ Cf. 1 Pet. i. 21.

gracious, intervening, judging, and redeeming God, who has put himself into plain communication with man, and who himself has suffered in man's behalf by putting himself in man's position. Nothing short of this is Christian theism; and this demands a whole world-order for its setting, a cosmology to fit the theology. The theology of the Bible is inseparable from its conception of world-order, and this conception is that of Christ himself. The theism of Christ involves this same world-order. His conception of God is manifestly conditioned by his conception of what God has done in this world and what he will do. At the lowest estimate Christ is still the highest exponent of God mankind has known. Even Renan thought this. Yet he is treated as an incompetent witness by men who are called his own disciples and his ministers, and who undoubtedly accept him as at least the highest organ, or even the final organ, of divine revelation. Certainly Christ himself assumed finality for the entire contents of his teaching.

After the culmination and fulfilment in Christ of all the earlier stages in revelation, and after the apostolic testimony to Christ was made, and a faithful record of the whole, an overt revelation was no longer needed until the present scheme of providence should end in the return of Christ to judge the world. This is the conclusion to which the Scripture would bring us; and Christianity, whether as a teaching or a life, can never be separated from its Scriptural form and remain a pure Christianity. It cannot long survive separated from the Christ of Scripture, save in a perverted form. Yet we are told in effect that men can be Christians without believing in Christ at all. Christianity cannot be reduced to a life without a teaching, nor to the second table of the moral law with the three postulates of Kant's practical reason plus teleology and Schleiermacher's feeling of dependence, Ritschl's judgment of value and the contemplation of Christ as a moral ideal. All this is very good so far as it goes, but leaves entirely out of

reckoning the gospel,—even the gospel of an intervening God. That is the heart of Christianity, nothing else; and therein lies its sin-subduing dynamic.

It is not these other elements that have made its martyrs, conquered races and kingdoms, and regenerated the most obdurate of sinbound souls. Only an empirical revelation of God's intervening and self-sacrificing love has made its power, its triumph and its glory; a revelation that began with the beginning of the human race and has its consummate expression in the Lamb of God. "The distinctive message of Christianity is that God loves man".²⁸ But no primitive man of Darwinian breed would ever have guessed it, whereas the Adam of Genesis knew it well. The God of Eden is in keeping with the God of the Gospels, but the God of nature on the plan of Darwin is wholly out of keeping with the gospel. If the gospel is true, Christianity is indeed as old as creation in a far higher sense than was dreamed by the coiner of this saying.²⁹ If the gospel is true, the paramount fact of human experience is this overt revelation, supernatural in its source, largely miraculous in its method, which philosophy has the privilege and duty of adjusting to the whole empire of human experience, and coördinating with all means of human knowledge. The Christianity of the Bible is no less than a corollary of theism, involving as a fundamental principle the revelation of God by intervention; and those who think this principle is trivial or obsolete, and made impossible by science, have yet to learn the essential character both of science and of God.

The strength of science does not lie in any universal negative, nor in the mass of floating hypotheses with which

²⁸ Dr. Edward Judson in the *Outlook*, April, 1911, p. 748. The same number of this journal contains the noteworthy, pathetic and reluctant confession of faith by the naturalist, John Burroughs, in the current doctrine of human origin. He hates the doctrine but declares that we must believe it as a dogma of science, precisely as our fathers believed in the dogmas of theology.

²⁹ Matthew Tindal, the deist, whose volume, *Christianity as Old as the Creation*, was published in 1730 in the seventy-fourth year of the author's life.

its data are invested. Science is critically organized knowledge in any department of research, and includes theology as its highest department,—the highest devoted to any particular category of experience. Science is the critically organized knowledge of self-evident principles and duly attested facts; or of such facts and their implications, both necessary and probable, duly distinguished. Science does not essentially consist in the tentative and unverified suppositions and prepossessions applied to these facts with a view to finding the formulas for their laws. A scientific hypothesis in plain English is a supposition, and the great vogue of a favorite hypothesis does not make that supposition science,—as physics and biology and the documental criticism have been lately finding out. A common prejudice against miracles among those scientific men who have taken no pains to understand the facts and laws of experience on its highest plane is no part of their scientific equipment and does no credit to their scientific judgment. As well might a geologist despise the findings of a physicist, and this has happened more than once; or a physicist, knowing nothing of the laws of life, inveigh against the best supported conclusions of biology; or a biologist ignorant of all the higher psychology and sociology, scorn the facts and laws in these domains, as for any man of science to ridicule the formulas of an experience he has never understood in its most rudimentary forms, its empirical evidence, or its antecedent presumptions. Yet this thing happens every day.

Huxley said, as he neared the end of his long war against theology: "I have done my day's work, not always with a light heart, but with a sense of responsibility, and a terror of that which may appear when the thick web of fiction men have woven about nature is stripped off".³⁰ It is not surprising that in a letter to Lady Pembroke the aging Spencer wrote: "My own feeling respecting the ultimate mystery is such that of late years I can not even try to think of ultimate space without some feeling of terror."

³⁰ *Fortnightly Review*, 1893.

Like Hobbes he was "taking a leap into the dark". A very impressive expression of this terror is to be found towards the end of his final publication, *Facts and Comments, treating of the Great Enigma and of Space*. A remarkable incident is told of Spencer in a volume of reminiscences called *A Stepson of Fortune* by Henry Murray, who says: "Walking up and down the lawn of Buchanan's house in Maresfield Garden, I told him, in a momentary absence of our host, what a load of personal obligation I felt under to *First Principles*, and added that I intended to devote the reading hours of the next two or three years to a thorough study of his entire output. 'What have you read of mine?' he asked. I told him. . . . Then, said Spencer . . . 'I should say that you have read quite enough'. He fell silent for a moment, and then added: 'I have passed my life beating the air'."³¹

This was the man who, boasting his ignorance of ancient philosophy, Locke and Kant, once expressed the opinion that his own *Psychology* would stand beside the *Principia* of Newton. This was the man who, but a little while ago, made the orthodox philosophy for naturalistic science, believed by many men of science to be the only philosophy really based upon experience, and its author the greatest thinker since Aristotle died. One of his clerical admirers called him "the great modern apostle of the rational religious life of the world."

Scientific men of the highest equipment can always be found who think the miracles of Christianity make a much better world than it would be without them. A God who never intervenes is certainly not the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and has no right to the sacred name of love. Such a God cannot possibly be the moral absolute, so perfect in character that nothing more perfect can ever be conceived. Intervention is the inexorable demand and spontaneous act of love in the presence of need, where not prevented by flagrant and unrepented

³¹ Henry Murray, *A Stepson of Fortune*, 1909.

guilt; or some needless delay of obedience in a sufferer who recognizes the deliverer's due. The times and conditions are in the hands of infinite Wisdom, but the God who never did intervene and never will intervene is not fit to be worshipped and can never be loved. God intervenes today for every man who entirely repents, and seeks his face with an undivided heart. If Kant himself had better understood the concrete content of the moral law, and gone deeper into its necessary implications, he would have made revelation by intervention a fourth postulate of his second *Kritik*. The unreconstructed Christianity of the Bible as it stands is all within the bounds of pure reason. As a unitary scheme of revelation it not only agrees with all self-evident truth, but is demanded by self-evident truth, as may elsewhere be shown. Coleridge, in his *Aids to Reflection*, the most mature of all his books, calls it the perfection of reason. Yet this scheme is not within the reach of bare reason in the sense that reason would have discovered it had it not been empirically given.

To be empirically given, and sufficiently attested, is all that the Christianity of Scripture needs to constitute its ineluctable claim on the highest service of philosophy. It is the business of philosophy to begin with what is empirically given, and to unite all that is so given in a single rational view of the world and its ground. If philosophy seeks a metaphysics of experience, it must first examine the experience, and the whole experience to be thus interpreted. It cannot afford to omit the highest department of experience from this examination. The science of theology, and especially of theology as Christian, is concerned with the highest department of experience. James Lindsay quotes Thiele as saying that "Not only the philosophy of an Aristotle or a Kant or a Herbart, but also that of a Plato, a Fichte or a Hegel rests finally on what is empirically given."³²

³² Cf. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, October, 1903, p. 648 on the "Metaphysical Needs of our Time."

The genetic process of events makes a great part of experience, and must receive proportional recognition in philosophy; but if this is not the whole of experience, and any other factor remains over, philosophy must reckon with that factor. Evidence of initial causality in physical nature or in human history demands as full attention as evidence of the genetic process; and if evidence exists of divine intervention in the course of things that evidence, like any other, must be heeded and weighed with the most impartial judgment. To bar out in advance from science and philosophy all consideration of such evidence, and to insist that no recognition of such evidence shall be admitted as legitimate, is to prejudice the order of the world, trample on the first principles of science and reduce philosophy to folly. There are at the present time some theologians who believe, or who at least are strongly inclined to believe, that the reported resurrection, and much else in the powers and personality of Christ truly exhibit facts transcending all common experience and the genetic course of events. These facts they are ready to believe on the strength of cumulative evidence; yet they say such facts can have no place in science, because science recognizes nothing that lies outside that genetic process which they suppose must constitute the whole world-order, and the exclusive method of phenomena. In other connections they will admit, and insist, that science lies in critically organized knowledge of all properly attested facts in any field of experience whatever, and they will admit that the attestation of facts is effected by the personal testimony of observers and participants in the experience. Then they will say that experience thus attested yields knowledge, but that the well attested experience of the Hebrew prophets and apostles to the facts of an overt revelation yields only at most material for faith; as if knowledge itself were anything but validated faith, as if all the facts in every science of experience were not received by faith, on the testimony of many observers, precisely as we may receive by faith

the testimony of the evangelists and apostles. Faith cometh by hearing testimony just as much in science as in religion; and all inductive science is a creed, very often revised. The fundamental creeds of Christianity may be better warranted today after surviving the severest tests that many centuries have been able to supply than most of the creed that constitutes our science, and that passes for knowledge as opposed to faith. In the volume on *Darwin and Modern Science* (1909) Bateson says that "No one can survey the work of recent years without perceiving that evolutionary orthodoxy developed too fast, and a great deal has got to come down." But a few years ago Darwin's creed was settled science. Where is it today? Ask the president of the British Association at Melbourne. In his presidential address at Melbourne he says:³³ "We go to Darwin for his incomparable collection of facts. We would fain emulate his scholarship, his width, and his power of exposition; but to us he speaks no more with philosophical authority. We read his scheme of evolution as we would those of Lucretius, or of Lamarck, delighting in their simplicity and their courage."

Who that has read the annual addresses before that tribunal of science has not marked the frequent revisions and contradictions in the changing creed called knowledge as distinguished from that Christian creed which nineteen centuries have confirmed with ever increasing evidence to this day? The fundamental creeds of Christianity are supported by a consensus of testimony and a range of corroboration such as no modern science has acquired; and despite all the opposition they have suffered, largely as a result of that opposition, they are more easily and more cogently defended today than ever before since they were framed. It is want of adequate attention to their evidence, and nothing else, unless the moral grounds of that neglect, that leaves them discredited by any man. Men listen to the incantation of the *Zeitgeist*, and often become deaf to anything else,

³³ *New York Times*, August 16, 1914.

prepossessed and obsessed with some latest novelties of thought, and refuse to explore the mountains of unrefuted evidence by which some of the oldest creeds of the Christian church still claim the right to rule our consciences.

There were no men of science in the last century more thoroughly equipped, more judicial in temper, more excellent in their lives, more splendid in their achievements, more distinguished among men than many to whom these Christian creeds meant more of indefectible reality than anything they found in modern science, and who saw no incompatibility whatever between the properly attested facts of science and the united testimony of the Gospels. There were not a few who regarded the whole Scripture as valid testimony to a world-order that science would yet corroborate at every point. When after wide wandering Romanes returned to the Christian faith, he was strongly impressed by the number of scientific men of the best repute in his own university who were wholly convinced and freely acknowledged believers. And at this very day, despite all the contumely heaped upon that Biblical conception of the world which was plainly entertained by Christ himself, all the daily contradictions it meets from men who have taken no pains to understand it, all the scepticism and neglect evinced by professional theologians and the clergy, a tardy, but continual approximation to this view can be discerned in every science by which it is traversed. Repeatedly in all these sciences positions urged against the Biblical teaching have either been displaced, or proved to offer no such antagonism as had been supposed, or supplanted by new evidence corroborating the Bible.

Philosophy builds all its higher interpretations on a given world-order, and has often taken for granted some conception of this order much in vogue without much critical examination of its credentials. Thus the naturalistic conception of world-order is now frequently assumed as the ground of metaphysics. But the task of metaphysics should never be begun until everything possible has been done to ascertain

correctly what the world-order is. This is the previous question of philosophy, and this is only to be learned from the actual events entering into the experience of mankind. All actual events belong to the world-order, and all unusual events have been disputed. Experience exists in a series of ascending planes, and every plane is full of mysteries and surprises. The *scala intellectus* reaches its highest level in the domain of religion; and religion itself presents a long ascent from its lowest to its highest experience. The highest forms of this experience present extraordinary phenomena, both in consciousness and to external sense, transcending all the common and rudimental forms of religion, and all the lower ranges of experience in other things. And why should it not be so? Why should this not be expected as a matter of course? Incredulity is aroused and challenged on every plane by the more exceptional phenomena. The higher the plane, and more wonderful the phenomena, so much the more incredulity will be aroused. This is not only natural, but normal and necessary to human sanity. But the laws of evidence are the same on every plane, and some of the most extraordinary facts are among the best attested.

The largest crux of inquiry has always been the seeming evidence of initial causality proceeding from the primary ground of the world. This crux does not appear in theology alone, but first of all in physics, where the origin of motion confronts the astronomer, as a question whether the physical order shows any marks of a beginning and whence the initial impulse came. We are also told that the universe is running down like a clock, and the question is asked, by what power its movement can be either perpetuated or renewed. Then, passing over intermediate ground, the origin of life demands our heed, and the question of initial causality again. It has long been supposed that biogenesis is a law of nature to which no exception is possible, much less is an exception found. This is disputed, but if the law holds good, a divine intervention in the physical order must be inferred. Again the whole history of life is filled with phenomena of the

most refractory sort when the attempt is made to keep them all within the genetic movement. The higher the scale of life ascends the more difficult it becomes to see genetic continuity. But the observed phenomena would agree entirely with the view that the fundamental types of life were separately created. When it is said in Genesis that God made everything after its kind, and endowed each kind with power of propagating its own kind, only the most generic term is used to indicate the primary types of life.

In the case of man the difficulty is enormously increased. No lines of man's descent have been established after multitudinous attempts. Let those who doubt this read *The Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist*, by Thomas Dwight. In comparative anatomy he has not among Americans been excelled. The physical interval alone between man and brute is very great. While man's higher properties of will and reason and speech have hitherto made futile and absurd all efforts to establish a genetic connection; either man is not a free agent, or his freedom is the sole exception to the entire course of inferior nature. If man is free his freedom can only originate in the free act of a free source, a moral Creator; for freedom cannot be a product of necessity though necessity is a product of freedom.

Shaler says: "The naturalist knows no miracles"; but nevertheless "a reasonable construction of the facts warrants the statement that the law of generational advance has in man undergone a sudden, indeed we may say, a paroxysmal alteration, in truth, the most startling change which the history of organic life exhibits."³⁴ And John Fiske, in his last book, goes further still. He says that however it may be for zoölogical man, yet "for psychological man you must erect a distinct kingdom; nay, you must even dichotomize the universe, putting man on one side and all things else on the other".³⁵

³⁴ *Interpretation of Nature*, p. 189.

³⁵ *Through Nature to God*, p. 82.

It is easy to multiply testimonies of this kind from naturalists, and some of the best advocates of evolution, such as A. R. Wallace, who always maintained that neither the mind nor the body of man could be accounted for without the intervention of some power above nature. So, without pursuing this quest further, we are brought up once more against the problem of initial causality and those marks of divine intervention which have in the Christian revelation their highest expression. And why indeed should not God intervene? Why all this horror of his intervention, unless "conscience has made cowards of us all"? Nothing is so welcome to man as the thought of divine intervention when situations of personal peril appear; but once the obvious peril is removed, it seems as if nothing were so hateful to man as the thought that God ever intervenes. The theist believes there is a Divine Being, infinite in power and in love. Why then should it seem a thing impossible or incredible to the theist that God should raise the dead, when the best of reasons for so doing exist; or that God should create in his own image at the beginning man and woman, meant by infinite love to share in his own glory and in all the riches of his house? Why should he not from the beginning give these objects of his love a start in life suitable to their destiny, and worthy of his own character and power? Was he not well able to do this? Did not the first human beings need his care and kindness just as much as we today? If Jesus Christ had been the Creator, as some think that he was not, would he have created moral agents in a way to forbid their possible knowledge of his goodness, and convince them of nothing but inhumanity? No answer to these questions can be given by a theist in his senses discrediting that beautiful old story of God's worth and love, which carries the whole endorsement of Christ himself, not only in his teaching, but in his life and death and resurrection. In the history of mankind that resurrection was the supreme instance of poetic justice, proof palpable of a moral order in the nature

of things, and pledge of ultimate justice to all moral agents.

How much more in keeping with God's character, if that character is truly expressed in Christ, or even as it was discerned by Plato, to find God creating man in the way he is said to do in Genesis than in the way described by Darwin! If man himself was a miracle at the beginning, created in the image of God, and his recognized child, capable of knowing, loving, serving God, and of receiving plain instruction from his word, then what we now call miracle, or initial causality on the part of God, belongs to the fundamental order of the world, and is to be expected wherever the conditions may demand it; there and there only. In this case sin was man's abuse of freedom and involved, as Kant believed, his lapse from normal; and everything else that is told us in the Bible is the sequence of events to be expected. Had there been no disobedience, we have good reason to suppose that open intercourse with heaven would have been an everyday affair; so common that it would be always recognized as an established part of the world-order. It would not have been called miracle. It could not appear like a miracle to Adam that God should talk to him face to face. How should he do otherwise? What kind of a God must that be who will not speak to his own children in language that they can understand? All that hinders his doing so today in a palpable, unmistakable manner, is the universal disobedience and alienation of the human race. But sin having entered and marred the relations of man to his Maker, the whole revelation made by God would have to be adjusted to that fact; and God himself who intervened for man's creation must also intervene for his redemption. Is he not perfectly able, perfectly free, perfectly willing to do everything that he justly can do for man's weal? Wherein does his perfection consist, if he is not?

Why should not that Being, who by necessity of his nature is absolute freedom, reveal that freedom in the

whole method of his works? Why should not an absolute Being, who by necessity of his nature transcends all the finite manifestations of his power, as Spinoza and Spencer both believed, give some expression to that transcendence in the whole constitution of the world? And why should not such a God as Christ presents reveal himself plainly at the outset in goodness, mercy and judgment precisely as we are told in Scripture that he did? Why should not that God who made man's mouth find some way of speaking to him plainly, some way level to man's intelligence, suitable to his situation, and precisely adapted to promote his education in those elements of truth that all mankind need most to understand? But this is exactly what he has done, if the internal claims of the Bible are received; and because he has done so, the Bible has already proved the most universal and effective instrument of education and enlightenment in the world. Its pedagogic values alone are the very highest among books, as many an expert pedagog has found, such as G. Stanley Hall.

There is practically no dispute in philosophy over the affirmation that the world-ground is Absolute Being and Absolute Power. In this assertion all the schools are one. The dispute begins in the effort to define other attributes or properties of the Absolute besides power, and the particular relations of Absolute Being to the phenomenal order of the world and its finite individuals. But perhaps no metaphysician would deny that Absolute Being must be possessed of absolute freedom. The Absolute is self-determined being, absolutely self-determined; subject to no external conditions but such as are self-imposed. Tennemann says of Frederick Koeppen, a friend and follower of Jacobi, that for him "liberty is a power that determines itself. It is consequently a primary cause, the substratum of all existence; in a word, Being, properly so called. But, at the same time, freedom is perfectly inconceivable to the understanding."³⁶ It is a fact of knowledge, and of activity,

³⁶ Using the word understanding in the Kantian sense.

perceived immediately, intuitively. Necessity is an order established by liberty. An unlimited, an absolute liberty is the Divine Being. The nature of human individuality consists in the relation between the exterior and the interior. By this relation liberty in man is limited".³⁷

However imperfect this statement may be of the liberty inherent in the absolute ground of the world, a conception of such liberty is the self-evident implication of a self-determination which has no external conditions but such as are self-imposed. The only self-determination known to man is that of will; and as the world-ground is necessarily self-determined, in the absolute measure, it was on the strength of this analogy, besides other good reasons, held by Plato to be personal. There is no more fundamental insight in philosophy than this. It has been made exceedingly plain in all the writings of William T. Harris. Divine personality, transcendence and freedom are grounded in absolute self-determination. The constitution of nature, or fundamental order of the world, becomes on these premises a product of God's free activity. Hence he is not only the ground of the world, but its Creator. The world-order is not self-existent, nor self-perpetuated, but wholly contingent on the will of God for its present form, its continuance, and the method of its evolution. God has made it what it is, he can also change it, or bring the present order to an end and make another. If he so chose, God could certainly make a world-order which, after its first inception, might be maintained as an exclusively genetic process. Or, if he will, he can make a world-order, in which, for ends of self-revelation to his moral creatures, he employs initial causality in such ways as they can recognize, and in such ways as would best conduce to their education, their moral welfare and their sufficient acquaintance with himself.

Self-revelation between man and man is principally effected by action that involves some measure and form of initial causality; and it cannot be reasonably doubted that

³⁷ Tennemann, *Manual of the History of Philosophy*, 1852, pp. 456-458.

by such means God may, if he will, make himself far better known to man than would be possible in the absence of such action. The naturalistic conception of world-order is one from which such action is entirely excluded. The Christian conception is one marked by the obvious presence of such action on the part of God in the history of man, and also in the general cosmic order. It is by initial action that the genetic movement is introduced at the beginning, and subsequently raised to higher levels. By this means distinct and irreducible categories of being, function and value are constituted and maintained, thus making possible real classification, and immeasurably aiding the organization of knowledge. By this means also the largest divisions of time in human history are made, and the scheme of history is projected into the future, furnishing principles and material for that sublime philosophy of history which was founded by the Hebrew prophets.

In saying that "necessity is an order established by liberty", a doctrine also taught by Hegel, Koeppen expresses what is both the logical and natural relation of initial causality to the genetic process both in the physical cosmos and in the history of man. If man is a free agent it is impossible to regard human history as merely a genetic movement. It is a perpetual alternation of initial action and genetic result, even if it be supposed that human wills are the only free agents concerned in it. Among men, personality is gauged by its power of initiative. National history and world-history, like that of the human individual, is fully half determined by the use made of this power in both thought and action. In his Birmingham address in 1913, as president of the British Association, Sir Oliver Lodge said truly: "The loom of time is complicated by a multitude of free agents who can modify the web, making the product more beautiful or more ugly, according as they are in harmony or disharmony with the general scheme. I venture to maintain that manifest imperfections are thus accounted for, and that freedom could be given on no other

terms, nor at any less cost. The ability thus to work for weal or woe is no illusion; it is a reality, a responsible power which conscious agents possess. Wherefore the resulting fabric is not something preordained and inexorable, though by wide knowledge of character it may be inferred". Even though human wills alone were concerned in human history these words would be true, if man is capable of choosing, uncoerced, between alternative ends and actions. Yet there is reason to suppose that human wills are not the only wills, nor even the only finite wills, active and influential in producing the results of history; and it is far from being nothing more than a necessitated and genetic process. Volitional agencies, both good and bad, concealed behind the screen of sense, may have an immensely larger share than men suppose in the direction of their own lives; and the will of God, if there is a God, must control the outcome without impinging on man's freedom.

For many centuries the principal means of bringing men to the knowledge of God has been the record found in the Bible of his self-revelation by intervention, and of the impressions made by this revelation on the minds of men. The record assumes the revelation as an empirical fact, known to the actual experience of men in many ways from the time of the first man Adam to that of the last surviving apostle of Christ. It is all one revelation, in successive stages and many forms, progressively continuous, cumulative and enriched by all its additions; but now completed or suspended or intermitted until its future resumption when the time arrives. The completion however is only of this overt or miraculous revelation; for all the common forms of revelation are perpetual. These include the spiritual illumination of all those who meet its conditions in repentance and faith, and due heed to the testimony given. In this sense revelation is continuous to this day.

The spiritual illumination thus within reach adds no new element of truth to the old record, but enlightens the believer's mind in the old truth; and, precisely in the measure

that the prescribed conditions are fulfilled, makes all that truth a great and rich and living reality; in this measure and no more. It is open to all men to fulfil these conditions, and gain a knowledge of what has been revealed, knowledge that in its measure is experimental. By this means and to this extent theology, which is primarily an historical science, may become incidentally an experimental science, through the assimilation and application to life of that testimony which is its foundation. In this way Christian experience, in the degree of its maturity, acquires secondary and corroborative data for the science of theology, supplementing the primary data found in the testimony of the primary witnesses to the overt revelation. In proportion to its maturity Christian experience corroborates that ancient testimony, and does so in many ways. The evidence of this can be found in the Christian biography of all the centuries and in many living witnesses today. There are forms of theology now in vogue that reverse this order, and seek primary data in the more rudimental elements of experience at the present time. This meager, modern experience is then made the test by which to judge the experience of the Hebrew prophets and apostles.

Philosophy, therefore, to be strictly cosmic in its scope, must reckon not only with the whole of that religious experience, which in its ethnic and sub-Christian forms makes the field of comparative religion, and not only with the record of an overt revelation, ostensibly exhibiting religious experience on its highest plane, but also with the entire range of Christian experience, from its most rudimental to its most exalted forms, from that of the babe in Christ to that of the full grown man in Christ, although he is all too seldom found; and all those variations of experience in which the centuries since Christ abound. Moreover the question of initial causality belongs no less here than in the case of the overt revelation, where this appears in a more conspicuous form. Christian experience claims to begin in a regeneration effected in response to faith by the Spirit of

God; and by that Spirit, through the continual exercise of the same faith, the believer's mind is subject to daily renewal, and may reach high degrees of spiritual understanding. To those who have no share in the experience it can never be made plain in words. But there are many kinds of experience, as all men know, which, until they arrive, cannot possibly be understood; yet men are very apt to ignore or discredit testimony to experience in which they have no individual share.

The complete elimination of divine intervention from the world-order in the recognition of both philosophy and faith usually issues first in some form of naturalistic theism or deism. It may result further in pantheism, paganism and atheism—formal atheism. These last results are not a philosophically necessary outcome but are the practical outcome. A kind of theism is possible, and doubtless philosophically warranted, without recognition of divine intervention. But it is a devitalized, anemic theism, with a precarious hold upon faith, always tending to more attenuation. Theism has been kept alive in the world chiefly by the recognition of divine intervention.

Are not science and philosophy under inevitable obligation to make sure whether initial causality proceeding from the world-ground may not be an integral factor of the world-order? And will any man of science or a historian seriously pretend that even if this factor be actually present, and plainly evinced, yet it cannot be allowed the least scientific recognition? Why should any man choose to stultify himself like that? Why admit that a fact is thus and so, yet make believe that it is not so? For what does science exist unless to organize all known facts? Why not sit down like a little child before a fact, as Huxley bid, not as he sometimes did? If Spinoza had been convinced that the resurrection of Lazarus was a fact he would have torn his system into shreds, accepted the common faith of Christians, and suited his philosophy to a different conception of world-order from that he entertained. A naturalistic world-order

is incompatible with Christianity, and if the last is true the first is a false conception. If Strauss had been convinced that the resurrection of Jesus as told in the Gospels was a fact he would have confessed that naturalism had broken down, had lost the game, and the whole world-order must be adjusted to that fact. Strauss exemplified the whole declension from a naturalistic theism through pantheism to formal atheism. There are well equipped men and excellent judges still alive who have not the shadow of a doubt that the resurrection of Lazarus and that of Christ occurred precisely as they are told, and that the world-order is conditioned by these facts, and by all other facts in line with them. Moreover these believers are not in the least ashamed of their belief, and are perfectly willing to await the whole verdict of time. Nay, they would sooner perish than deny these events; for they see that the whole character and purpose of God are, in human knowledge, conditioned by these events, which naturalism turns into cunningly devised fables.

Why should not the whole world-order be conditioned by events like these, and by acts of originaive power proceeding from the immanent ground of the world, if that ground is indeed a moral being? And why should not philosophy first make sure what the actual world-order is before approaching its ulterior problems? In theism, which is, of course, a philosophy, the whole world-order is framed by the wisdom of God, and rests immediately on the will of God. This will is absolutely free, and the only fountain of all finite freedom. From this will only does the will of man derive its power of initial action, and by his will, says Emerson, does man most resemble God. Will is the man, all other powers are his properties; and will is the foundation of Absolute Being—free will, or self-determination in the absolute measure, having no limits but such as are self-imposed. In the world-view of all Scripture, which is that of Christ, the immanent Spirit of God is the executive of the Godhead,—a term used fitly by Charles Hodge.

The omnipresent Spirit of God is the primary source of all power, action, life, order and excellence in physical nature and in the mind of man, though not identical with the mind of man. By the Spirit of God were the heavens garnished, and the earth, was brought out of chaos into order. By the Spirit of God are we fashioned in the womb, and the breath of the Almighty giveth us life and understanding. By the same Spirit man is born anew, and restored to the true image of his Maker. There is no biology so profound as that of Scripture.³⁸ By the Spirit of God Christ cast out demons, wrought all his miracles, spake all his matchless words, and offered himself without spot unto God; and by the same Spirit he was himself raised from the dead. This is that Spirit that Christ sent upon his disciples at the day of Pentecost, and this Spirit was always under his command. Why then is it judged a thing incredible with you, if God doth raise the dead?³⁹

The resurrection of Christ as the first fruits of them that sleep, and the final resurrection of all the dead, every man in his own rank and place, are, in Scripture, not something extrinsic to the world-order, but an integral part of that order; just as the whole earthly career of the human race is likened in Scripture to the seasons of a single year ending in harvest. Are there any signs of harvest drawing near? "The use of natural history", says Emerson,⁴⁰ "is to give us aid in supernatural history". "Every natural fact is the symbol of some spiritual fact". "It is easily seen that there is nothing lucky or capricious in these analogies, but that they are constant, and pervade nature". "Is there no intent of an analogy between man's life and the seasons? And do the seasons gain no grandeur or pathos from that analogy?"

On these analogies that are constant and pervade nature

³⁸ Cf. Job x. 8-12; xxxi.15; xxxiii.4; Neh. ix.6 (various reading); Psa. cxix.73; cxxxix.14-16; Eccl. xi.5; Jno. iii.6 and many other passages that complete the teaching.

³⁹ Acts xxvi.8.

⁴⁰ *Nature*, 1836, chapter on "Language".

Butler built in the interest of Christian philosophy the most perfect example of inductive reasoning the whole history of science can exhibit. On these analogies the Lord Christ built his incomparable parables, with a whole philosophy in everyone. By these analogies that are not capricious, but are constant and pervade nature, the very vocabulary of the Bible is constructed. A better understanding of this fact would bring the whole world-order of the Bible into strong and luminous relief. Those literary critics who render all this deeply significant, only adequate and exquisite language of Scripture into dessicated prose, mock the magnificent world-view of the Bible, and prove themselves destitute of literary sense. But a world-view can be found in Scripture that no philosophy can afford to miss. It is the *Weltanschauung* of Jesus Christ himself.

East Northfield, Mass. HENRY WILLIAM RANKIN.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

Social Heredity and Social Evolution. The Other Side of Eugenics.

By HERBERT WILLIAM CONN. Professor of Biology in Wesleyan University. Author of "Evolution of Today," "The Living World," "The Method of Evolution," etc. New York, Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press.

This work opens so many avenues of discussion and covers such a wide field of inquiry that a complete consideration of it is impossible in this place. Dr. Conn seeks in studying the evolution of the race to discover what elements in human character are transmitted by direct organic heredity. These, according to Weissmann (whom he follows and in whom he implicitly trusts), cannot be altered by acquired characteristics. Only those characters which were in the original life stream of the parents can thus be transmitted. Therefore through organic heredity alone man cannot rise except by a rigid and controlled system of mating. If this is all that enters into the problem of advancement then the future is black indeed since marriage control is next to impossible and the possible advance of single individuals is lost when they pass from sight; their progeny only inheriting the life common to them and to their ancestors.

Dr. Conn therefore turns to the study of the evolution of man and of human society and finds that the laws of animal evolution fail to control man's development after he reaches self-consciousness. Certain other factors appear which have to do with man in his social relations. Speech and government develop gradually. The human family is formed. Altruism follows. The great battles between individualism and centralization and between egoism and altruism are waged. Man is now controlled by new laws of social evolution. His purely physical development is at a standstill. Socially and morally he moves onward. It thus appears that while we cannot change the elements inherited organically by an individual from his ancestors yet these are only a very small part of his later developed character. We can alter his surrounding—his social environment. His brain and character being unformed and plastic can therefore be made the inheritors of all the victories of the past. Consequently those things that tend to uplift the social environment are the essentials to progress. These all rest on altruism and altruism now rests on religion as its foundation. The future for the race is therefore full of hope and our personal responsibility is reaffirmed with new and more solemn sanctions.

Dr. Conn believes implicitly in the evolution not only of physical

but of spiritual man. He explains at length how conscience appeared and how moral codes originated. He describes the very earliest history of the race and its first impulses and methods of acquiring advancement. And very interesting is his discussion although it would be better were there not so many repetitions especially in the illustrations used. The position taken harmonizes with the general theory of organic evolution and is on the whole consistent. But it is very questionable whether the evidence for this is at all conclusive. The argument from language proves little. We are so *very* far from the original sources that we can tell but little about them. The argument from racial practices among savage tribes is open to question. Have they gone up or degenerated? They also are, possibly, millions of years from primitive man. The argument from the development of children may or may not be strong. Children develop a conscience or display it very soon. It is hard to say that conscience and other powers are lacking in a little child because we see no evidence of them until a later period. As for the origin of religious beliefs, only touched upon here, it does not seem that we have yet sufficient evidence to be so dogmatic and so certain.

Philadelphia, Pa.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

Conduct and the Supernatural, being the Norrisian Prize Essay for the year 1913. By LIONEL SPENCER THORNTON, M.A., of the Community of the Resurrection, Mirfield; Late Scholar of Emmanuel College, Cambridge; Carus Prizeman. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 39 Paternoster Row; New York: Fourth Avenue and 30th Street; Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. 1915. 8vo; pp. xiv, 327.

It is a striking fact that, "for some two hundred years or more after the Reformation and the rise of modern philosophy, no one ever questioned the supremacy of the Christian ethic, though from every other quarter inroads were being made upon the received traditions". At the present time, however, owing to the spread of rationalism, the dominance of the theory of evolution, the influence of the idealist philosophy and the repudiation of Christian dogma, "there is no branch of truth more openly assailed, or more urgently in need of attention from the Christian apologist, than the Christian ethic itself, the sacred science of conduct". The writer of the essay under review "has had a double purpose before him throughout: first, to examine and criticize certain ethical systems which illustrate the modern reaction against Christian ideals, and, secondly, to offer in apologetic form an argument for the supremacy of the Christian ethic".

"The first thing which strikes the student of the modern revolution in morals is the extraordinary variety of the schemes put forward, and the amazing failure of their authors to agree upon the most important

questions." So far from giving any "clear, definite, and coherent programme for humanity", they "are in disagreement as to foundations". For example, Strauss held that "rationalistic faith comes to rest in the cosmic process". "He declared that man's reason has been set the task of coöperating with the Cosmos; and such coöperation, he thought provides sufficient inspiration for altruistic conduct." "Nietzsche set aside reason and her confident search for truth in favor of the will-to-power; he believed that reason is always the servant of will, and that truth is to each man only that which he wills to believe. "From his point of view we have not to find out what is right, but rather to make sure what it is that we really want, and then to make ourselves masters of it."

Nor do we observe less difference "when we come to the various superstructures. As far as his philosophical bases go, Mr. Bernard Shaw is in close agreement with Nietzsche; yet their ethical schemes are wide apart. "Both reject morality, as such, in theory; but in fact Mr. Shaw's conclusions are very much more akin to Christianity." Pure egoism does not find nearly such an advocate, in him as in Nietzsche. So again, Mr. H. G. Wells "has for the most part placed his faith in education, that is, in knowledge rather than in will". "He, too, is—by conviction at any rate—an altruist." "On the other hand, John Davidson, the poet of materialism, has proclaimed with no uncertain voice the gospel of individualism in its most extreme form." He smiles at what he considers the Christian sentiments of Nietzsche. "So much for the chaos among extremists."

Nor is it otherwise in the case of those writers "who do not reach the extreme conclusions of the Nietzschean school", such as Prof. F. Paulsen, Mr. H. W. Garrod, Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson, and Mr. H. S. Chamberlain. One may say of these writers generally that there is simply a revulsion of feeling against Christian conceptions of sin, moral law, and asceticism, and in favor of a return to the "Natural Man"; but, like the extremists already mentioned, they differ widely with regard to what they construct on this base. Mr. Lowes Dickinson harks back to Hellenism. "Professor Paulsen seems to think that both Hellenism and Christianity have had their hey-day and that we are now in process of forming some new ethic which will include the best in both." Mr. Garrod believes that an attempt to do this was made at the Renaissance and that it did not succeed. "Hellenism is too dangerous; Christianity, too unpractical. He gives his allegiance to a new 'Teutonic' way of life, which is to be better than both." Mr. Chamberlain agrees with him in advocating the new Teutonic religion, but differs from him in professing adherence also to the Gospel which Mr. Garrod would throw over. In a word, the most obvious characteristic of all these writers—the less extreme equally with the more extreme—is that each one has an ethic of his own.

What impresses us next is that they still have points in common. They agree in repudiating three things: "the Christian view of human nature, the moral law, and the Gospel itself; and they also agree in

being "positive", in the sense that they all believe that their schemes of life would leave the world better than they found it. In so far they are on the side of Christianity, though avowedly and really opposed to it. They are more worthy of refutation than mere Epicureanism. What each advocates is a pagan morality, but with a not wholly pagan motive.

Having thus outlined and characterized the existing ethical situation, our author advances to the work of refutation. He deals first with the "Individualists", among whom he singles out, as might be supposed, Friedrich Nietzsche and John Davidson. His criticism of them is searching and acute. He would "seem to show that the standpoint of individualism is an impossible one to maintain. It refuses to take account of the facts of human nature: it ignores the social instincts so firmly planted in man. We may, then, set it aside in favor of some less radical solution of the problem of conduct."

Such attempted solution is found in "Socialism," and as the most typical representatives of this our author takes Mr. Bernard Shaw and Mr. H. G. Wells. In his criticism of the former he points out, that, as in the case of Nietzsche, "the prevailing note is one of despair"; that "the whole system is deeply involved in inconsistencies which go down to the roots"; and that "these inconsistencies arise from the notion, upon which the whole turns, that morality is harmful and must be replaced by instinct".

Mr. Wells our author finds standing very much nearer to Christianity than any one of the three writers already mentioned. "His belief in progress does not break down utterly, as is the case with Nietzsche and with Mr. Shaw." "He refuses to adopt the superman theory." "He believes in acquired virtue; and in his opinion man must give his whole energies to acquiring it." Yet his "optimism" is only apparent. "He seems to be in a state of very great uncertainty, both as to the exact goal towards which he is driving and also as to the method by which he proposes to reach it." Hence, "disillusionment and hopeless perplexity" result, and at last, on him too, there really settles down a "deep despair". "Our examination, then, of this group of writers makes two things clear: first, that the vicious circle of self-contained nature fails to give man harmony and progress; and secondly, that systems of conduct based upon pure nature, though they may start optimistically, are fundamentally fatalistic, and are bound to end in pessimism.

In view of these conclusions we are brought to the position, first, that "a morality is necessary, and, secondly, that it cannot be wholly subjective, as Mr. Wells would make it; that is to say, it cannot be simply the eclectic creation of the individual, formed pragmatically to suit his own estimate of his needs." In a word, an objective law must be posited, "and it must be founded on religion."

But there remains still one question to be decided as to the basis of morality. May it not be grounded on the universal element in human nature as opposed to the individual? and so may we not hold to the Christian ideals, but found them on a naturalistic basis? This, the

compromise position of Mr. H. S. Chamberlain, our author next proceeds to discuss. The former would "graft the Christian religion, as it were, on to the Natural Man without the interpolation of objective moral law". This he regards as "external" and as "arbitrary". But in rejecting this he rejects his Christianity also. As our author clearly shows, "at every point his system falls back on to that same plane of nature which we have seen to be an impossible basis for any ethical system except the most extreme of all; and which, if consistently practiced, would destroy its adherents".

In short, "human nature is disordered and weakened and requires a new direction. It requires a law higher than itself, and coming from a supernatural source, to furnish guidance to it in unravelling the tangle of life. *But law by itself is not enough.* That is the truth of all criticisms of morality and law which we have encountered in this discussion." And Christianity does not end in law and in the sense of sin, indispensable though these are. "They are only the starting point of the Christian, parts of the foundation upon which the superstructure is built." Hence, our author passes on to the positive side of his argument and sets forth "the true method by which Christianity moulds conduct". He would not imply that "the natural order is in itself bad, but rather that it is imperfect and incomplete". If it is to realize its possibilities, it must ground itself on the Supernatural and develop itself through the Supernatural.

This is effected by Christianity through its otherworldly principle. The long chapter in which our author discusses the nature and the operation of this principle is, perhaps, the most valuable in the book. In it he takes issue properly and successfully with Mr. H. W. Garrod in his essay on "Christ the Forerunner", and refutes "the end ethics" which must have resulted from his belief in "the immediate apocalyptic Coming of the Son of Man". He shows that this Coming, as distinguished from the "eschatological Coming", was "not external but mystical, and that "it becomes the Christian's experience of fellowship with Christ". Hence, the moral power of it. "By virtue of that personal Coming He uproots us from the natural plane of experience and replants us upon a supernatural plane in the spiritual world." In that world, therefore, "must henceforth be our centre of gravity". "The kingdom of God is within us", but it remains to be realized by us through the phenomenal world about us. This world, since it is the creation of God, is in itself good: and "thus far the Gospel may be held to include all that is best in natural religion; for it counts all the natural order to be the antechamber to the throne of God. This is the truth emphasized by the Alexandrine school in the Primitive Church. But this is not all. Christianity has in it an element which makes it something more than the crown and consummation of all the natural religions; and this something is to be seen clearly in its attitude toward sin." This creates a great gulf between the natural and the spiritual, between the world and God. This gulf man cannot bridge; but it is bridged for him by the redemptive power of Christ, and, as we have

seen, the whole man is planted afresh in the redemptive sphere." "All things become new." The natural order specially acquires a new because spiritual value. "Earth becomes transfigured when it is regarded and used as a training school for heaven." Then the otherworldly principle of the Christian outlook gives to the whole field of human life and conduct, both individually and socially, a worth and a significance for which the natural order by itself could never provide a basis. Christianity by supplying a supernatural foundation for conduct empowers it to be truly natural."

The way in which all this is worked out by our author is clear and often very suggestive. At some points, however, he has not said, and, doubtless, he does not think himself to have said, the last word. For example, his discussion of "the use of force and of non-resistance" is not wholly satisfactory. "The use of force belongs to the plane of right and not to the plane of love", and it is only in the latter plane that the individual as an individual ought to act. But can the individual, even in his most individual life, ever separate himself from society and "the corporate use of force"? In a word, is not self-defense a social duty? Is not the question really as to the spirit in which force is used and not as to whether it may or should be used in defence of personal rights? Logically carried out, our author's position at this point would be subversive of morality itself.

Having presented the "otherworldly principle" as the basis upon which Christian conduct rests and as affording the aims towards which it directs its energies, Mr. Thornton considers, next, "the method by which Christian character is built up". This method is that of "the Ascetic Principle". Properly this is only another aspect of the "Otherworldly Principle". It is this principle "seen in the light of its antagonism to sin", and it suggests certain "objections which have been urged against Christian ideals on the ground of a supposed hostility to the whole natural order of life."

Our author takes up, first, the objections raised by Nietzsche: such as, that asceticism means "the suppression of vitality"; that its doctrine of the equality of all before God "is destructive of individuality; that "Christian fellowship" amounts to little more than "a herding of the sick"; and that all penitential discipline, as fasting, is really the expression of "an extravagance of feeling".

Having disposed of these objections, in general on the ground that Christian asceticism is "positive" rather than "negative", our author turns to some more comprehensive criticisms that have been passed on the Christian view of life. These may be summed up in the charge that Christianity is "destructive of the natural man". It is so because it cultivates indifference to the interests of this world. But in doing so it transmutes, it does not ignore, the interests of this life. Thus, "while moving towards the supernatural ends, it does not reach them directly". "It reaches them through the earthly materials, using them as means", and so developing and glorifying them. Thus only he who lives for heaven can make the most of earth, and otherworldliness realizes this

world. This explanation, however, does not satisfy the objection that, in the last analysis, Christianity demands nothing less than "the extermination of the natural man". This is so, but it is the natural man as under the control of sinful desire. It is not the truly natural man, the man as made by God and pronounced by him "very good". So when it is urged that the natural virtues were regarded by the early church as at best "splendid vices", the answer is that she "was conscious of having in her treasure-house something vastly superior to them all, namely, the whole hierarchy of virtues which proceed from the otherworldly centre and from the Spirit of Love". The church did not consider the natural virtues as vices in themselves, but she did look on even the best natural things as evil in contrast with "the perfection which is in Christ". And yet when all has been said, it remains true that Christianity was and is and always will be "revolutionary". Her distinctive message is that we should cease to live for this life and should live for that which is to come. Only then, through the ascetic principle, can man attain those otherworldly ideals in which, as we have seen, he shall truly find his life.

"The significance of the Christian solution to the problem of conduct in contrast to the other attempts which history records" is next emphasized by our author. "Either the individual", he shows, "is submerged in his own altruism, because there is no personal incentive to virtuous effort, or again he is submerged in his own egoism; his true self is lost in the pursuit of individual ends. In both cases what is wrong is the absence of anything which can inspire a true self-respect for the absolute worth of the nobler self. The otherworldly ideals show a man that his personal worth is too great to allow him to dissipate it in a mere culture of earthly happiness. On the other hand, in the light of these same ideals it would be an equally foolish waste to expend energy solely that others may thereby be enabled to dissipate *their* personal worth in the same shallow pursuit of happiness."

In his closing chapter our author applies the principle which he has thus far been expounding and maintaining. This application he makes in the sphere of the sex-ideal. He first discusses sex "on the natural plane", showing how, on the one hand "the sex passion is treated as a thing which can easily be made to bow to state laws of breeding, and how, on the other, it is exalted into the position of a religious inspiration which must be allowed to work out its own destiny without restraint"; and these false tendencies of these writers he traces to: (1) their theory of self-realization, and (2) their amazing over-estimation of the human power of controlling the sex-instincts".

He then proceeds to unfold "the Christian Ideal" of conduct in this sphere, emphasizing "the otherworldly significance of marriage" and discussing "the ascetic principle and the sex ideal". Under the former head he shows how "the Christian institution of life-long monogamous marriage is the necessary and permanent expression of a sex ideal based entirely upon the otherworldly principle". We wish that he had gone further and explained how "the otherworldly principle harmonizes

with the Biblical sanction of second marriages. "Neither marriage nor family life", he rightly maintains, "ought ever to become ends in themselves." He points out how "the presence of the child intensifies the sacramental value of the marriage as a means to the realization of the otherworldly ideals"; and he calls attention to "the danger which lies in the path of the eugenic movement". This danger is the very serious one of making the natural life an end in itself.

From our author's views on divorce we must dissent. He would exclude it from the Christian life. "It constitutes", he says, *a deliberate renunciation of the otherworldly ideal*, which is infinitely more damaging to the moral sense of the children than the vision of that ideal imperfectly realized. Even when the ideal has been lost, the continuance of the marriage tie is a promise that it may be recovered; whereas divorce is a final denial of the possibility of recovery. Such denial must leave in the soul of the child a deep sense of violence done to human personality far exceeding any harm wrought by the quarrels of parents, who have, however, not yet turned their backs upon the ideal for good." Does not this position misconceive the Biblical doctrine of marriage? Is not this that marriage is not a partnership, but is a common life, i.e., "one flesh"? But if it be this, neither its dissolution nor its continuance is subject to the will. As it may not be dissolved on the inclination of those who have entered into it; so neither may it be continued, not even for the sake of the children, when once, as by death, or by its more than equivalents, adultery and absolute desertion, the common life, the "one flesh", has been destroyed. It is a question not of inclination but of fact. The head cannot and ought not to live with the body when the latter is dead or worse, and the body cannot and ought not to live with the head when the latter is dead or worse. To deny both the right and the duty of divorce under such circumstances is to do injustice to personality and this is to subvert the very foundation of Christian ethics. It involves even a disregard of truth, and otherworldliness must, first of all and above all, be true.

With our author's discussion of "the ascetic principle and the sex ideal" we do not find ourselves either in entire accord. It involves a false conception of the virtue of celibacy. This it regards as a holier state than matrimony. Hence the place and the worth of "the Christian monastic community". "Over against Christian marriage it sets the ideal of a family of celibates. It does this in no sense with a view to depreciating marriage, but in order to *preserve* it by exercising a strong influence on behalf of self-discipline, the only means by which the sex ideal can be maintained in its full purity and beauty. The individual Christian from time to time withholds himself deliberately from a full enjoyment of the natural order by the method of the ascetic principle, in order that he may strengthen his hold upon the spiritual world and his power of using the natural order sacramentally. In the same way it is good for the Christian society that some of its members should deliberately withhold themselves from the lawful use of marriage and family life, from sexual love and the whole range of natural

enjoyments which belong to it. Thus the society will through some of its members, be enabled to realize the other wordly ideal as something to which the cycle of natural experience belonging to the sphere of sex must always be subordinated." Is it the fact, however, that Christian marriage is less otherworldly than celibacy? To take the ground that it is, as our author does, would seem to involve the position that the Son of God lowered and secularized himself when he took his church into vital union with himself; for it is to this union that St. Paul likens marriage and by it that he explains it. Moreover, is it true that asceticism for the sake of discipline as distinguished from asceticism for the purpose of laying aside worldly "weights" and "besetting sins" is inculcated by Scripture? On the contrary, we are taught that "every creature of God is good and nothing to be refused if it be received with thanksgiving; for it is sanctified by the Word of God and prayer." Our Lord, too, teaches us to pray "Lead us not into temptation", *i.e.*, trial; and could he have done this, had he not meant that we might and ought to trust him to afford us through his providence all the exercise and discipline that we need for the "good works which he before prepared that we should walk in them"? Our author's conception of asceticism seems to overlook the fact that we have the Son of God for our trainer.

These exceptions however, that we have felt obliged to make, do not affect the general worth of our author's discussion. It must rank with the most important and the most timely of our day. We have tried to epitomize it, and as far as could be in the writer's own language, that many might thus be induced to read it for themselves. Its closing words ought to be committed to memory by every Christian. "The whole strength of the Christian position lies, not in repudiating those features in it which are most unlike the temper of the world, but in emphasizing them. If the Christian ethic were of this world and like unto it, there would be nothing more to be said. Its distinctive character is its very otherworldliness. For Christianity, so far from being a system or a code, is the manifestation in the world of a Life which draws all its power from a supernatural religious experience which in its turn is based upon a supernatural creed."

It should be added that in an Appendix we have an illuminating discussion of "The Relation of Christian Asceticism to Ancient Physiological Theories".

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Nature and Evidence of the Resurrection of Christ. By the REV. E. H. ARCHER-SHEPHERD, M. A., Vicar of Avenbury, Herefordshire. Author of "Three Bulwarks of the Faith," "Burning Questions in the Light of To-day," "The Ritual of the Tabernacle: A Devotional Study," etc. 8vo, pp. 100. Rivingtons, 34 King Street, Covent Garden: London. 1910.

This is a small but remarkable volume. It is a strong and approximately complete presentation and defence of the nature and proof of

the literal physical resurrection of our Lord by a convinced and aggressive champion of the higher criticism. The author would "leave nothing unsaid that would be useful" to establish our Saviour's resurrection and ascension as both objective and physical events; and, in the judgment of the reviewer at least, he has fallen short of his purpose only so far as necessarily compelled by space and time limitations. Indeed, though his comments and even his arguments were ruled out, his mere telling of the resurrection story, so clear and simple is it, would be its demonstration. For all this we cannot thank him adequately. On the other hand, however, he is an extreme higher critic. He is the author of a book entitled "The Bulwarks of the Faith: Evolution, The Higher Criticism, and the Resurrection of Christ." To the little volume under review he has added, as an "Appendix," "A Vindication of the Old Testament": and in this he takes the ground, that "there are probably not ten lines strictly true, in the literal historical sense, in the first two chapters of Genesis"; that "the beginnings of Israelitish history are no less wrapt in obscurity than those of ancient Rome"; and that "the traditional lives of the patriarchs are as much a matter of folk-lore as are the doings of Romulus and Remus."

This synthesis of two positions usually regarded as opposed, if not mutually exclusive, suggests the following remarks:

1. How strong must be the evidence of the resurrection of our Lord, if it can both convince and make an aggressive champion of the resurrection out of one who, because of his abhorrence of the Supernatural, denies the historicity of most of the Old Testament and, it should be added, seems to attach little importance to the miracles of our Lord himself. If such an one cannot escape the force of the evidence under consideration, it would appear that no one should be able to do so.

2. How weak is our author's defence of his position with regard to the Old Testament. He grounds it on what he calls "true analogy". "Before," says he, "we decide offhand that the Bible—the record of God's revelation of himself to his Church—can contain no genuine statement of fact which is not strictly true so far as it goes, let us observe God's mode of working in the analogous case of his revelation of himself to the individual soul. . . . How does God act when by his Spirit he comes to the sinner, with a message for the man's own soul, that the blood of Jesus cleanseth him from all sin'? He takes the man just as he is. . . ." If the man be poor in mental equipment, he remains so still. If he be wretched in the narrowness of his view, he remains so still. If he is blind to the commonest facts of nature, he remains so still. He retains all his old honest ignorances and prejudices; and the Spirit of God does not disdain to sanctify and use them to God's glory. If he was before a Free Trader or a Tariff Reformer, a House Ruler or a Unionist, a Socialist or an Imperialist, he will be so still. He will be emphatic in his condemnation of those who thwart his cherished ideals

in proportion to the degree in which they possess him; but all who know him, however much they may differ from him, will readily acknowledge that he is a 'man of God.'"

There are three criticisms to be passed on this passage. One is that there is another and contrary analogy. When "for us men and our salvation" the Word became flesh" it was, as even Mr. Archer-Shepherd admits, not sinful, but sinless humanity that he assumed. It was only such humanity that the Son of *God* could take unto himself. How, then, could he who is "the Truth" reveal himself in and through the untruth of which, as our author claims, the Old Testament is largely made up? The analogy in this case is as good as in the other.

The second criticism is that the analogy in question is not "a true analogy." God's purpose in his revelation of himself in and to the sinner and in and through the Old Testament is not the same. He comes to the sinner to save him, and so must take him just as he is—in all his sin; but he gives us the Old Testament to foreshadow and to predict the *truth* of his salvation, and truth cannot consist of untruths.

Finally, our author begs the question. He assumes that the truth of the Old Testament narratives is their moral significance rather than their historical reality. This, however, is the crux of the whole situation, the thing of all others that needs to be proved.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Princeton

The Ethics of Confucius. The Sayings of the Master and his Disciples upon the Conduct of the "Superior Man." Arranged according to the Plan of Confucius, with Running Commentary, by MILES MENANDER DAWSON, Member of the Confucian Society of China. With a Foreword by Wu Ting Fang, Late Minister to the United States from China. Prepared under the auspices of the American Institute for Scientific Research 8vo; pp. xxi, 323. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. The Knickerbocker Press. 1915.

"The aim in preparing this book has been to put before Occidental readers in the words of the Chinese sage and his followers, as translated, everything concerning ethics and statecraft contained in the Confucian classics which is likely to interest such readers, omitting nothing of importance.

The passages quoted, arranged by topics, in accordance with a scheme laid down as that of Confucius himself in 'The Great Learning,' are connected by a running narrative, showing briefly the relationship of one passage with the other, stating from what book taken and by whom enunciated, and most sparingly accompanied by quotations from other moralists, ancient and modern."

The scheme presented as that of Confucius himself embraces the following main topics:

- I. "What constitutes the Superior Man."
- II. "Self-Development."

- III. "General Human Relations."
- IV. "The Family."
- V. "The State."
- VI. "Cultivation of the Fine Arts."
- VII. "Universal Relations."

The book closes with an "Appendix," on which the "Great Principle" of Confucius is discussed by Dr. Chen Huan Chang; and with a minute and very valuable "Index."

Mr. Dawson has done his work well. At the cost of what must have been almost excessive labor, he has given us a sympathetic as well as a comprehensive and exhaustive summary of the ethics of Confucius and of his chief disciples. Perhaps, he is too sympathetic. For example, he does not see in Confucius' reserve with regard to religion, the future life, providence and the personality of God the agnosticism which we have been accustomed to see. Despite this probably too favorable bias, we congratulate him on his achievement; and we venture to suggest that the way is now open for the easy as well as thorough study of the interesting and instructive and often striking, if seldom moving, ethical maxims of the great Chinese sage.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Princeton

The Natural Theology of Evolution. By J. N. SHEARMAN. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 8vo; pp. xv, 288. Index.

In this interesting volume we have an evolutionary Paley. It was a book which was bound to come; and it has come in good form and with convincing force. Mr. Shearman writes with notable simplicity and presents his argument plainly and with great expository skill. He divides his work into four parts. In the first of these he reproduces Paley with only such corrections as the evolutionary point of view compels. This he calls the "common sense argument". In the second part the same argument is restated in a more abstract or philosophical spirit. The third part applies the argument to a number of examples. The fourth part, which is very brief, considers cursorily a few objections. Mr. Shearman is strongest in the direct presentation of his argument. His criticism strikes the reader as sometimes a little over-acute, and even sometimes as largely verbal.

The standpoint of the book is that of plain common-sense. The trustworthiness of the human understanding is assumed and confidently built upon. The fundamental proposition asserted is that order means intelligent design; and the whole argument is but the elaboration and illustration of that principle. The attempts which have been made to account for order without mind are surveyed and rejected. The presence of order itself infers mind and that no matter how this order, in point of fact, has come into existence. The point is not by what processes it was brought into existence, but that it is order. Wherever order is produced, there mind has been at work. By whatever processes things

may have come to be, if mind is seen in the result, mind must have been at work in their production. Thus the flank of the evolutionist is turned and his evolutionism is shown to be irrelevant to the issue. He may point out the steps and stages through which the product has been produced, but he has not eliminated the action of intelligence from the process so long as the mark of intelligence, order, is discernible in the product. Without intelligence order could not have got into the product.

The main argument turns on the course of evolution itself, which Mr. Shearman has no doubt has been continuously upward. Change as change might not imply design: we can conceive of meaningless change. But change which is at the same time progress cannot be conceived except as intended. Where there is real progress or advance to anything higher or more complex chance variations will not help and any change that occurs is a proof of design. The assumption on which this reasoning rests may, of course, be challenged, that, to wit, the course of evolution has been, on the whole, forward. Mr. Shearman himself does not scruple to speak of it as "a continual progress, a steady rise in the scale of being, a constant coming in of new designs, fresh kinds of organisms, more complicated machines." With this understanding of the course of evolution the argument is irrefragable. A captious objector might, it is true, challenge the very idea of advance. What is a "higher" organism? Mr. Shearman appears to use "higher" and "more complex" as synonyms. What reason is there to represent a constant increase in complexity as an advance? Well, there is at least a constant increase in complexity; and every increase in complexity renders it more and more difficult—more and more impossible if the phrase may be pardoned—to attribute the product to mere chance. And here our attention may pass over from the general course of evolution, which obviously infers design, to the complexity of organs which have emerged in the course of evolution. We may look at the human eye, or at the pecten's eye; we may look at the mechanism of fertilization in the cookoo-pint and the aristolochia, or in the orchids; we may look at the action of insectivorous plants, at the asymmetry of the plaice, at the marvellous arrangements for the flight of birds—to say nothing of the flight of the bats and fossil reptiles, and the insects, all independently developed: we may look at the wonders of instinct. He who can believe that these things have come by mere chance may hopefully set to work stirring up a box of printer's types with a stick in the expectation that he will stir out of them a volume of sonnets. The thing is absurd: you cannot get more intelligence out of a process in the end, by way of product, than you put into it at the beginning, in the way of design.

So far from "evolution" being fatal to teleology it may be fairly argued that teleology is the very soul of evolution, and "the end" is the only reality which a strictly conceived evolutionism can admit. This is because of the inherent affiliation of a strictly conceived evolutionism with idealism. The idealist cannot look upon existing things as real in the full sense because they are to him in a flux: the only reality is

the fixed mental concept. Similarly to the evolutionist (if we may take Mr. Huxley as an example) the external world is process and process only; it is not, it is rather ever *becoming*. All things are in a perpetual process of change; the only stable thing is the idea to which the external world is ever more and more approximating. In this idea, then, alone can be found the true reality; external things are only progressing more and more to its embodiment in fact. But this is merely to say that the one real thing is the governing end, towards which all that is tends. This conclusion can be escaped only by representing evolution not as progressive change, but mere blind and therefore vagrant change. But this, though it may be called transformation, scarcely fills out the idea of evolution, especially as that evolution is observed actually at work in the course of the world's development. In its very idea, evolution involves change towards a result, a perfecting; and this is the evolution which a contemplation of the world's development brings to our observation. It is an unrolling, a realization of a somewhat already present in idea, but not yet embodied in fact. An idea so present is the very form of an idea which we call an end. Imbedded in the very conception of evolution, therefore, is the conception of end, and of an end which is in process of realization, and for the realization by which all that exists is but a series of stages. It is this end that impresses its law of existence on all the process, and that gives what reality it has to every stage of the process. A purely materialistic evolution is inconceivable; it would not be an evolution, but a mere instability,—meaningless and vacuous. To give meaning to it direction must be postulated for it; and when direction is postulated for it, an end towards which it is directed is postulated on the one side, and a director, directing it to that end, on the other.

We are not saying, of course, that a purely materialistic evolutionism has never been attempted. Men like Haeckel would at once rise up to confront us; and indeed men like Charles Darwin. Darwin attempted to develop a purely materialistic evolutionism: his system was pure accidentalism; and his whole interest in it turned exactly on that fact. Precisely what he tried to show was that order might be the product of chance; that we might have all the marks of mind before us and yet not be able to infer mind; that we might have, in effect, the results of intelligence without intelligence. That Darwin failed in his effort, we suppose is now fairly universally admitted. But a curious thing has happened. Men desire to retain the conclusion which Darwin reached while rejecting the evidence on which Darwin reached this conclusion. Mr. Shearman, for example, tells us that Darwin "brought together reasons for believing that the existing species of animals and plants had their origin by a process of evolution" and that these reasons were "so strong and so forcibly put that the doctrine of evolution is now universally received"; and then adds, "But besides proving the doctrine of evolution, Darwin tries to show how evolution has been brought about, and in this he is less successful." We do not think these two things can be thus separated. What Dar-

win endeavored to do was to render the idea of evolution credible and acceptable by pointing out a *vera causa* by which it might be—he said, by which it was—effected. The reason which he commended to his readers for believing in evolution lay in his doctrine of natural selection, and he can hardly be said to prove the former if the latter fails. The discrediting of his doctrine of natural selection as the sufficient cause of evolution leaves the idea of evolution without proof, so far as he is concerned; leaves it, in a word, just where it was before he took the matter up. And there, speaking broadly, it remains until the present day. If we understand Mr. Shearman he sits skeptically over against not only Darwin's attempted explanation of the evolutionary process, but all others which have been proposed. He would have us accept the fact that evolution is established but to look upon the several attempts which have been made to explain how it has all come about as only so many plausible speculations. It is a fact, the true explanation of which as yet escapes us.

That is to say, Mr. Shearman wishes us to look upon evolution as a bare "law of nature", in his sense of of that term. "A great deal", he tells us, has been written in our day about the Laws of Nature, and much of it is very wise, and some of it is very foolish. But nothing can be further from the truth than the assertion that Science is wholly devoted to the discovery of laws of nature. Scientific people are like other people in this, that what they want is not laws but explanations. Wherever an explanation is possible it is given, and where no explanation can be found we have to be content with the law. The laws of nature are in reality the mass of unreduced facts which remain when as much as possible has been explained. They are not the triumphs of the scientist but his problems; they measure not our knowledge but our ignorance." Evolution is, then, if a fact, not a triumph of the scientist but one of his toughest problems: he does not know how it has taken place: every guess he makes as to how it has taken place proves inadequate to account for it: his main theories have to be supported by subsidiary theories to make them work at all, and these subsidiary theories by yet more far-reaching subsidiary theories of the second rank,—until the whole chart is, like the Ptolemaic chart of the heavens, written over with cycle and epicycle and appears ready to break down by its own weight. Meanwhile we are to accept evolution as a bare "law of nature"; it is an observed fact—but how it comes about Goodness only knows. Well, it is something to be sure that Goodness knows; and to be solidly assured by Mr. Shearman's convincing argument that it did not come about without Goodness having a hand in it.

We are rather surprised to find Mr. Shearman still operating with the embryonic-recapitulatory theory which was in vogue a generation ago: "all animals, in the course of their development go through a kind of condensed summary of the history of the race". We have supposed that this notion had been long since exploded. We regret that he has, even as a rebuttal not supposed by himself to be necessary, allowed himself to suggest that imperfections in nature may be ac-

counted for by supposing that not God directly but the angels, acting as His intermediaries, are responsible for the making of these things. But these are little matters. The book is a good book and its argument plainly put and well sustained throughout.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

The Beacon Lights of Prophecy: an Interpretation of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Deutero-Isaiah. By ALBERT C. KNUDSON, Professor in Boston School of Theology. New York: Eaton & Mains. Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 1914. 12mo; pp. xii, 281. Price \$1.25 net.

A readable book, written with vigor and ease of style, and in most respects an admirable exposition of its theme. It is a welcome aid in hastening the passing away of not a few superficial teachings, called modern and scientific, which have been current of late.

The author lays much stress upon ecstasy, especially in the earlier prophets but not exclusively in them; in later prophets also (pp. 7, 8, 33, see also 43), but not in all (p. 35). But ecstasy of the sort intended certainly was not characteristic of the prophets of Israel. In fact, so far as the records go, a "state of frenzy" like that of "modern dervishes and the ancient Greek worshipers of Dionysus" (p. 2), an "intense state of excitement, from the effects of which they lost either their normal self-control or self-consciousness" and were in a "condition of holy frenzy" (p. 34), cannot be discovered in the actions of the accredited prophets. Religious enthusiasm or exaltation of spirit is not ecstasy. The soothing of the mind by music and the awakening of the soul to God by sacred song are not introductions into the ecstatic state (see this *Review*, p. 129; Beecher, *The Prophets and the Promise*, pp. 72-75). And the slurs cast upon individual prophets by those hostile to them as being mad (2 Kin. ix. 11; Jer. xxix. 26), and the sight of a true prophet driven out of his mind into insanity by persecution and by the abounding iniquity which he was powerless to check, or the denunciations of those prophets as fools and mad who cried peace when wickedness was rampant (Hos. ix. 7),—not one of these things indicates that the prophets as a class acted like wildly insane persons or were called madmen, any more than does the remark of Festus to Paul indicate that men of great learning were looked upon as mad (Acts xxvi. 24). And who believes that the Christ when he uttered the parable of the Good Shepherd was in the frenzy of ecstasy or excited in manner, because some of the hearers said that he was mad (John x. 20)? It would be nearer the truth to speak less of ecstasy and the dervish, and more frequently to liken the prophets of Israel to men of the present day, found in various walks of life, men of sober mind, who know God, have his holy fear in their heart,

and live their daily life in fellowship with him; who address to their fellowmen words of truth and soberness, and in their worship of God, their Maker and Savior, sing and pray with spiritual joy and exaltation.

For an introductory statement the author speaks of the early religion of Israel as polytheism, a worship of nature gods (p. 11). Now Joshua reminded the Israelites that their ancestors, while living beyond the Euphrates and in Egypt, feared and worshiped more gods than one (Josh. xxiv. 2, 14). But he specified Terah (verse 2), who dwelt in Ur and Haran; and as places where polytheistic beliefs and practices had a hold upon the people he mentions the region beyond the River and in Egypt (verse 14), where the people were living in the midst of polytheism, and he significantly excludes Canaan and the south country, the home of Abraham, Isaac, and the aged Jacob (verse 3). The known facts are entirely compatible with the picture, common alike to all the narratives, early and late, of the pure and undefiled religion of Abraham and many of his descendants. The statement of the author that before Moses' "time the Israelites seem to have been polytheists" (p. 11) is too sweeping.

These two exaggerations reveal to the initiated the background of the story as told in these pages and which cast long shadows forward. In the background stands also the theory that "first the prophets gave expression to the great spiritual principles of Old Testament faith, and then later the priests reduced those principles to symbol and statute" (p. 50, comp. p. 90). In the background, too, is found a conception of the nature of prophecy that may be indicated by a quotation. "In that day . . . mental states of an abnormal or supernormal character were supposed to be especially clear indications of the Spirit's presence. Accordingly, it is not improbable that some unusual psychological experience was necessary at that time to create the conviction that a message had been received from God. The moral and spiritual nature was not sufficiently independent, was not yet sure enough of itself, to stand forth as the self-conscious voice of God himself" (p. 43).

Two other matters, quite minor, mere details, call for notice. The author is much given to announcing the successive stages in religious thought, by stating that such and such a one was the first to teach a particular truth (*e.g.* pp. 18, 59 bottom, 125, comp. 119). But alas, the development of doctrine cannot be traced so easily. The available literature is too scanty. The author himself has found a proper limiting phrase, when he says of this prophet and that, "he, so far as we know, was the first" (p. 84; also pp. 80, 111, 113). A similar corrective which he applies (pp. 58 and 92) might have been used more frequently; for example in view of the Tenth Commandment, on page 167. Another statement, a casual remark of the author's, is misleading, namely when he is attempting to establish a contrast between the earlier and the later period in respect to the relation of the prophets to the people. "Previously" the prophets "seem to have waited for people to call upon them, simply answering such questions as were asked. Now

they take the offensive" (pp. 5 and 35). There are, indeed, a few cases on record of people in the early period calling on the prophet (1 Sam. viii. 4, ix. 6-10, and generally ix. 9); but in the later period, too, throughout it there is mention of the resort of the people to the prophets. David went to Nathan (2 Sam. vii. 2), Jeroboam's wife went to Ahijah the Shilonite (1 Kin. xiv. 1-4), Jehoshaphat had Micaiah called on one occasion and on another went to Elisha (1 Kin. xxii. 7-9, 2 Kin. iii. 11 f.), the Shunammite woman went to Elisha at Mount Carmel (iv. 25), Naaman the Syrian sought Elisha (v. 3, 8-10), Hezekiah sent to Isaiah (xix. 1-5), Josiah sent to Huldah (xxii. 12-14), Zedekiah sought Jeremiah several times (Jer. xxi. 1, 2, xxxvii. 3, 16, xxxviii. 14), the leaders of the people also sought him (xlii. 1-6), the elders sought Ezekiel (Ezek. xx. 1, comp. viii. 1, xiv. 1), the men of Bethel sent to the priests and the prophets (Zech. vii. 2, 3). On the other hand, while in the later period the prophets often sought the people, they did so in the early period too, the mention of their doing so being somewhat more frequent than the mention of a resort of the people to the prophet. Moses, like the later prophets, addressed assembled Israel (Ex. iii. 16, xxiv. 3-8, xxxii. 25 ff., Num. xi. 24 f., and other passages early and late), during the oppression by the Midianites Jehovah sent a prophet to the children of Israel to remind them that their distress was due to their abandonment of Jehovah (Judg. vi. 7-10), Deborah summoned Barak and delivered Jehovah's message to him (Judg. iv. 4-6), a prophet went with a grievous word to Eli (1 Sam. ii. 27), and that it was not an unusual thing in the early period for a prophet to go to individuals with a message from Jehovah is further evident from the belief of Manoah and his wife that it was a prophet who had come to them (Judg. xiii. 6, 8). The truth of the matter is that at all periods of the history people called on the prophets and prophets went to the people; but with the growth of the state and its increasing importance in the world the prophets became more conspicuous in public life. Prophets of the caliber of Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah naturally stand out from the rest of the order as national figures; for these servants of Jehovah were obliged to undertake the arduous task of holding the nation loyal to Jehovah, of so instructing and exhorting king and people, so caring for the morals of the populace, so guarding the purity of the state religion, and so guiding the policies of the kingdom, that the life of the nation in all respects should conform to the will of Jehovah, the God of Israel. The prophet was God's ambassador to Israel, individually and collectively; and when the occasion demanded, he spoke in Jehovah's name to the whole nation. In the nature of the case the occasion arose more frequently in the later than in the earlier history.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

A History of Babylonia and Assyria. By ROBERT WILLIAM ROGERS, Ph.D. (Leipzig), LL.D., F.R.G.S., Hon. Litt.D. University of Dublin, Professor in Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, New

Jersey. Sixth Edition. In Two Volumes, Revised, Largely Rewritten, and Illustrated. Volume I. Prolegomena. Volume II. The History of Babylonia, Assyria, and Chaldea. The Abingdon Press. 1915. 8vo; pp. xxvi, 542; xix, 609. \$10 net a set.

The first edition of this valuable work was noticed in *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for April, 1901, pp. 341f. This edition, the sixth, marks the growth from 847 pages to 1151 pages. As in the earlier editions, the first volume is in large part a history of exploration in Babylonia and Assyria and of the decipherment of the inscriptions. It is the best compendium on these subjects that has ever been written. The history of Babylonia has been transferred from the first volume to the second, and expanded from eighty pages in the first edition to one hundred and thirty-two pages. The history of Assyria and the Chaldean empire completes the volume. In this part of the work a sentence, not found in the first edition, is inserted here and there, and occasionally a paragraph has been introduced; but proportionately the greatest increases are made in the account of the beginnings of Assyria and in the story of Sennacherib's reign. The change in the form of proper names is noticeable, and also the lowering of the dates assigned to the earlier events. Perhaps the most notable change from the first edition is the acceptance, and introduction into the history, of the opinion advanced by Winckler that Sennacherib carried on two campaigns against Judah and Egypt, one in the year 701 B.C., the other sometime between 688 and 682 B.C. (2 Kin. xix. 9-36; and cp. 1st edition, p. 203 note 4 with 6th edition, p. 385 note 1, and *Studien zur semitischen Philologie und Religionsgeschichte Julius Wellhausen Gewidmet*, 1914, pp. 319-328, article by Dr. Rogers entitled *Sennacherib and Judah*). On this interpretation the clash between Tirhakah of Ethiopia and Sennacherib fell within the reign of Tirhakah over Egypt.

The reader of ancient history must be on his guard against ascribing finality to the dates assigned by the modern historian to events of the early ages. The careful historian himself is always cautious, but his reader sometimes forgets to be so. There is need of caution, because 1. Apart from the errors of the ancient scribes and contradictory statements in the records, the frequency of round numbers in the writings of antiquity distresses the chronologist. 2. A difficulty is met at times in the interpretation of statements regarding the length of a king's reign or the duration of a dynasty. The death of a king and the accession of his successor to the throne generally occurred during the course of a civil year; and accordingly, when the length of a king's reign is stated, the question properly arises whether the fraction of the civil year at the beginning of the reign and again the fraction at its close have been reckoned to him as full years, or have been combined as one year, or have been neglected altogether; and hence whether, when the length of several reigns have been added together in order to obtain the duration of a dynasty, the sum total for the dynasty is excessive

(by many years perhaps), or is accurate, or is too small. 3. A similar uncertainty regarding the chronology may be caused by the co-reign of a son with his father, and the consequent possibility that the years common to the two have been reckoned to each, that is, have been counted twice. 4. Another difficulty presents itself to the chronologist when the length of a long period of time is stated; for even when the duration of each of the dynasties which rose and fell during the period is known, yet the possibility exists that the ancient scribe in calculating the length of the period simply added together the years of these dynasties without inquiring or caring whether any of the dynasties were contemporary. Such calculations were not misleading to the ancients, for they knew the methods employed by the scribes and understood the meaning of the results; and their chronological needs were satisfied.

These four statements are not formulated by Professor Rogers, but words of warning are not lacking from him against accepting assigned dates as final. And in broad statement he says: "We shall not expect their chronological systems to be scientific in the modern sense" (I. 469). The frequent disagreements between chronological statements regarding the same matter and the blunders of the scribe in his reckoning "may well give us pause in ascribing too much accuracy to other computations of the chronologists of Babylonia" (I. 486). "It is clear that the ancient Assyrian chronologists found difficulties, and we have not the materials wherewith to solve their doubts or to reconcile their differences" (I. 539).

JOHN D. DAVIS.

Princeton.

Scripta Pontificii Instituti Biblici. *Christus in seiner Präexistenz und Kenose nach Phil. 2, 5-8*. I. Teil: Historische Untersuchung. Von HEINRICH SCHUMACHER, Dozent der Neutl. Exegese an der Catholic University of America in Washington, D. Von dem Bibelinstitut zu Rom preisgekrönt. Rom: Verlag des päpstl. Bibelinstituts, 1914. 8vo; pp. xxxi, 232. Bibliographical List and Tabular View.

In 1912 there was published as the sixth part of the *Freiburg Theological Studies* an admirable critico-exegetical study of "the Johannine passage in the Synoptics" Mat. xi. 27, by a young Catholic scholar, Dr. Heinrich Schumacher. The book was greeted and favorably commented on in this REVIEW for October, 1913 (XI, 4, pp. 660-664). In the same year P. Leopold Fonck, the Rector of the Biblical Institute at Rome, proposed to his students—one of whom Dr. Schumacher was—as the subject of a prize essay, the investigation of the passage, Phil. ii. 5-11. Dr. Schumacher was only too glad to place by the side of his study of "the lapidary compendium of the Christology of the earliest Gospel-proclamation", another on that passage in the Philippian-letter which is widely considered, says he, "the core and star (*Kern und Stern*) of the Christological conception of Paul". Only half, the historical half,

of this study is given us in this volume: the publication of the exegetical half for a variety of reasons is postponed meanwhile. The separate publication of the historical half of his work does not seem to Dr. Schumacher, however, a serious evil. It forms a complete whole in itself. And it has a peculiar value: one almost gets the impression that Dr. Schumacher is ready to present it as the most valuable part of his work. He thinks he brings in it something new to the understanding of the passage: and he estimates the importance of this new contribution very highly. He seems to be inclined, indeed, to look upon it as decisive for its correct understanding and to congratulate himself upon having happily at last untied the Gordian knot.

The reader may perhaps be excused if he does not find it quite easy to share Dr. Schumacher's enthusiasm. The difficulty of finding the right way through the passage by purely exegetical methods may seem to him a little exaggerated. He may hesitate to describe the passage with Velasquez, without some qualification at least, as *locus obscurus et salebrosus*, and he may quite draw back when asked to make his own H. J. Holtzmann's declaration that it is "not capable of any certain exposition". But suppose the exegetical situation as bad as represented,—it is only to cut the knot, not to untie it, to throw ourselves back on what Dr. Schumacher calls "history". The discovery which he thinks he has made here is that "the Patristic tradition" is practically unanimous and not, as has heretofore been represented, divided into an Eastern and Western line. And the use which he proposes to make of this discovery is that, the Patristic tradition being unanimous, the function of exegesis is superseded—a unanimous Patristic tradition must just be followed.

Obviously this is a procedure which will commend itself more readily to a Roman than to a scientific consciousness. One rubs his eyes and wonders whether he is seeing aright when he reads (p. 129): "The result of the history of ἀρπαγμός must be sacrosanct to the objective exegete; he has to accept it and to examine whether the *philological meaning of the terms in question, the textual connection, and finally the mind of the author of the epistle to the Philippians* revealed in other passages harmonizes with it. If this is the case, then, for the untrammelled student the 'endless guessing' with respect to this passage of which B. Weiss has lately spoken, is ended." The procedure here proposed—to begin with tradition and make exegetical processes only corroborative of it—is thoroughly bad. It is just the reverse of all sound method. That the passage has been made the subject of late of endless and quite wild guessing as Weiss certifies, is true enough and is quite appallingly exhibited in Dr. Schumacher's survey of recent opinions upon it. But the only cure for bad criticism is good criticism, and the proposal to settle the matter out of hand by the sheer authority of tradition can only raise a smile. And that the more when the nature of this tradition is considered.

For the tradition does not seem nearly so unanimous as Dr. Schumacher's presentation of it would lead one to think. He cannot

be acquitted of a certain amount of special pleading in his dealing with the Greek authors. Nor were the tradition unanimous would it have anything like the value which he is inclined to ascribe to it. It is too late in arising, for one thing. The passage seems to be cited first in Greek by Clement of Alexandria, but not to be so commented on as to make the sense put upon it by the writer clear until Origen, who finds a meaning in it diverse from that which Dr. Schumacher wishes to impose on it on the authority of unanimous tradition. It is not until Eusebius that Dr. Schumacher professes that his tradition begins. And it does not really begin in Eusebius favorably to his contention. Things are little better in the West; Tertullian is, of course, the first to cite the passage and Tertullian already had a Latin Bible and, it is to be feared, failed to consult his Greek Testament here. We can hardly appeal to a tradition which does not begin for nearly two hundred years later to convey to us authoritatively the meaning known to have been attached to a passage by its writer. These two silent centuries form a fatal gulf. There is really no more intrinsic reason why this Patristic tradition should be right than there is why the nineteenth century English tradition, say, should be right.

Of course this is not to say that we should neglect the Patristic expositors of the passage—any more than we should neglect the nineteenth century English expositors of the passage. It is only to say that we should not transmute them into authoritative instructors. It is of large value to us, to ascertain how the Greek expositors understood the passage, because Greek was their native language and they would feel its shades of meaning instinctively. In the case of a rare word like *ἀρπαγμός* this is of very especial importance. This word not only occurs only this once in the New Testament, but, it appears, also only a single time (in Plutarch who seems also, however, to have the Attic form *ἀρπασμός* once) in secular Greek: and only a few times independently in Ecclesiastical Greek. We are shut up for knowledge of its usage almost entirely, therefore, to its repetition by the Greek fathers from our passage. It is chiefly from their discussions of our passage thus that we can learn how the word struck on Greek ears. It is almost as important to observe how such a phrase as *ἐν μόρφῃ θεοῦ* was understood by them. They do not fail us in these matters. Nor does their guidance fail us in the general understanding of the whole passage and we give as a matter of course the same attention to their expositions of it that we do to other thoughtful expositions. No expositor can afford to neglect the serious work of any of his predecessors.

His overestimation of the authority of "the Patristic tradition" leads Dr. Schumacher to give the larger portion of his space to its discussion. His plan requires him, however, to cover the whole history of the exegesis of the passage and he does this with praiseworthy diligence. His method is to present first the history of the exposition of the word *ἀρπαγμός*. This occupies the first hundred and thirty pages of the book. Then he takes up the history of the other important expressions in the passage, devoting to them an hundred more pages. He

closes with a few pages of general summing up. The strength of the book is given as we have said to the presentation of the Patristic material. The most recent expositions are treated nevertheless with care and fulness. It is a fault in their presentation that it does not follow the chronological order and that the several writings quoted are not dated. It is a fault in their presentation also that no critical discrimination is shown in the choice of authors to be adduced. On the whole, we read the sections on the later expositions with some difficulty and with some confusion. It is not this portion of his work which has interested Dr. Schumacher most.

After presenting the history of the exposition of the passage Dr. Schumacher stops short. His own exposition is yet to come—in the promised second part. He conceives himself, however, to have laid its foundations firm in his historical survey. "Its guiding star," he says with emphasis in the closing words of the volume, "is and remains: the whole Patristic tradition regards *οὐχ ἀρπαγμὸν κτλ* as an expression of the equality with God which belongs to Christ of right and by nature: *Ὅτι οὐχ ἡρπασεν, ἀλλ' ἔχει τῇ φύσει* (Cyril of Jerusalem)"—where the words "Cyril of Jerusalem" seem to be a slip for Apollinaris of Laodicea (p. 30). The outlines of the exposition which he proposes to give are made plain, moreover, by his running comments on the historical material. It is that embodied in the Latin Bible and given expression in the comments of the Latin fathers in general. We do not think that the Greek text naturally yields it or that it can be justified from the Greek text. The only form of it to which, as it seems to us, the Greek text is even patient is that form which is ascribed by Dr. Schumacher to Calvin and which seems to be reflected in our English authorized version. And the Greek text seems to us only barely patient of this form of it. It seems to us quite clear that *ὑπάρχων* must be taken concessively and *οὐχ ἀρπαγμὸν κτλ* in the sense of the best Greek expositions of Christ's refusal to cling to His equality with God, and *ξέκένωσεν* of His "making Himself of no reputation" as our English authorized version has it. But all this belongs to a discussion of Dr. Schumacher's second volume for which we yet wait.

Perhaps we ought to add that the book seems to have been somewhat hastily completed and that the proof-reading is not impeccable.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

New Testament Introduction (or Special Canonics). By L. BERKHOF, B.D. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans-Sevensma Co. 1916. Pp. 352. \$2.00.

It would be too much to expect important contributions on a subject so frequently discussed with great learning and comprehensive mastery of detail. But even a hand-book intended primarily for students and based, as in this instance, on "labors done in and for the class-room" may render service by concise and clear presentation of matters of fundamental importance and by exhibiting and inculcating a sound and adequate point of view. All who work in this field are debtors to the

labors of others and heirs of a rich heritage; yet each will disclose in the use made of fact and opinion a quality of judgment which ultimately has its grounding in a conviction touching the nature of the Christian religion. This is true of the author of this "Introduction". His book shows the results of labor; his point of view is sound; his judgment is generally good. About details it is natural that opinion should differ; and there are some aspects of the author's treatment of his subject in which a fuller statement would have contributed both to the proper orientation of the student and to the strengthening of valid conclusions. The style is not free from defects of form; and there are serious omissions of matter pertinent to the present discussion of the subject. The treatment also suffers from the comprehensiveness of the author's plan which includes but scarcely does justice to such subjects as inspiration and canonicity.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

The Latin Church in the Middle Ages. By ANDRÉ LAGARDE. Translated by ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER, Ph.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. 8vo; pp. vi, 600.

This volume is one of the last of the promised publications in the International Theological Library, and we may at once add that on the whole the treatise will compare quite favorably with the other members of this series that deal with the history of the Church.

At the same time we cannot but express our regret that the editors (for reasons not stated) have abandoned their original purpose of devoting two volumes, one on "The Early Latin Church" and another on "The Later Latin Church", to the period—it amounts to a round millennium, from ca. 476 A.D. to ca. 1500 A.D.—now traversed by the work before us. The constraint under which the author has labored is everywhere, and sometimes painfully, apparent. The last chapter especially, in which he undertakes to give some account, within the compass of less than fifty pages, of the "Ecclesiastical Writers" of the Latin Church from the sixth to the sixteenth century, is a quite jejune narrative, offering at times little more than a list of names. Doubtless the necessity for brevity is largely responsible also for the rather meagre bibliographical helps given the reader. In this respect the work is distinctly inferior to the two volumes on the Reformation contributed to this series by the late Professor Lindsay. As is perhaps natural, in view of the author's nationality, the French literature on the subject receives a more generous recognition than either the English or the German, but the frequent slighting and the occasional ignoring of the standard monographs in these tongues is a rather disappointing feature in a manual of this sort. Moreover, the whole plan of the book and the disposition of the material seems to have been adversely influ-

enced by the restrictions imposed upon the author. The comprehensiveness and thoroughness of some of the discussions have been secured at the cost of failing to do justice to other factors for which at least the "general" reader might presumably wish to consult a work bearing the title of the one before us. The sixteen chapters into which the book is divided are treated with such a degree of mutual independence, not to say exclusiveness, that at times one can hardly avoid the impression that the treatise is a collection of historical essays or articles originally made to serve a different purpose. There are remarkably few cross-references; but even if there were several times as many, the rigid schematization that makes the several longitudinal divisions run continuously through the whole period prevents our getting a clear idea of the development as a whole. While, therefore, the sixteen themes here surveyed are large and vital enough to permit the author's discussion of them to make at least some allusion to nearly everything of importance in his vast story, still the picture in its entirety lacks life-likeness: we can never see but a corner of the canvas, and though the persons and events there portrayed may be duly represented in their interactions upon one another, they apparently seldom, if ever, sustain any organic relationship with the contemporary actors and scenes in other theatres of the history.

But in spite of these and similar defects—many of the purely formal ones being, as we have conceded, quite unavoidable under the circumstances—the work has such decided merits that it may be said to maintain a high average of excellence. The style is unusually engaging, if account is taken of the encyclopaedic character of some of the divisions of the book. The author is impartial, when he ought to be, and uniformly sober and judicial in his estimates. But the chief claim upon our gratitude is that found in the masterly treatment of certain portions of the subject. Among these we may mention in particular: (Chap. II) "The Christian Life: Sacraments and Devotions"; (Chap. IV) "The Pontifical Election"; (Chap. IX) "The Pontifical Exchequer"; (Chap. X) "The Episcopal Elections". These are scholarly discussions, largely from the sources, but reflecting also the latest results of historical study along these lines. To a considerable extent justice is here done to some hitherto neglected factors in the story of the Latin Church of the Middle Ages.

Due credit ought to be given to the translator for his part in making this work so attractive to English readers.

It is to be hoped that not many copies of the treatise repeat the fault of the bookbinder found in the one before us—the duplication of pages 297 to 312.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas. By ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFERT. New York: The Macmillan Co, 1915. 12mo; pp. x, 315. \$1.50 net.

This volume appears as the first of a series of "Works on Modern

Theology" under the general editorship of James M. Whiton, Ph.D. These works "are severally designed", we are informed in an Editorial Note, "to embody the results of such theological research, reconstruction, and readjustment as have thus far taken place, especially during the last half-century". Another statement from the same source may throw some further light on the character of this new enterprise: "That the systematic theology framed by these [*i.e.*, "the old divines"] has hopelessly broken down in the collapse of the ancient conceptions of God, of Nature, of the Bible, and of man, which molded and sustained it, is now frankly confessed in the chief seats of theological instruction. Much of it still survives. Though in modern time, it is not of it, and is gradually yielding to the transforming influences of modern knowledge".

The work before us is based upon the Earl Lectures delivered by the author before the Pacific Theological Seminary in 1912. The title accurately sets forth the purpose of the book, which is not that of giving "a history of modern religious thought", but rather that of indicating "the influences which have promoted" and "the circumstances which have attended the rise of some of the leading religious ideas of the present day, in so far as they differ from the ideas of other days, and hence may fairly be called modern".

Professor McGiffert begins the work with an account, in Book I, of those disintegrating forces which, beginning in the latter part of the seventeenth century, profoundly affected the thought and life of Protestant Europe. The first of them was Pietism, which is briefly characterized as a "protest of individualism against institutionalism" and as "an assertion of the religious rights and responsibilities of the laity". Among its results two are specially emphasized: "the rapid growth of the spirit of tolerance for other views and other sects", and the "distinction between important and unimportant doctrines", which "reduced the traditional system to comparatively low terms". Under the caption "The Enlightenment", the author gathers together another series of theologically disintegrating forces, and alludes to their effects in the political, social, economic, industrial, scientific, philosophical, ethical, and, above all, religious spheres. In Chapter III, after a brief survey of the condition of the natural sciences in the early Christian and the mediæval world, the author portrays the revolutionary influences that came into modern Europe, when, owing to the Renaissance and the Reformation, men began to have a keener interest in, and higher estimate of, the natural and secular life, and when they learned to apply the inductive method to the study of nature. The fourth and last of the disintegrating forces is that of "The Critical Philosophy", beginning with Des Cartes and culminating in Kant's criticisms of the traditional theistic arguments.

This philosophy is made the bridge to Book II, which presents the work of "Reconstruction". For it was the practical aspects of the Kantian philosophy that led to the gradual "emancipation of religion". Here Dr. McGiffert clearly indicates the historical importance of

Schleiermacher, whose work and influence are throughout presented as a quite unmixed blessing. The treatment of Hegel (in Chapter VI, "The Rebirth of Speculation") is clear, discriminating and most suggestive. After an account of the Evangelical Awakening and of the tendencies of the Romanticists, the author traces "The Rehabilitation of Faith" through two lines of development; one, that of intellectual intuitionism (Jacobi, Fries, Schelling, DeWette, Coleridge) and the other, that opened by Kant, which led to the postulating of spiritual realities on the basis of our moral needs (Fichte, Ritschl, and the Pragmatists). The influence of Agnosticism (Chapter VIII) is traced through Kante, Comte, J. S. Mill, Spencer, Dean Mansel, and Ritschl. Agnosticism is put by our author among the forces of "reconstruction" rather than among those of "disintegration", for the reason that though its influence was largely negative, it nevertheless profoundly altered modern ideas of religion by bringing the practical aspects of the subject, as against the future and supraphenomenal world, into prominence: it "has forwarded the search for spiritual values in the immediate present, and as a result, the existence of such values, even within the framework of a finite, human, and mundane society, quite apart from its relation to infinity and eternity, has been convincingly demonstrated". The validity of such a statement may not be apparent, but the author is bound to be an optimist, and we cannot but admit that he offers good reasons for our making at least a partial revision of the common estimate put upon nineteenth century Agnosticism. Chapter IX shows the rise of modern ideas of "Evolution", and traces their influence in methods of education, in the conception of the meaning of human history, and in religion (the new views of revelation and of the authority of Scripture; emphasis on divine immanence; the "substitution of natural for legal categories throughout theology"; and in general the obliterating or abandoning of "the fixed classifications of other days").

The next two chapters on "Divine Immanence" and "Ethical Theism" are to some extent mutually supplementary. Together they bring clearly to view the new problems which Christian theism must face.

In Chapter XII, on "The Character of God", Dr. McGiffert pays his respects to historic Calvinism in a way that may be inferred from the following comparative judgment: "The most important contribution of modern times to an understanding of the divine character was made by Ritschl." Then follows an account of "The Social Emphasis" so characteristic of the religious thinking of to-day, and the book closes with a rather one-sided presentation of recent views concerning "Religious Authority".

Dr. McGiffert has given us a volume worthy of his reputation as a scholarly historian. To a considerable extent he has retraversed the ground covered in his somewhat smaller work, published in 1911, on "Protestant Thought Before Kant". In the later as in the earlier treatise he is quite content to maintain the rôle of the historian and not essay that of the dogmatician, much less that of the prophet. It is,

indeed, quite difficult at times to know just how far the author himself approves of some of these "modern religious ideas", the rise of which he has so skillfully traced and so suggestively portrayed. Doubtless the "we" which he uses so much to designate "modern" Christians may generally, and especially if the name of Schleiermacher or Ritschl occurs in the context, fairly be taken as at least the equivalent of the editorial we. The author himself concedes that he has had to restrict himself to "a few representative topics" and that he had to present even these "in an all too fragmentary and incomplete fashion". Just how much he would make of some of the forces of conservation that conceivably may have played or still play some part, however subordinate, in the scheme of modern "reconstruction", the work before us does not disclose, though, to be sure, it leaves the rather bewildering impression that these last centuries have been inordinately fond of religious revolutions, and that little of original Protestantism is worth trying to save.

Princeton. \

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

History of Christian Missions. By CHARLES HENRY ROBINSON, D.D., Hon. Canon of Ripon Cathedral and Editorial Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. 8vo; pp. xii, 533.

Our first use of this *History* as a reference book was quite disappointing. By its spacious title we were beguiled into the belief that these pages would furnish, among other things, a serviceable sketch of early mediæval missions. But we could find no mention whatever of such celebrated missionaries as Columba, Augustine, Boniface, Gall, Ansgar, Cyrillus, Methodius, Otto of Bamberg. On the other hand, in glancing at the chapter on India, the eye at once fell upon the familiar words of Eusebius concerning the tradition of the Apostle Bartholomew's visit to that country, and upon other evidences of the author's intention to make at least some sections of the *History* chronologically complete. The explanation of these facts is given in the Preface, where he informs us that he had to abandon, for want of space, his original plan of including the story "of the conversion of Europe and of the methods which were adopted by its early missionaries." Meanwhile, it is to be regretted that the title of the book was not more accurately adjusted to its altered purpose.

It is, of course, a huge task that Canon Robinson has essayed to perform in this volume. Doubtless, it is still some decades too early for a thoroughly adequate and satisfactory treatment of this subject: the necessary preliminary work has yet to be done. But in an enterprise of this sort even a confessedly imperfect treatise may be exceedingly valuable; and we may add that, though our author cannot be said to have had the privilege of being a pioneer in this field, he does deserve the honor of having produced the most useful general sketch we have, in English, of modern missions.

The chief interest of the work, then, centers in the missionary efforts

made by the Church—especially the British and the Continental Churches—since the opening decades of the seventeenth century.

The main divisions of the book, naturally enough, are based upon geographical considerations. In some seventeen chapters the author surveys the major missionary operations of ecumenical Christendom. Now and then the allotment of space to some of the subdivisions seems somewhat arbitrary, but on the whole the perspective is excellent. Considerable variety is secured in the mode of treating the different countries. Sometimes, as in the case of China (chap. vii) the order of time is the governing factor; sometimes, as in the case of India (chap. IV) special attention is given to the subject of missionary methods; and in nearly every large field figures from the latest available statistics are cited to give some idea of the results of the work.

Toward the close of the volume two chapters narrate the labors of the church among Moslems and Jews—two specially difficult missionary tasks—while another chapter gives a comprehensive table of the missionary societies of to-day. The first three chapters may be regarded as introductory: the first presents missions as the distinguishing work of the church; the second gives a historical sketch of missionary methods; and the third traces the beginnings of "Modern Missions" (the views of the Reformers; Pietism; Moravianism; the formation of the first missionary societies).

The closing chapter, "The Outlook", is full of the hope that Christian faith ought to beget and that the study of missions is fitted to confirm. As the author says: "To the Christian who contemplates his obligations in the spirit of Christ's teaching, the work which is being done will appear pitifully minute, but compared with the other influences which are shaping the destinies of nations, it will be seen to be both large and intense".

As Editorial Secretary of the venerable S. P. G., Canon Robinson naturally is most familiar with Anglican missions, and we can readily forgive him for allotting a disproportionately large amount of space to this phase of the subject; the more so, because he in advance tenders his apologies to our various American societies for his imperfect presentation of their work, due to his difficulties in getting the necessary information. But we do not like the Canon's use of the word "Anglican" as a term to be coördinated with the Roman and Greek Catholic Church, on the one hand, and the Protestant churches on the other. Nor are our hopes for "Christian reunion in the mission field" as bright as those expressed by the author in an appendix on this theme, in which the "non-Episcopal" churches are invited to accept "the historic episcopate".

But we prefer to close this notice with a word of commendation. This recent issue of the International Theological Library deserves to be taken as our best English text book for the study of the history of modern Christian missions.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Dogma, Fact and Experience. By A. E. J. Rawlinson, Student of Christ Church, Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Litchfield; Formerly Tutor of Keble College, Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co. 1915. Crown, 8vo; pp. vii, 207.

This little book is one of the reverberations of the explosion which followed the publication of the manifesto of young liberal high-churchmen called *Foundations* (1913: cf. this REVIEW for July, 1913, pp. 526-538). Mr. Rawlinson was one of the contributors to that volume and had prepared an essay on *The Resurrection and the Life* to be inserted into a new and enlarged edition of it which was at one time in contemplation. That project having been abandoned, he has added four other essays to that one and has published them in this volume. The four additional essays treat of *Religion and Temperament*, *Dogma and History*, *Our Lord's View of the Future*, and *Clerical Veracity*.

The last of these essays is, of course, a defence of the ethical position of Liberal Churchmen in the Church of England, against the strictures of Bishops Weston and Gore (see this REVIEW, for October, 1914, pp. 529-585). The defence runs on the ordinary lines and amounts to saying that the *animus imponentis* is not strict, that everybody understands the situation and so nobody is deceived, and that so little has really been settled as yet as to Christian truth, or at least as to the Christian truth that is in dispute (after two thousand years!) that patience should be had for a little while with very varying forms of belief and modes of statement. The first essay is an appeal to us not to look upon religion as so entirely an emotion that it really depends on temperament, and people of a different temperament are incapable of religion. The second essay is an interesting examination of the inner meaning of Modernism. The two remaining essays, on *The Resurrection and the Life* and on *Our Lord's View of the Future*, are the most important.

The former of these, reversing Paul's method of explaining our resurrection by Christ's (which had occurred, been observed and therefore was well understood), seeks to explain away Christ's resurrection by the application to it of a theory of ours (which has not yet occurred, which has consequently not been observed, and which is comparatively therefore ill-understood). "The precise manner" of our Lord's resurrection, Mr. Rawlinson suggests, may profitably be left for the present undefined. Meanwhile as the Church has condoned Westcott's theory which disbelieves in the real existence of "matter" and represents our Lord as entering at what we call the resurrection "on another form of existence under new conditions" in which "His life formed a new embodiment"—why should it balk at other theories which allow, like this, no real resurrection of the flesh? Why should it balk, for example, at a view "which should combine the doctrine, upon the one hand, of a miraculous annihilation of our Lord's body in so far forth as it was a body of flesh and blood, with the assertion, upon the other, of

such a series of self-manifestations of the risen Lord to the disciples as Canon Streeter and those who think with him affirm?" To our Moderns any theory apparently is more acceptable than the plain fact of a genuine resurrection which is affirmed by its witnesses; even a miracle, it seems, may be called in if only it is not *this* miracle.

The essay on *Our Lord and the Future* undertakes to face the question whether our Lord was mistaken in His eschatological outlook. The difficulty of the question is not minimized; nor is the seriousness of the issue which it raises. "It is here, surely," it is remarked, "that the storm-centre of theological speculation resides at the present moment. It is probable enough that this, and not the controversy about miracle, will be for the next generation the great intellectual difficulty of the Christian religion." The various methods of dealing with the question which have been advanced are reviewed and then a new solution is proposed. It is this: Our Lord was a prophet, and prophets were accustomed in their outlook on the future to confuse immediacy with certainty. "The truth would appear to be that the prophets expressed in the terms of the proximity of the kingdom their assurance of its certainty. The prophet is neither clairvoyant nor soothsayer, and prediction is not the essence of his rôle. . . . His certainty assumes the form of immediacy, and it is psychologically inevitable that he should see the Kingdom as a thing that is near. It is within his horizon and a man's horizon is short. Three score years and ten is its utmost limit. And to the prophet the Kingdom is in sight. . . . They exhibit the ideal, not as something dim and remote and shadowy, but as something vivid and close at hand full of present inspiration and power." So, whether in the prophets or in the Creeds—or in the words of Jesus—"the certainty of the arrival of the Kingdom is expressed in the terms of an assertion of its proximity."

It is easier to criticize than to construct; and we think Mr. Rawlinson's criticism of others' explanations more successful than his attempt to construct an explanation of his own. There is Professor A. G. Hogg's explanation for example. According to Professor Hogg, Jesus gave expression in these statements to a genuine hope which He cherished, to a real will of God. But His own hope, God's will, hung for its realization upon the coöperation of men; and the coöperation of men has failed and so Jesus' hope, God's will, has failed too. The criticism on this representation is excellent. "Thus to make the Kingdom dependent for its consummation upon the attitude of man is in effect to put God at man's mercy; and to demand that men should have faith to believe that the Kingdom, even so, will one day come, is in the last resort to ask them to put their trust, *not* in God, but in their fellows and in themselves. That, surely, is to rob Christianity of its essential character as a faith, not in man, or in the faith of man, but in God."

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Mysticism in Christianity. By the Rev. W. K. FLEMING, M.A., B.D., of the College of Allhallows, Barking, E.C. London: Robert Scott; New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1913. 8vo; pp. x, 282. Bibliographies and Indices.

Mysticism and Modern Life. By JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM, Professor of Christian Theology in Pacific Theological Seminary; Author of "Christ and the Eternal Order", "Personality and the Christian Ideal", etc. New York and Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press [1915]. 12mo; pp. 256. Index.

These two books illustrate a movement of recent thought which both of them are eager that we should recognize as in progress. This is a movement towards a reawakened interest in Mysticism, and even toward a reversion to it as a satisfying religious point of view. Such a movement was for religious men inevitable in the prevalent decay of confidence in the Christian revelation. For Mysticism is religion, and supplies a refuge for men of religious mind who find it no longer possible for them to rest on "external authority"—as George Tyrrell both expounded and illustrated for us. Once turn away from revelation and little choice remains to you but the choice between Mysticism and Rationalism. There is not so much choice between these things, it is true, as enthusiasts on either side are apt to imagine. The difference between them is very much a matter of temperament, or perhaps we may even say of temperature. The Mystic blows hot, the Rationalist cold. Warm up a Rationalist and you inevitably get a Mystic; chill down a Mystic and you find yourself with a Rationalist on your hands. The history of thought illustrates repeatedly the easy passage from one to the other. Each centers himself in himself, and the human self is not so big that it makes any large difference where within yourself you take your center. Nevertheless just because Mysticism blows hot, its "eccentricity" is the more attractive to men of lively religious feeling. But it is just as scornful as Rationalism of the supernatural, of "external revelation", of historical foundations for religion. Face to face with the supernatural revelations recorded in the Christian Scriptures, it reduces them to "mystical phenomena", and assimilates them to the experiences of a Plotinus, or of a Sadi. Face to face with the historical foundations of Christianity, it treats them as symbols of transactions which take place within the souls of men. It is of the very essence of Mysticism to find God within the circle of the individual's experience. So soon as any other "way" of coming into "contact" with God is proposed than by sinking into ourselves, Mysticism is radically deserted. And because not the perception of God but God Himself is found in the human soul, and by implication in every human soul, God is ultimately confounded with the human soul: at his deepest depths man is God. No doubt, being a religion and not merely a philosophy, "unification" is presented by Mysticism as an achievement rather than as a postulate. And no doubt we may learnedly distinguish between Pantheism and Panentheism, between Pantheism and Negativism. All such efforts to escape from the coils of the serpent, how-

ever, are futile. Mysticism, in its fundamental basis of underlying conception, is just Pantheising Antisupernaturalism. And such it has shown itself—in greater or less purity of manifestation—in its entire historical development.

This is what Mysticism, with a capital M, is. Spell it with a lower-case m, and we may possibly broaden it out into only another name for natural religion. As it is religion, it is of course when so understood admirable. As it remains natural religion, it is equally of course, for fallen men, inadequate. Its relation to Christianity is that of natural religion to the religion of revelation. It goes without saying that it finds "for itself in Christianity a field of the richest and most fruitful soil." This is saying too little. We must say that only in Christianity can it attain its true development and complement. For Christianity is not an unnatural religion disputing the field of religion with natural religion. It is natural religion reinforced by supernatural republication and sanctions, and completed by the addition of what is needed for a religion for men in the unnatural condition induced by sin. It takes up natural religion into itself and gives it the power to come to its rights while it enlarges it by adding to it the supernatural religion needed for sinful man. But it goes equally without saying that mysticism, understood as natural religion, is not, in some of its less complete developments, confined to the soil of Christianity. Just because it is natural religion it is present wherever human nature is present and functions religiously; and we do not need Schleiermacher to teach us that there is no human self-consciousness which is destitute of the God-consciousness. Of course, then, "it has been at the root of any and every religion worthy of the name, in its original and indefectible 'feeling after God, if haply it may find Him'". Wherever man exists he is "in contact" with God; and wherever men are "in contact" with God they may "know" Him if only they will attend to Him "in contact" with whom they are. We may even use the word "know" in its full sense. We see no reason to dispute Plotinus' dictum that God to be known must be "seen" or "felt". If God be a mere hypothesis, however fully that hypothesis is verified, He can scarcely be said to be "known". That He is we may be sure; but to know that God is, is not yet to "know" God. We may acquire after a while good reason to believe that Mars, say, is inhabited: that would not warrant us in saying that we "know" the beings whose bare existence we have found reason to believe in. God is known only by those who being "in contact" with Him have looked upon Him with that eye of the soul to which He is visible. If this be mysticism, we are all mystics: not merely Augustine with his doctrine of the intelligible world and the *sensus internus* by which it is perceived, but Calvin also with his doctrine of the *sensus deitatis* which is the *semen religionis*. But it certainly is not Mysticism in any historical sense of that term.

The fault of books like those now before us is that they confound Mysticism (which is Pantheising Antisupernaturalism) with mysti-

cism (conceived as conscious living, moving and having our being in God) and then interpret Christianity in terms of the resultant confused idea. The effect is to desupernaturalize and dehistoricalize Christianity, and to reduce it to a merely natural religion, or rather to substitute merely natural religion for it. Christ is ranged with other masters; and the Christianity which He died to give to the world is explained as already in the possession of men before and quite apart from Him; as lying always, in fact, at the disposal of men in the depths of every man's own heart. This is the fundamental point of view which lies beneath and gives their ground-color to both of the books now before us, though it manifests itself in the discussions of each, of course, in a degree and manner of its own. Mr. Fleming's book is historical in form. Its task is to present a succinct account of the manifestations of Mystical thought and of the Mystical attitude in the historical development of Christianity. His mind is on Mysticism with a capital M, and he represents its presence in the Christian life and thinking of the ages as the saving salt by virtue of which Christianity has been made, and maintained, as a religion. Mr. Buckham's book has more the form of a discussion of principles. Some of the chapters which constitute it were written originally for separate publication and the unity of the volume suffers somewhat from this fact. But a sufficient internal unity is given to the whole by the common purpose, pervading all parts alike, to assimilate Mysticism and Christianity to one another. This assimilation is effected by first interpreting Mysticism in terms of Christianity—the stages of "the Mystic Way" for example are expounded in a fashion which may enable the Christian to "receive it" but scarcely the Mystic to recognize it as his own—and then interpreting Christianity in terms of Mysticism. What comes out as a result is something which is neither Mysticism nor Christianity, but a good deal more the former than the latter. Anti-doctrinal zeal is a fundamental trait of both books; their misprision of evangelical teaching and practice is marked; their hatred of Calvinism and all its works intense, though not very intelligible, or indeed even intelligent. Observe this list of names brought together by Mr. Buckham as not very commendable for the theology they represent: "Arius, Pelagius, Abelard, Dominic, Socinus, Calvin, the Westminster Divines, Priestly"!

It is interesting to observe what Mr. Buckham makes of Christianity in his determination to give it a common denominator with Mysticism. In one passage, he formally expounds "the essence of Christianity." We do not quarrel with him that, in his anti-dogmatic zeal, he seeks primarily the essence of Christianity as spiritual experience. What we quarrel with him for is the particular spiritual experience which he segregates as constituting the specific essence of Christianity. This he phrases as "a filial communion and coöperation with God, so deep and real as to transform life." Obviously, there is nothing specifically Christian in this. "This spirit came through Jesus", he says. But

then he adds immediately: "Not that it is absolutely new with Jesus." He adds again, indeed: "But it was so intense and fructifying as to exercise an almost"—this "almost" is intensely revealing—"creative influence upon those who came to share it with and through Him." But this does not remove the fatal fact that nothing exclusively Christian is discovered in "the essence of Christianity." Christianity may bring what it brings with a special poignancy of appeal; but it is a matter of degree not of kind after all. So Pelagius said that men could be saved apart from Christianity as truly as by Christianity, only they could be saved more easily under Christianity: just as a boat would convey you from Carthage to Italy by sail more easily to yourself than if you had to row it across—but you could row it across all right if you had to. Christianity is a good religion; no doubt the best religion; but you can do very well without it.

But, now, how did Mr. Buckham arrive at this remarkable "essence" for Christianity? By historical induction, it seems. "It is only as we grasp that which is common in Christian experience, in the first century and in our own, and in all that intervene, that we understand the essence of Christianity", he tells us. And then he tells us, that proceeding after this fashion he finds the essence of Christianity what we have seen. Did anybody ever reason with more delightful circularity? We presume that the spiritual experience of those alone who possess the essence of Christianity is truly Christian experience; and we presume equally that the essence of Christianity is the spiritual experience of those only who are truly Christians. We may know who are truly Christians by observing who have truly Christian experience; and we may know what truly Christian experience is by observing what is the experience of those who are truly Christians. Or, shall we say rather that the spiritual experience common to all who *call* themselves Christians is "the essence of Christianity"? If only a single man from the time of Christ until today who has called himself a Christian and has not been truly a Christian be included in this induction, the conclusion is vitiated. We should get not what is common to all Christians, but what is common to Christians and non-Christians. This is what has happened to Mr. Buckham. He gives us not the essence of Christianity, which is a specific religion, but the essence (from his point of sight) of religion. And that is the reason why after saying that this "filial communion and coöperation with God", to be Christian, must be "so deep and real as to transform life", he immediately, bethinking himself of the other religions with which Christianity is confounded in his thought, qualifies this and says of it that it is only "an *almost* creative influence".

We have noted that Rationalism does not lie any too far away from Mysticism. Mystics sometimes betray a tendency to Rationalistic turns of thought. Mr. Buckham does not altogether escape. Does God send trouble? is a question which seems quite to bowl over his attempt to interpret the universe in terms of God. In reporting the attitude of the Mystic towards "the disasters and ills" of life he interjects a

remark on his own account to the effect that these disasters and ills of life "are acts of nature rather than of God, or His only as belonging to a world that is His". What wretched dualism have we here? Mr. Buckham seeks to salve his defection by intimating that Mysticism at least does not go so far astray here as Evangelicalism—that *bête noire* both of himself and Mr. Fleming. "Evangelicalism", he tells us, "went too far" in the direction of attributing the dark and the storm to the sending of God and interpreting "the lightning javelins of fate" as "hurled by His hand". The Mystic has not urged, he affirms, that disasters are direct acts of God, and especially not that they have been sent with punitive intent: he has only endeavored to utilize trouble when it comes for his own purification and perfection. All this is obviously not only unevangelical, but irreligious, if we can make a distinction here. He who does not see the hand of God in all that befalls him is a Rationalist more extreme than even such an extreme Rationalist as Wilhelm Herrmann. He has not only torn God out of his heart (where the Mystic finds Him), but even out of the universe (where the mere Theist must see Him).

"The experience of the mystics as a whole", writes Mr. Buckham, "offers a striking exemplification of the saying of Christ as to the life of the Kingdom consisting in a *renewed childhood*." What saying of Christ is this? Mr. Buckham seems conscious that there is something wrong here; for he immediately adds, "Not that such a life has the weaknesses and limitations of childhood, but, rather, its vision, its faith, its confiding communion." Has childhood—infancy would be the truer term—"vision, and faith, and confiding communion"? The mistake here is not to be condoned merely because it has become so common. The kingdom of heaven is not an infantile estate in which the immature alone may be at home; nor is it a children's paradise. Men are not to renew their childhood in it, but to put away childish things. We rise not sink into manhood, and the kingdom of heaven consists not in reduced men but in enlarged men,—built up into the fulness of the stature of manhood in Christ. What our Lord said was not that life in the kingdom consists in a renewed childhood, but that no man can enter the kingdom save as an infant enters the world, naked and bare of all claim on his own behalf, utterly dependent on God for all and receiving all from His mere grace. It is to that state that we are to turn, humbling ourselves, if we are to enter the kingdom. To receive the kingdom as a gratuity from God is a very different thing, however, from using it as a *crèche*.

We may of course speak of a "mystical aspect of Christianity", and we may even speak of "the doctrine or rather the experience of the Holy Ghost", as "the real truth of mysticism". The term "Christ-mysticism" may have a good meaning. But in the ambiguity of the word "mysticism" all such modes of speech may also be gravely misleading. If it be true as R. C. Moberly said it was true, that "had only all Christians understood, and lived up to their belief" in the Holy Ghost, "they would all have been mystics", it is certainly not true, what he imme-

diately adds, "or, in other words, there would have been no 'mysticism'". All Christians not only might have been, or may be, but actually are "mystics" in the sense of the former clause: communion with God is of the very essence of Christianity: Paul tells us in so many words, that "if any man hath not the Spirit of Christ he is none of His". No man is a Christian who has not the experience of the indwelling Christ. But "Mysticism" is still with us and is another matter. This is a Pantheising anti-supernaturalistic religiousness which must not be permitted to come to us in the sheeps-clothing of "essential Christianity" on the ground that it is only another name for "spiritual inwardness." It is most decidedly something very different from that.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Christian Freedom. The Baird Lectures for 1913. By WILLIAM MALCOLM MACGREGOR, D.D., St. Andrew's United Free Church, Edinburgh. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1914. 12mo; pp. xii, 428. Indices.

In inviting Dr. W. M. Macgregor to deliver the Baird Lectures for 1914 the Trustees of the foundation called to that function for the first time in its history one not a minister of the Church of Scotland. The distinguished preacher whom they selected brought to the service asked of him an alert mind stored with rich culture. His exegesis is heedful and exact; his translations of the New Testament text are characterized by a delicate nicety which almost amounts to preciosity. The gleanings of wide and varied reading are poured out lavishly, in text and note, on the page. The delightful directness of the style and freshness of the presentation keep the reader ever in mind that he is in the hands of a gifted and practiced speaker. The preacher's habits of thought and speech are not wholly left behind. There is some over-elaboration. Paragraphs,—even lectures—have a tendency towards what seems occasionally undue extension. Even repetition is not always shunned: the frank avowal of its occasional presence made in the preface disarms criticism, but leaves the reader nevertheless in some surprise when he meets in the later pages of the volume illustrative extract after extract from the author's reading which he had already had the pleasure of perusing on earlier pages.

Dr. Macgregor takes the Epistle to the Galatians for his subject and conceives his topic, derived from it, to be "the priesthood of all believers". Written by a man whom he describes as "almost fiercely individualistic", the Epistle to the Galatians is to him "for all time the declaration of the profound significance of an individual experience of Christ". This is to him the same as to say that we have in our hands in the Epistle to the Galatians a Mystical document. For he finds the distinctive part of Mysticism in the assertion of the possibility of "a direct apprehension of spiritual realities", and its essential discovery, "that God can be apprehended not by logical reasoning but directly by the soul." Such an unhistorical and unreasonable identification of Mysticism and spiritual religion, like a thoughtlessly

flourished weapon, distributes destruction impartially on every side. By reducing Mysticism and spiritual religion alike to what is common to the two, it destroys alike all that is distinctive in Mysticism and all that is distinctive in spiritual religion. Among the results is a tendency on the one hand to make spiritual communion with God do the work of revelation and, on the other, to depreciate all that comes to us through revelation to others as received only "by tradition or at second hand". The effect is to abolish by logical consequence distinctively supernatural revelation, and with it of course ultimately that supernaturally revealed religion which we call Christianity. If we eliminate from Christianity all that comes to the individual Christian in this sense "by tradition or at second-hand", and throw him back entirely on what he obtains through his own communion with God, we have reduced him from a supernaturalistic to a naturalistic basis for his religion and we have reduced his Christianity to a natural religion.

With tendencies of this kind working in his mind, of course Dr. Macgregor sits loosely to the authority of the Scriptures. They can be to him at best only records of revelations granted to men of the past, which we can receive only by tradition or at second-hand; at worst merely records of the religious experience of dead men,—“foot-prints in the sands of time”,—normative to us only as any other worthy examples of religious experience may be normative to us. His allusions to Scripture everywhere suggest this point of view. “Even though an apostle takes a side” in a debate, that seems to him no reason why we should become partizans in it; “the writings of even Christ’s greatest servants bear traces of confusions which He, by implication, condemned”; and “the story of the development of law and worship in Israel”, “in which everything is attributed to Moses, though at a hundred points what is enjoined transcends and even traverses the old teaching”, provides only the most conspicuous example of an instinct illustrated by others of the Biblical writers also. Paul was a “various teacher” (the English here seems as much at fault as the theology); he did not possess “the arid virtue of logical consistency”; his arguments “are sometimes no arguments at all”; he is even sometimes “less than fair”; there were present in his mind “curious backwaters of prejudice through which the tides of new thought and feeling did not run”,—and by these he was often involved in contradictions, laying down rules of conduct quite inconsistent with the more advanced position at which, in his deliberate thinking, he had arrived. Witness, for example, those precepts of his about women: how can they be conciliated with his “great assertion that in Christ there is neither male nor female”? “Much of his argumentation about the election of Israel in Romans ix. x. xi. is really indefensible. Such an outburst, for example, as that in ix. 19-20 is not logic, it is violence.” . . . But enough! There is a great deal of this kind of thing scattered up and down through Dr. Macgregor’s pages, and it makes it perfectly plain how little he is inclined to make the letter of Scripture—or its substance either—authoritative for his “faith and practice”.

He does not even allow that the religious experience which finds record in the Scriptures is normative for the Christian man, in any absolute sense. There is, he asserts, no "universal standard of experience"—or rather he asserts that there is no need of such an assertion, it goes without saying. "The freedom of a Christian man contains the freedom to think as God, in experience, has taught him". "In experience", that is, in his own experience, not in Paul's, say,—for Paul had his own experience and you have yours, and you are just as much entitled, just as much bound, to follow your own experience, as he was to follow his. And so Dr. MacGregor puts in a formal plea for diversity of Christian experience. There is no single type of experience which can be pronounced alone legitimate. The application which he immediately makes of this general pronouncement is to deny on its ground the necessity of what we know as the Evangelical experience of conversion. His plea is that there are many genuinely religious men who have not experienced this conversion. "These men", he even suggests, "are the strength of our churches on the institutional side." All "clean souls", he urges, tend to come to Christ, at the last: and those who come—by whatever path—should be welcomed. He does not seem to be keeping fully in mind here that he is dealing with a question which is not only very old but fundamental, and which Jesus Himself has answered for us (if, that is, even Jesus can answer anything for us). Jesus said that He came to call not the righteous but sinners. "Clean souls" cannot be denied the right to a religion: just because they are "clean souls" they will certainly have a religion. But the Christian religion is not for them: it is exclusively for sinners. And sinners can come to Christ over one pathway only: Jesus Himself again plainly declared that: "I am not come to call the righteous, but sinners to *repentance*." That is to say the evangelical way to Christ is the sole one which is Christian. On an earlier page we had read Dr. Macgregor as rebuking Dr. McGiffert for suggesting that some men are in need of "grace" and others not. "If any one in that age", the age of Paul, remarks Dr. Macgregor, "had suggested as Dr. McGiffert has done in ours, that the need of Divine grace is a peculiarity of selected individuals, Paul would despairingly have brushed him aside as a man without understanding." We now see that the rebuke was not intended for Dr. McGiffert but for Paul. In his narrowness, Paul was "less than fair to the religion which he had renounced; and just as we would not take unchecked Luther's account of mediaeval Christianity, so we must not hastily widen out Paul's estimate of the effect of the Law." No doubt some grace is necessary for everybody: grace is the fundamental thing. But Paul's experience was entirely his own and we are not entitled to make it a Procrustean bed to break everybody to. The legitimacy of diversities in religious experience carries with it, of course, the legitimacy of diversities in Christian doctrine. Dr. Macgregor does not decline to "follow on" to this issue. "The admission that no one type of experience alone is legitimate", he says, "may be held to imply that no single type of doctrine alone is

lawful." And then he goes on to declare, as we have already seen, that "the freedom of a Christian man contains the freedom to think as God, in experience, has taught him." In his own experience, that is: there is to be no external authority for him and therefore no single type, as of experience, so of doctrine. How far Dr. Macgregor would carry such teaching remains, of course, a question. To carry it a single inch is meanwhile thoroughly out of line with the New Testament. The New Testament writers knew but one saving Truth: that came to men not from within but from without: and it was to each man to whom it came an "inviolable deposit", which it was his duty to guard in its purity.

As to the contents of this "deposit" it is quite possible that Dr. Macgregor from his point of view would feel less interest in that than we do, from ours. He feels sufficient interest in it, however, to inquire at least what Christianity is, in its general conception; and he seeks light here by throwing together as he says, "some general descriptions of what Christianity implies, taken from modern scholars of different schools". The differences in school between the scholars appealed to, however, is not wide. They are five in number,—Herrmann, Harnack, Wernle and Wicksteed, all liberals of the liberals, with Dr. Lewis F. Stearns as one mediating theologian thrown in for good measure. Of course we can get no conception of what Christianity really is from these men; though equally of course, Dr. Macgregor can say that what they agree in is contained in Christianity: "In these things the Church is at one." The Church is at one on the being of God, and the existence of Jesus, as a religious teacher, and these five men's agreement will not go much further than that. Dr. Macgregor might have thrown his net wider and included a Mohammedan among his teachers without decreasing greatly the area of their agreement; if he had thrown it wider on the other side and included, say, Paul, he still would not greatly have increased it. Here is a place where we do not seek a consensus, but choose our leaders. We choose Paul. Dr. Macgregor tells us that with Paul "Christ holds the central place". But that is not enough to say. It is not Christ *simpliciter* which holds the central place with Paul but Christ as crucified. Paul tells us at least that he determined to know nothing in Corinth but Jesus Christ and Him as crucified and he recoils with horror from glorying in anything but the cross of Christ. In the nearest to a formal *credo* which he has "delivered unto" us,—a *credo* which he tells us he did not invent for himself but himself "received", and which he tells us was the universal *credo* of the church as known to him, preached by all its accredited teachers and accepted by all its recognized members—he makes everything revolve around the death of Christ for our sins and His rising again. There is no hint of the cross which Paul thus places at the center of Christianity in any of "the general descriptions of what Christianity implies", which Dr. Macgregor cites: the nearest they come to it is a vague allusion to a "mediation" or a "con-descention" on the part of Christ! Yet Jesus Himself, whom one

might suppose to be the fountain-head, declared with great emphasis that the purpose of His coming was just to give His life a ransom for many. None of Dr. Macgregor's descriptions include that in the religion which He founded by means of this mission. One of them indeed (Wernle's) is near to expressly excluding it: "Jesus raised His disciples to be children of God without a word being heard about redemption."

In Dr. Macgregor's exposition of Paul's teaching there is a manifest shifting of the emphasis from the objective to the subjective. He even tells us that Justification was not thought of first of all as *in foro coeli*; that was a theological afterthought, "which has ministered comfort", it is significantly added, "to minds of a certain type." In the first instance Justification was an experience,—“a pure experience of the mercy of God, breaking in upon their hearts. *Justificatio vivificatio est*; it is a legal word for a religious experience.” Strange, then, that Paul always speaks of it not as an experience of man but as an act of God and expressly distinguishes it both from pardon and from vivification! But perhaps the thoroughness with which the subjectivation of Paul's teaching is carried out, may be better exhibited by observing its working in a less central matter. Take this phrase: "His claim to be considered an apostle was based on the one fact that, with the eyes of his heart, he had seen Jesus." Paul does not in this connection speak of having seen Jesus "with the eyes of the heart", but with the eyes of the flesh. Broadening the reference, the "revelation from above," which is the significant phrase in all this discussion, is distinctly not a personal subjective one which every servant of God may look for and receive, but a general objective one which lies historically behind us all: and the Society of Friends do not stand out preëminently as having accepted Paul's principle. Of course it is true that "the ministry of the word is not to be a dragging chain with link holding simply by the next link and thus" only through a long chain, "coming at last to the throne of God." It does "at every step depend on God directly, on a Divine call and Divine instruction and Divine illumination". Without this there can be no valid ministry of Christ. But equally without the historical revelation of God in Christ there can be no valid ministry of Christ. To substitute that for this is merely substituting Mysticism for Christianity: Christianity is built now as ever on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the chief corner-stone. Dr. Macgregor thinks, it is true, that Paul did not lay much stress on the office of Apostle: "on the mere dignity of his office, Paul never laid much stress", he says, and he supports his saying by an appeal to 1 Cor. xv. 9. We should have supposed it difficult to exaggerate Paul's stress on the dignity of his office. What does he leave unsaid that could be said to make the office of Apostle great in the eyes of his readers? Of his personal fitness for this great office he makes nothing; but of the office itself he makes everything. When he declares himself the least of the Apostles, not worthy to be called an Apostle, he is not belittling the office, but

exalting it. And speaking as an Apostle, he did not merely venture to advise men, he commanded them; he did not merely invite them by his example to freedom of thought, he imposed a definite faith upon them.

The Epistle to the Galatians is a charter of Christian freedom. But it does not exempt the Christian man from all authority in religion. Paul did not claim such freedom for himself: he does not offer it to others. Dr. Macgregor does good service in defending a proper individualism in religion, and in focussing attention upon what may perhaps be called the mystical element in Christianity. But it is easy to press this beyond the mark. Paul was not a Mystic; and Christianity is not Mysticism. Only ruin lies in the road which many apparently are eager to tread, that leads from Christianity with its fundamental external authority to a Mystical repudiation of external authority. One of the most interesting passages in Dr. Macgregor's lectures is the defence of Mysticism which occupies the latter part of the third lecture,—the introduction of which is defended on the ground that Paul lays such stress on the direct apprehension of God, when "He ceases to be an object and becomes an experience" that it may be well to examine Mystical experiences and to consider what they mean. The defense may not be managed quite wisely but none will question that it is carried on graciously, with numerous citations, of instances and with fine insistence that if Mysticism is to be Christian, it must be "Christ-Mysticism", with the figure of the crucified Jesus at the center of its vision. It seems a pity, however, to call things so diverse by the same name. The distinguishing of things that differ is, according to the Apostolic dictum, a Christian charism. After all said and after all done, Christianity and Mysticism are not merely different but antagonistic and mutually destructive religions. They are not different names for the same thing, nor are they complementary halves of one thing: they are mutually exclusive things. The one is natural religion; the other supernaturalistic to the core. The one admits no authority exterior to the individual spirit; the other, in all the peculiarity which makes it Christian, depends entirely on authority. There can be no commerce between such contraries: there should be no confusion between such contradictories.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

"A Great Counterfeit." "Two Men and Russellism." By I. B. HALDEMAN, D.D., New York: Charles C. Cook, 150 Nassau Street. Paper, 12mo; pp. 39, 64. Ten cents.

Both of these brief books are written in answer to the erroneous teachings of the self-styled Pastor Russell. The full title of the first is "A Great Counterfeit, or the False and Blasphemous Religion called Russell-

ism and Millennial Dawnism." The second is an imaginary dialogue which traverses much the same ground as the first of these books. The spirit of both is severe and polemic, but seems to be warranted by the perversions of truth quoted from the series of books entitled "Studies in Scriptures." Among the teachings referred to are those which suggest that Christ is a created being identified with the arch-angel Michael; that Christ never rose from the dead; that his second coming is to be dated from 1874; and that there is no future punishment for the impenitent. Such reviews with exposures of this false teaching are certainly needed at the present time.

"Religion and the Mind." By PRESIDENT GEORGE RICHMOND GROSE. New York: Abingdon Press. Paper, 12mo; pp. 112. 75c net.

The vital question as to the relation of Christianity to culture is here discussed by one who, as President of DePauw University, has had an opportunity of close contact with students, and who knows the need of communicating to them a rational faith, and of offering to them a religion of the mind as well as of the heart. He discusses "Education as a Religious Obligation," "Intellectual Liberty," "The Limitations of Knowledge," and related themes, in a sane and thoughtful spirit, with directness and clearness of expression. Most of these chapters appeared in the Adult Bible Class Monthly in a series entitled "Christ in the Intellectual Life." In their present form they will probably reach a wider circle and prove to be of increased helpfulness.

"The Seven Great Parables." By MR. GEORGE NEEDHAM. New York: Charles C. Cook, 150 Nassau Street. Paper, 12mo; pp. 47. Ten cents

The parables of Matthew XIII are here reviewed by a careful student of Scripture. Some of the interpretations may appear fanciful but the general discussion is illuminating and helpful. Special stress is laid upon the dispensational implication of these familiar and illuminating parables.

"The Three R's of Rescue Mission Work." By PHILIP I. ROBERTS. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. Boards, 12mo; pp. 63. Thirty-five cents net.

The three R's to which the author refers are ruin, rescue and recovery. Under these captions, in three brief chapters, he gives a graphic picture of the aims and methods of Rescue Missions. The book is a strong testimony to the power of divine grace to save in the name of Christ the most helpless and hopeless.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Princeton, N. J.

"What God Hath Joined Together." By MALCOLM JAMES MACLEOD, Minister of the Collegiate Church of St. Nicholas, New York: George H. Doran Co. 1915. pp. 230; \$1 net.

The thought of the title is carried through the eleven sermons which make up the volume: Seed and Harvest; Evangelism and Personality;

Strength and Beauty; Trust and Peace; Faith and Fearlessness; Religion and Simplicity; Fidelity and Reward; Righteousness and Satisfaction. The motto of the book might be the words of the son of Sirach—"And so look upon all the works of the Most High, and there are two and two, one over against another."

The style is clear and agreeable, the thought wholesome and helpful. A marked characteristic is the profuse, sometimes excessive, use of illustrations, drawn from a wide range of reading and experience. Sometimes we wish that the thought were more closely woven, and not so frequently broken by quotations. Illustrations maybe so abundant as rather to conceal than to illumine the truth.

Recent events furnish a singular commentary upon the statement that "the German mind is dreamy" (p. 149). The text of the last sermon is cited and interpreted according to the erroneous rendering of the A. V.—"As for me, I will behold thy face in righteousness: I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness" Psalm 17:15. It is a bold saying that "there are no real difficulties in religion"; for religion is defined as "a knowledge of God" (p. 174). Are there no difficulties involved in our relation to him? Bible students will be surprised to learn that the Bible "has come down to us from the very twilight of time, older than the Pyramids, older than Homer, older than Cadmus. The Book of Job existed before Cadmus brought his letters into Greece" (p. 84).

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

Princeton.

"*Vision and Power.*" BY JOHN A. KERN. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1915. pp. 395. \$1.50 net.

The tenth and eleventh chapters of the Acts are taken "as a thread of guidance and suggestion for a study in Christian preaching." The seventeen chapters are entitled The Man; The Housetop; The Vision; The Interpretation; Visions and Vision; Vision of Nature; Vision of Man; Vision of Jesus; The Opportunity; Enlargement of Opportunity; Power though Evangelic Truth; Power though the Personality of the Preacher; Power of the Indwelling Spirit; Effects of Power; Certain Signs of Power; The Way of Power; The Confession. We have a series of meditations based upon careful exegesis and exposition. The book is marked by freshness and vigor of thought, a devout and earnest spirit, grace of style, and abundant and appropriate illustration; and is an admirable example of that blending of the intellectual, the emotional, the spiritual which is essential to the adequate interpretation of the Scripture.

A few errors may be noted. On p. 106, note, *John* should be *I. John*. On p. 262 we find *vāyathós* and on p. 263 is what appears to be a sadly garbled quotation from Campbell's noble ode, Hallowed Ground.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

Princeton.

Ethical Readings from the Bible. By HARRIET L. KEELER, A.M., LL.D., formerly of the Cleveland Public Schools, and LAURA H. WILD, B.D., Professor of Biblical History and Literature, Lake Erie College. 8vo; pp. ix., 79. New York, Chicago, Boston: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915.

It is the purpose of this attractive booklet to supply for our public schools "a supplementary reader," containing at least an outline of the ethical teaching of the Bible. "The passages interpret themselves and are the common ground upon which people of all phases of religious faith rest for their ethical ideals." "It is hoped also that these selections may be used more widely than merely in our schools. There are many public occasions when words from the great seers of truth are a fitting prelude to the service of song or the address of the hour, when the few moments of 'opening exercises' might be profitably directed toward some definite and practical ethical teaching."

This purpose is admirably fulfilled. The mechanical make-up of the book could not be improved: to see it is to wish to open it, and to open it is to read it. The passages chosen are well selected: they are ethical rather than dogmatic; they are appropriate to their designed occasions; they interpret themselves; they are so free from religious bias that the baldest theist could not take exception to them; and not so much as once is there mentioned the name of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

Yet it is just this that raises in the mind of the reviewer the question whether there should be any place for such books as this. On the one hand, it may be claimed, as it is, that non-Christians may not object to the use of such a reader in our schools; for it presents only "the common ground upon which people of all phases of religious faith rest for their ethical ideals: and that Christians themselves have no reason for opposition; for what is given is taken directly, without alteration or comment, from what they hold to be the "Word" of their God. Ought not all parties, therefore, to welcome so authoritative and so attractive a presentation of the more important precepts of the highest morality? On the other hand, however, the thoughtful Christian cannot but be troubled in this connection by at least the following misgivings.

1. Is it right to detach, as this and like volumes must do, certain parts of God's Word and present them out of the setting which he has given them? Is not this to change their meaning or at any rate their emphasis, and may we do that with what we hold to be *the* message of our King? Of course, it can be objected that this is what is done every time that a minister chooses a text and preaches from it. Yet if he understands his business, he is careful, first of all and above all, to interpret his text in the light of the context, and then it is one thing to call attention on a single occasion to a text because the limitations of time forbid a larger subject, and it is quite another and a different thing so to publish and to use a certain kind of Bible-teachings as that attention shall be directed to them as if they were the only or at

least the most appropriate kind. Is not this to take a liberty with God?

2. Aside from the impropriety just noticed, is it wise to take this liberty? Does not ethical teaching require a dynamic, if it is to be carried out? and must it not be detached from its dynamic if it is presented in isolation? It is the cross of the Gospel which makes the ethics of the Gospel effective. Ethical readers like that before us may inspire admiration in the thoughtful for "the Sermon on the Mount," but only the love revealed on Calvary can constrain them permanently to practice it. Hence, Paul was careful to give as the basis for his ethical teaching in the Epistle to the Romans twelve chapters on the deepest things of Christian dogmatics. In a word, the little book before us impresses us as would a machine without an engine; there is nothing to run it. Could anything be more unwise, not to say foolish?

3. What could be more unsafe than such folly? To become accustomed to ethical teachings and accustomed at the same time to leaving them unpracticed—this, as every psychologist knows, is the destruction of morality. The machine that is not worked rusts. The engine that propels it is necessary to save it. That is, to detach the ethics of the Gospel from its dogmatic setting must issue at last in its repudiation. No less than this is the danger which we cannot help seeing in such books as "Ethical Readings from the Bible."

The reviewer must remark in closing that the most palpable, as well as the great, defect of this little volume is its omission of the "Ten Commandments."

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Princeton.

GENERAL LITERATURE

Goethe with special consideration of his philosophy. By PAUL CARUS.

185 portraits and other historical illustrations. Chicago, London:

The Open Court Publishing Company. 1915. I, pp. 357. \$3.00 net.

In a very handsome, not to say pretentious volume, printed in beautiful type on highly calendered paper and profusely illustrated with photogravures to which, among a host of others, Könnecke's *Bilder-Atlas*, the *Publications* of the Goethe Society, Simm's illustrations in Hallberger's edition of *Faust* and Kaulbach's well-known paintings with their false note of overelegance, have made contributions, Paul Carus, the inveterate maker of books and the editor of *The Open Court* and *The Monist* has offered a presentation of Goethe with the special purpose of bringing out those features of his life which characterize him as a thinker, or perhaps better, a philosopher.

In a democratic society, there is, we suppose, a place for many different kinds of books and every study of a great poet, like Goethe, which keeps alive interest in his works and spreads saner views of his conduct and ideas, is to be welcomed even when no great contri-

bution is made to the sum of our knowledge. But it is hard to see just what place Carus' book is intended to fill and just what he has offered that could not have been offered in a much briefer and more appropriate form. By far the greater part of this work consists of quotations from the current English translations of Goethe's *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, his *Wilhelm Meister*, his letters, conversations with Eckermann, and his *Faust* and shorter poems, interlarded with the familiar anecdotes of the biographers. The total impression is, therefore, not that of a scholarly, sympathetic and synthetic study of Goethe's views of man and the world, but rather that of a collection of materials—materials, too, nearly all of which are elsewhere accessible to the English reading public.

It is true that Carus' attitude toward the poet is the sympathetic attitude of a modern evolutionist. The author has also translated into English, for the first time, a few of the minor poems and tells us, in his concluding paragraph, that "his book is not intended to exhaust the entire field, but to serve as an introduction to the poet's work and to set forth in general outlines the significance of his world conception in the literature of humanity". But it is just in this last respect that the book falls far short of what Goethe himself has given us in his writings. Without logical coherence, without some historic syntheses, without some new angle of vision from the viewpoint of contemporary thought, without some new light to throw upon the relation of Goethe's philosophy to the life of the present, an author, in a work of this kind, does not get far, particularly when his materials are drawn chiefly from works which have already been known to readers in the vernacular for over a generation and a half. This method of putting a book together by gathering everything that a great writer has had to say about a given subject has been a popular one in Germany for the last decade, and some of the passages quoted are drawn from a book of a similar kind on Goethe's philosophy by Heynacher as the author, on page 214, acknowledges. But such works put together "with scissors and paste" to use Lessing's phrase, leave no coherent impression and we doubt if the general reader derives as much real pleasure and profit from them or as good an idea of the poet's philosophy as he would from reading the poet's chief works in their entirety. Scholars, who are familiar with the works on Goethe's "Weltanschauung" by such writers as Steiner, Schrempf and Bouck are sure to find such a book as this fragmentary, sketchy and incoherent, while the most that it can do for the general reader is to arouse enough interest to induce him to turn to the poet's works themselves. A satisfactory treatment of Goethe, the man, the poet, the thinker it does not contain.

The most significant feature of Carus' book is the sympathetic attitude it evinces toward Goethe, the man and thinker. The old polemic attitude toward the poet, with its hackneyed charges of immorality and heathenism, begun by Wolfgang Menzel in Germany, repeated in this country by Longfellow and his successors and reëchoed only a few years ago by Prof. Charles Harris in a paper on *Goethe's Love Affairs*, read before the Modern Language Association, has been left

behind, we hope, forever, even in works intended for popular consumption. With justice Carus points out that the worst we know about Goethe the poet has told us himself. Neither the efforts of his enemies nor the minute researches of impartial investigators since, have been able to add anything more damaging to the poet's reputation. While no sensible man today wishes to palliate Goethe's sins a bit more than those of King David, the historic spirit as well as the charity which thinketh no evil, demand that our judgment on the worst that we know about him should be tempered by a recognition of the wide difference between the social and moral atmosphere of a New England village in the early nineteenth century and that of a German patrician city and a petty German court in the eighteenth, dominated as the two latter were by the French influence of the day. Puritan moral standards will never form the just measure for Goethe, the man, in the intimate personal relationships which grew out of his numerous love affairs.

The same holds true of his religious and philosophic views. Unlike Lessing, Goethe took no real vital interest in the bitter controversies over theological dogmas which abounded in his time. He had passed beyond them as something unprofitable and barren. Not only were logic, dialectics and abstractions in general repugnant to his whole aesthetic nature but he positively disliked analytical and critical investigations of any kind. In his positive and constructive thinking he had already grasped the great idea of "development" or evolution, the idea which has dominated the thinking of men since the latter half of the last century. The poet always objected, perhaps for aesthetic reasons, to that separation and opposition of the soul and the body, which had been begun by Plato and which, in the form of a conflict between the spirit and the flesh, had been so emphasized down the centuries by the Christian Church. To Goethe this procedure was contrary to the very order of nature which does not conceal but reveals the Deity. A generation like our own, therefore, which is wont to regard, as a tangent away from the true orbit of intellectual progress, the last great idealistic movement in philosophy beginning in Kant and ending in the nebulous abstractions of Hegel, which sees modern biological and psychological science both endeavoring to bridge the gap to which Goethe so emphatically objected, can hardly refuse now to do the poet historic justice.

That he was not an orthodox Christian, according to the formulated creeds of the churches, goes without saying. But on the other hand he was not an anti-Christian; at most, he was an anti-dogmatist. He believed in the soul, in its persistence after death and in God, however widely his conceptions differed from traditional and popular views. He loved and cherished the Bible and confessed that to it alone he owed his moral culture; and in the last year of his life he asserted that the human soul, however much it may expand, will never surpass the moral culture and sublimity of Christianity as it gleams and shines in the Gospels. Goethe's general position was not very different from that of many Christians at the present day who have never stopped to

formulate their own creeds in theological terms and all of whose actual thinking is carried on with ideas developed under the influence of modern scientific and sociological teaching. Carus has done, at least, some service in presenting Goethe's religious ideas from the viewpoint of evolutionary philosophy.

It would not be worth the trouble to point out the various passages in Carus' work where the scholar or critic might be led to take exception to the author's statements. As Carus relies chiefly on translations of Goethe's own words the question resolves itself into one of interpretation, a difficult problem from the viewpoint of systematic philosophy or theology, as Goethe always preferred the sense-perceptible image to the abstract formula and expressed his ideas in different figures and images at different times. But we do not see the appropriateness of inserting the translation by H. Stevens of six of Gellert's hymns in an account of Goethe's personality. We do not believe the poet was ever seriously influenced by these watery effusions and what he really owed to Gellert can be learned much better from the seventh book of *Dichtung und Wahrheit* where the poet has done complete personal, as well as historic, justice to that lachrymose professorial worthy. Just as little do we see the need of three different translations by three different translators of the same sonnet on page 268-269. Its importance to the text hardly warrants this procedure and a discussion of Goethe's views of literature and criticism is scarcely the place for a display of the translator's talent unless some question of interpretation is involved. Finally we must emphatically demur to the author's statement on page 264-265 in which Lessing is grouped with the Storm and Stress poets. The great critic's bitter, not to say coarse, remarks on Goethe's *Götz von Berlichingen* found after his death and written when the Storm and Stress fermentation was at its height, show that Lessing never had any sympathy with this wild individualistic reaction although his own previous critical and productive efforts were, no doubt, in part its cause.

The really new that Carus' book has to offer consists in the translation by the author of a number of shorter poems by Goethe which hitherto have not been done into English. Neither the content nor the significance of these poems is sufficient to alter or even to modify our ideas of Goethe's philosophy. They only follow his chief lines of thought as found in his *Autobiography*, his *Faust*, his poems on the *Metamorphosis of Plants* and of *Animals*, and in some of his scientific articles. Carus has undoubtedly done some service in making these accessible to English readers, but still we do not see the need of creating, typographically speaking, such an elaborate, expensive and pretentious book in order to attain this end. There should certainly be some appropriate relation between the external character of a book and its content. If the author had embodied these poems in an article with appropriate introductions and had engrossed what he really had to say himself in the form of an essay, he would, in our opinion, have done the poet as well as the reading public a greater service.

The book is provided with a complete list of illustrations and a good alphabetical index.

Princeton University.

JOHN PRESTON HOSKINS.

Recht und Schuld in der Geschichte. Rede vor der Universität Tübingen am 27 Januar 1915, an Geburtstage des Kaisers. Von D. A. Schlatter, Professor in Tübingen. Gütersloh. Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1915. (Beiträge zur Förderung Christlicher Theologie, XIX, 1.) pp. 24.

In this address delivered before the University of Tübingen on the anniversary of the Emperor's birthday (January 27, 1915) Dr. Schlatter makes certain observations in regard to the war and specifically in regard to the new emphasis which it has thrown upon the ethical factor in the shaping of history. That the nations are animated in this gigantic conflict by what appears to them the cause of righteousness and appeal to the ideal, ethical interests, which they believe themselves to be defending, in justification of their course of action, is in his view an eloquent witness to the reality and primacy of the responsible human will, with its alternative choice of right and wrong, in determining the historical process. As will be seen from this, the address is in no sense a flamboyant war-document, although, of course, it voices a very ardent patriotism and a strong conviction as to the merits of the conflict from the German point of view. Dr. Schlatter makes his observations not as a patriot primarily, but as a calm, philosophical observer of the great historical movement that is taking place. He is fair enough not to confine the ethical signature which, at least subjectively, the conflict bears, to his own side, but freely recognizes its presence in the mind of the British nation, which he calls "the strongest and most venerable of our opponents," and even in the revanche idea of the French he does not ignore the quasi-ethical ingredient. But his main contention is, that the war as a historical phenomenon has discredited the modern treatment of history as determined almost exclusively by involuntary, physical, social, and economic forces. The "majesty of history" as residing in its essentially ethical complexion stands once more revealed. Not the historians of intellectualism or culturism, but the historians of ethics, like Treitschke and Carlyle have at present the ear of the people.

Also the theory, characterized by the author as of Hellenic provenience, of the preponderant influence of individual genius in shaping historical issues, receives according to Dr. Schlatter scant support from the experience of the present struggle. Not the individuals, but the broad ranks of the nation itself stand back of the movement.

There is undoubtedly considerable truth in these observations. The war has had a clarifying effect in regard to the principle that only ideal and moral interests of the highest nature can ever justify such a fearful catastrophe from the standpoint of human responsibility. This may be obscured, but it cannot be altered by the fact that both contending parties claim for themselves with equal emphasis the championship of the right. So far as they do so sincerely their appeal to the ethical stand-

ard is a sincere tribute to the supremacy of ethics in all human affairs. And even so far as it is done insincerely, and the national or individual conduct is unethical under ethical pretense, the tribute still retains its impressiveness. Much has been said about the religious awakening which the solemn experiences of the war have produced among the several nations involved in it. Paradoxical though it may seem, along the line of Dr. Schlatter's reasoning a parallel hope may be expressed in regard to ethical results.

Less convincing appears to us what the author says about the norm by which the ethical consciousness awakened to a new sense of its own reality and importance ought to be measured. Dr. Schlatter is disinclined to conceive this norm with the necessary objectivity. He thinks the norm should be viewed in the closest contact with and dependence on historical developments, and seeks in this way the solution of the problem that the contending nations appeal to the same norm. What he characterizes as "geschichtslose" and therefore "grundlose Ethik," owes its origin, according to his mind to Hellenic philosophy, and is a companion-product to the epistemological method, which relies on abstract concepts and not on concrete observation as a source of knowledge. This comparison seems to us out of place. Even in the theoretical sphere the norm is not found by mere induction, but given in part a priori so that it confronts us with objectivity and from the religious point of view acquires the character of revelation. Even more so is this the case in the moral sphere, where the abnormality of sin requires a greater objectivity of standard. No appeal to the internalized ethics of Jesus or Paul can in any way alter this fact. The nations of Europe have themselves in their conduct of the war furnished the most convincing evidence of the fact that humanity has not outgrown the need of an objective rule of right and wrong. The test of rightness which Dr. Schlatter proposes, viz. that a line of conduct, in order to be ethically justifiable, must be "gemeinschaftbildend" is in that general sense entirely inadequate. Whether an action or line of conduct promotive of national social coherence is right or wrong depends not on its adaptation to that end, but on the character and aims of the communal body, which it seeks to promote or preserve, and this character must in each case submit to the objective judgment of the law of God. We fear that through applying this subjectivized norm to the historical judgment, the latter is in danger of coming again under the influence of those unethical drifts of historical science against whose influence the author issues his earnest warning and for which he hopes that experience of the war will bring a needful corrective.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

Princeton.

The Universe as Pictured in Milton's Paradise Lost. By WILLIAM FAIRFIELD WARREN. New York and Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press. 8vo; pp. 80. 75 cents.

This book is an attempt to assist readers to gain a realization of the beauty and glory of the world in which the stately epic of Milton

moves. The author is well qualified, by his studies in the earliest cosmologies, to present the cosmography of "Paradise Lost".

Since the descriptions of the poem are so complex, and the products of a mighty invention, the complexity being especially prominent in the references to the universe in which the various scenes are laid, "one cannot hope to harmonize to a nicety every detail; for the poet is often studiously vague, piling up incongruous terms in order to better suggest the inexpressible."

A prime requisite in studies like this, according to the author, for the scientist as well as for the student of literature, is "a constructive space-measuring and space-filling imagination".

The essential features of the universe as pictured in *Paradise Lost*, are presented in ten brief paragraphs, showing that Milton presented in his poem the traditional geocentric conception of the universe, a motionless earth and eight homocentric spheres, essentially the same that we find in Plato and Ptolemy, with the addition of the Crystal-line and the Primum Mobile. Three spatially distinct regions are found in the poem; Heaven, Hell and Chaos, and the limitless space in which these regions coexist has centre and poles. Hell-gate is "plumb-linearly" beneath the gate of heaven. Originally the polar axis of the earth was perpendicular to the plane of the Zodiac, when all days were equal and spring was perpetual; but the fall of man brought about the obliquity of the earth, with its consequent change of seasons, and the days of unequal length.

Apart from these clear inferences, there remain some subordinate questions, more or less cosmographical, for whose solution the data presented in the text of the poem seem inadequate, *e.g.*, The Bridge, constructed by Sin and Death; the Circumfluous Waters; the Quadri-furcate River of Eden; and the Cosmographical Location of Milton's Garden of Eden.

Diagrams to illustrate the theses, by the author, and also by Masson, Himes, Sprague and Orchard add to the interest of the book.

The discussion will be of interest to the admirers of Milton; references to the poem are abundant; and students of Milton will be aided to "reproduce in imagination the localities and dramatic movements set before them" in his masterpiece. The author is guarded in his reference to the Biblical system of cosmography in the days of Milton, when he says, "the Bible, *as then interpreted*, had made sacred the Ptolemaic, or rather the "so-called Alphonsine cosmology" in which Milton had been instructed.

Keller, Ga.

HENRY RANKIN.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, January: ALFRED BERTHOLET, Pre-Christian Belief in the Resurrection of the Body; ROBERT E. HUME, Hinduism and War; A. H. LLOYD, Incarnation: an Essay

in Three Parts; ARTHUR C. WATSON, *Logic of Religion*; CARL S. PATTON, *Miracles and the Modern Preacher*.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, January: ALBERT H. LYBYER, *The City of God*; JOHN F. GENUNG, *Inner History of the Chaldean Exile*; E. S. BUCHANAN, *The Lost Christ*; H. W. MAGOUN, *Ought Followers of the Galilean Be Pacifists?*; ALBERT W. MOORE, *Why the Raising of Lazarus is not Reported by the Synoptists*; W. F. LOFTHOUSE AND H. M. WIENER, *The Criticism of the Pentateuch*; HAROLD M. WIENER, *Text of Genesis 31*; JAMES LINDSAY, *Some Methods of Theological Criticism*.

Catholic Historical Review, Washington, January: OWEN B. CORRIGAN, *Chronology of the Catholic Hierarchy in the United States*; J. C. FITZPATRICK, *Preservation of Ecclesiastical Documents*; V. F. O'DANIEL, Right Rev. Richard Luke Concanen, the First Bishop of New York; N. A. WEBER, *Rise of the National Catholic Churches in the United States*.

Church Quarterly Review, London, January: O. C. QUICK, *Self-Sacrifice and Individual Immortality*; L. W. KING, *Recent Babylonian Research and Its Relation to Hebrew Studies*; G. H. RENDALL, *The Problem of 2 Corinthians*; J. WICKHAM LEGG, *The Roman Liturgy and Its Roman Critics*; ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, *The Holy Catholic Church*; ROBERT VAUGHAN, *'After His Resurrection'*; WILBERFORCE JENKINSON, *Westminster Abbey and St. Margaret's*; W. R. MATTHEWS, *Mr. Balfour as a Religious Philosopher*.

Constructive Quarterly, New York, March: I. I. SOKOLOFF, *Orthodox Church of Constantinople*; ROBERT E. SPEER, *Some Aspects and Problems of Missions in the Far East*; FRIEDRICH NIEBERGALL, *Prayer and the Answer to Prayer*; J. T. F. FARQUHAR, *The Holy Eucharist*; T. R. GLOVER, *Immortality and the Person of Jesus Christ*; REINHOLD SEEBERG, *Fundamental Characteristics of New Testament Christology*; CLEMENT BESSE, *Intellectualist Theodicy in France*; JUNIUS B. REMENSNYDER, *The Basic Call for the World Conference on Church Unity*; RICHARD ROBERTS, *Catholicity and Nationality*; ERNEST ROCHAT, *Christianity a Unifying Power in War-Times*; BENJAMIN W. WELLS, *Archbishop Theodore*.

East & West, London, January: E. H. WHITLEY, *Ancient and Modern Pantheism*; S. L. THOMPSON, *Our Attitude toward Hinduism*; J. O. NASH, *Education Problems in South Africa: A Pioneer Missionary in Burma*; J. C. K. ANSTEY, *Vernacular Training in India*; MARGARET WILSON, *Position of Women in South Africa*; CANON BULLOCK-WEBSTER, *Missionary Aspect of the New Scheme of Church Finance*; *Conversion of France*.

Expositor, London, January: W. A. CURTIS, *The New Testament and Its Interpretation for our Time*; MAURICE JONES, Dr. Kirsopp Lake on the "Stewardship of Faith"; J. M. THOMPSON, *Composition of the Fourth Gospel*; A. E. GARVIE, *Judgment in the Fourth Gospel*; W. ERNEST BEET, *The Map as an Aid to Preaching of the Old Testament*; W. F. LOFTHOUSE, *Mosaic Codes and Popular Hebrew*

Religion. *The Same*, March: J. E. McFADYEN, Isaiah and War; RENDEL HARRIS, Who Sent Apollos to Corinth?; A. VANHOONACKER, The Servant of the Lord in Isaiah 40 ff.; T. H. ROBINSON, A Study in Inverted Commas; J. E. McFADYEN, The Mosaic Origin of the Decalogue; BERNARD H. TOWER, St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, January: Notes on Recent Exposition: H. MALDWYN HUGHES, Anti-Zealotism in the Gospels; STEPHEN H. LANGDON, Sumerian Epic of the Fall of Man; J. BONNAR RUSSELL, The Object of the Fourth Gospel; R. MARTIN POPE, Studies in the Pauline Vocabulary. *The Same*, February: Notes on Recent Exposition; ALFRED PLUMMER, Christian Agnosticism; JOHN BEVERIDGE, The Sun Song of Iceland; R. H. STRACHAN, Is the Fourth Gospel a Literary Unity? *The Same*, March: Notes of Recent Exposition; H. A. A. KENNEDY, Alleged Paulinism of First Peter; R. H. STRACHAN, Is the Fourth Gospel a Literary Unity? DAVID CONNOR, Did Uziah Die by Lightning?

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, January: CRAWFORD H. TOY, Thomas Kelly Cheyne; GILBERT REID, Confucianism, An Appreciation; JOHN F. MOORE, Ethics in Modern Business; JOHN P. PETERS, Hebrew Psalmody; NORMAN WILDE, Scepticism and Faith in the Philosophy of Pascal; FRANCIS A. CHRISTIE, The Diary of an Old New England Minister.

Hibbert Journal, Boston, January: GOBLET D'ALVIELLA, On Some Moral Aspects and Issues of the Present War; FREDERICK POLLOCK, The "Fight for Right" Movement; J. W. DIGGLE, Against Departmental Religion; A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON, Mr. Balfour's "Theism and Humanism"; CHARLES A. MERCIER, Vitalism; GEORGE T. LADD, The Human Mind vs. the German Mind; M. E. ROBINSON, The Definite Failure of Christianity and How It Might Be Retrieved; WILLIAM A. BROWN, Is Christianity Practicable?; E. ARMITAGE, The Incompetence of the Mere Scholar to Interpret Christianity; J. V. SIMPSON, Religion in Russia To-Day.

International Journal of Ethics, Concord, January: JAMES P. HALL, The Force of Precedents in International Law; AMOS S. HERSHEY, Neutrality and International Law; HAROLD C. BROWN, Human Nature and the State; G. A. JOHNSTON, Morals and Manners; ELSIE C. PARSONS, When Mating and Parenthood Are Theoretically Distinguished; MARY W. GLENN, The Interdependence of Family Relationships; JAMES H. TUFTS, Ethics of the Family; C. D. BROAD, Prevention of War; HOMER B. REED, Ethics of Competition.

Interpreter, London, January: F. R. BARRY, Patriotism and Apocalyptic; L. W. GRENSTED, Atonement and War; R. H. KENNETT, Korah, Dathan, and Abiram; C. J. CADOUX, Ethics of a Hebrew Lawyer; H. H. B. AYLES, Origin and Date of the First Gospel; H. D. A. MAJOR, Future of Christianity as Affected by the War; BUCHANAN BLAKE, Teaching of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel; ALBAN G. WIDGERY, Morality and Religion.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin, January: GARRETT PIERSE,

Catholicism and Culture; DENIS J. O'DOHERTY, Irish Augustinians in Spain and the Philippines; M. J. O'DONNELL, Quasi-Domicile; Historical Development of the Idea; HUGH POPE, Origen and the Biblical Question; JAMES MACCAFFREY, Position on Irish Catholics under James I.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, January: SOLOMON T. H. HURWITZ, Pygmy-Legends in Jewish Literature; HARTWIG HIRSCHFELD, Fragments of Sa'adyah's Arabic Pentateuch Commentary; ALPHONSE MINGANA, Syriac Versions of the Old Testament, SAMUEL DAICHES, Explanation of Isaiah 27:8; ISRAEL FRIEDLAENDER, Present Position and Original Form of the Prophecy of Eternal Peace in Isaiah 2:1-5 and Micah 4:1-5; JACOB MANN, Jesus and the Sadducean Priests.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, January: H. ST. J. THACKERAY, Song of Hannah and Other Lessons and Psalms for the Jewish New Year's Day; F. J. BADCOCK, Council of Constantinople and the Nicene Creed; A. C. CLARK, Primitive Text of Gospels and Acts; B. T. D. SMITH, Apollos and the Twelve Disciples at Ephesus; H. G. EVELYN-WHITE, The Second Oxyrhynchus Saying; J. MEARNs, Anthologia Graeca Carminum Christianorum.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, January: J. E. WHITEKER, What Lutheran Christianity Has Given and Has to Give to America; E. F. KRAUSS, The Theological Seminary as a Factor in Modern Church Life; GEORGE DRACH, The War and Foreign Missions; HUGO W. HOFFMANN, Gothic Version of the Bible; J. F. OHL, The Music of the Common Service and the New Hymnal; HUGO W. HOFFMAN, Struggle for Christian Truth in Italy; W. C. POOL, Keeping Ministers Young; LEANDER S. KEYSER, The Regulative Principle; Its Relation to a System of Doctrine; WALTER KRUMWIEDE, The Rescue Mission; I. CHANTRY HOFFMAN, "Man's Wounded God" C. THEODORE BENZE, Lutheran Church in Germany; JOHN C. MATTES, Luther's Attitude in the Peasant's Revolt; GEORGE M. STEPHENSON, Conservative Character of Martin Luther.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, January: EZRA K. BELL, The Old Land-Marks; HENRY E. JACOBS, The Changeless Faith and Changing Conditions; DAVID H. BAUSLIN, Rev. Michael Wolfe Hamma; DAVID H. BAUSLIN, Dedication of Hamma Divinity Hall; ANDREW G. VOIGHT, Full Assurance of Faith; B. F. PRINCE, Theological Education in Wittenberg College; FREDERICK G. GOTWALD, Theological Education in the Lutheran Church Prior to the Founding of Wittenberg College and Seminary in 1845; J. A. SINGMASTER, The Seat of Authority in Religion.

Methodist Review, New York, March-April; GRAFTON T. REYNOLDS, Charles W. Smith; JAMES R. DAY, Restore Our Episcopacy—Final Article; JOHN L. NUELSON, The Foreign Policy of the Methodist Episcopal Church; GEORGE P. MAINS, Book Concerns Dividends for the Younger Ministry; W. F. OLDHAM, Was It Only a Dream?; PARKES CADMAN, Archbishop Cranmer and the English Reformation; C. G. SHAW, Thomas Hardy and the Ancient Anguish of the Earth;

T. B. NEELY, *The General Conference—What It Is and What It Should Be*.

Methodist Review Quarterly, Nashville, January: FRANK M. THOMAS, Doctor Gross Alexander; DAVID LUBIN, National Marketing and Rural Credits; J. C. CALHOUN NEWTON, Sin and Atonement; LI TIEN LU, Present Situation in China; LOVICK P. WINTER, Charles Wesley in America; W. W. PINSON, Christian Unity and Co-operation; FREDERICK F. SHANNON, *The Minister's Dictionary*; ROY L. SMITH, Cyprian, the Ezra of the Christian Church; ISIDORE LEWINTHAL, *The Origin and Growth of the Synagogue*; W. K. TATE, *The Country Church*; WILLIAM HARRISON, *Those Excommunicated Laymen of Palestine*.

Monist, Chicago, January: RAFFAELLO PICCOLI, Carlo Michelstädter; PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, Philosophy of Mr. Bertrand Russell; A. H. GODBEY, *The Hebrew Tithe*; THEODORE SCROEDER, *Intellectual Evolution and Pragmatism*; JULIUS J. PRICE, *Jews of China*.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, January: E. L. COBLENTZ, *The Home Base of Home Missions*; WILLIAM J. HINKE, *In Memory of Rev. John Waldschmidt*; A. B. KOPLIN, *Christian Baptism*; JOHN L. BARNHART, *New Testament in the Light of Greek Papyri*; EDWIN W. BOWEN, *Cleopatra, the Ill-starred Queen of Egypt*; JOHN B. STOUTT, *Rev. Michael Schlatter in the Lehigh Valley in 1747*; A. S. WEBER, *Contemporary Religious and Theological Thought*; GEORGE F. MULL, *Dr. Stahr and Franklin and Marshall College*; GEORGE W. RICHARDS, *Dr. Stahr and the Reformed Church*; THEODORE F. HERMAN, *Dr. Stahr and the Reformed Church Review*.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, January: HENRY W. CLARK, *False Mysticisms and Christianity*; O. O. FLETCHER, *The Existence of God; A Study of Religious Consciousness*; W. T. CONNER, *The Formal Factor in Christianity*; JOHN W. WEDDELL, *The Savor of Evangelicalism*; W. W. EVERTS, *Adolph Schlatter on Three Types of Theology*; N. J. MECKLEM, *Did Jesus Repent?*; GEORGE R. BERRY, *Purpose of Book of Ecclesiastes*.

Union Seminary Review, Richmond, January: R. A. WEBB, *Second Coming of Christ*; CHARLES R. ERDMAN, *The Coming of Christ*; E. C. GORDON, *Christ's Kingdom of Glory*; A. T. ROBERTSON, *The Priesthood of Christ, A Book Study of Hebrews*; E. C. CALDWELL, *The Ideal Brother, A Book Study of Philemon*; WILLIAM DINWIDDIE, *Modern Study of Mind*.

Yale Review, New Haven, January; BROOKS ADAMS, *American Democratic Ideal*; GEORGE V L. MEYER, *Our Navy in the Event of War*; ANSON P. STOKES, *The Question of Preparedness*; JOSIAH ROYCE, *The Hope of the Great Community*; *Invading Alsace,—A French Officer's Account*; A. F. POLLARD, *The War and the British Realms*; HUC-MAZELET LUQUIENS, *The Post-Impressionistic Revolt*; HANNA A. LARSEN, *Four Scandinavian Feminists*; BUELAH B. AMRAM, *Swinburne and Carducci*.

Bilychnis, Roma, Ottobre: C. ROSTAN, *L'oltretomba nel libro VI*

dell "Eneide"; S. BRIDGET, Per la storia di un terribile dogma; IVAN LIABOOKA, Le origini dei Battisti in Russia; T. FALLOT, Sulla soglia; P. CHIMINELLI, Una santa laica; Teresina Ravizza. *The Same*, Novembre-Dicembre; I. W. CARLIOL, Il monopolio in religione. Pan ecclesiasticismo e Pan-germanesimo; IVAN LIABOOKA, I nuovi orizzonti della teologia ortodossa russa; La teologia dell 'adommatismo; Ille Ego, Che ne è del "Modernismo"? o meglio; che cosa fu il "Modernismo"?; GIULIO NATALI, Il pensiero religioso di Giuseppe Parini: Eduardo Tagliatela, Morale e religione; GIOVANNI E. MEILLE, Intorno all 'immortalità dell 'anima; ERNESTO RUTILI, Vitalità e Vita nel Cattolicesimo. *The Same*, Gennaio; GUGLIELMO QUADROTTA, Religione, Chiesa e Stato nel pensiero di Antonio Salandra; EDUARDO TAGLIATATELA, Morale e religione; MARIO FALCHI, Affinchè Essi non siano morti invano; FERRUCCIO RUBBIANI, Padre Gazzola; ROMOLO MURRI, Christianesimo e Storia.

La Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Noviembre-Diciembre; J. G. ARINTERO, Son místicos todos los Santos?; RAYMUNDO MARTIN, El problema del influjo divino sobre las acciones humanas un siglo antes de Santo Tomas de Aquino; A. COLUNGA, Amarás á tu prójimo como á ti mismo; Yo soy Jahweh; SABINO LOZANO, El "Discurso sobre el método" de la filosofía católica. *The Same*. Enero-Febrero; FRANCISCO MARIN SOLA, Melchor Cano y la conclusión teológica; J. G. ARINTERO, Son místicos todos los Santos; J. M. VOSTÉ, Vió San Paolo á Jesucristo; Anhélos de unidad; LUIS G. A. GETINO, Don Juan Menéndez Pidal.

Gereformeerde Theologisch Tijdschrift, Heusden, Januar; A. G. HONIG, Een Schets van het leven en de werkzaamheid van Alexander Vinet, en van zijne beschouwing van het geweten: G. ELZENGA, Catechisatie; J. C. RULLMANN, Kroniek. *The Same*, Februari; G. CH. AALDERS, Hugo Winckler, de vader van het Pan-babylonisme; C. LINDEBOOM, "Die na mij komt, is voor mij geworden"; G. CH. AALDERS, Organisatie der verstrooide Gereformeerden in Indie.

Lehre und Wehre, St. Louis, Dezember: Bible und Morallehre in den öffentlichen Schulen; Lutherischer Bund und Allgemeine Ev.-Luth. Konferenz; Luthers Kleiner Katechismus. *The Same*, Januar: Lehrbasis der Generalsynode seit 1913; Bibel und Morallehre in den öffentlichen Schulen: Die Anglikaner und der Weltkrieg. *The Same*, Februar: Das sprachliche Studium des griechischen Neuen Testaments; Lehrbasis der Generalsynode seit 1913.

Theologisch Tijdschrift, Leiden, XLIX:6: FELIX ORTT, Studies in het grensgebied van natuur- en godsdienstwetenschap; L. N. DE JONG, Schets eener vrijzinnig-christelijke levensleer; H. J. TONOPUS, Mattheus 11:11; F. W. GROSHOEDE, Nog eens Mattheus 1:16. *The Same*, L: 1: L. KUIPERS, Het natuurlijk zedelijk bewustzijn; R. MIEDEMA, Twee Oostersche Martyrologieën.

Theologische Studiën, Utrecht, XXXIII:6: C. F. M. DEELEMANN, Eene nieuwe uitgave van Lucianus' geschrift De morte Peregrini; J. DE ZWAAN, Literatuuroverzicht. *The Same*, XXXIV: 1en2: TH. L. W. VAN RAVESTEYN, God en Mensch in Babel en Bijbel; F. E. DAUBANTON, Ter inleiding tot de Didaktiek des Nieuwen Verbonds (VI).

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